This guy is exceptionally good! I listen to a lot of civil war and world war II documentaries on the commanders the battles and the situations that create these wars. Often I will let the documentaries run it in the background, but I was not able to do that here. His crossover especially between the commanders ie Lee Longstreet, Yamamoto, Yamagoto, the overall strategy versus the on-site tactics are posed so quickly and with so much depth that just listening in the background doesn't cut it. Really a superb piece that I will have to watch a number of times before it all sinks in. I'm going to go find other talks this guy has given and listen to them because he knocks it down bigly!, 😲

The stern plate of Enterprise is in a park in River Vale, N.J., not at city hall. It is across the street from a ball park and next to a library which has a nice display on the ship inside. Enterprise's bell is in front of Bancroft Hall at the U.S. Naval Academy and one of its anchors is at the Washington, D.C. Navy Yard. Some portholes from CV-6 were installed in the next Enterprise, the first nuclear-powered carrier. The portholes are to be installed in the next Enterprise, currently under construction.

No excuse for failing to give the man a hand held wireless or wireless lapel microphone to give his presentation with. Clearly he knows what he is talking about. He put forth a wealth of information. I suggest that with the technology available at the time of this - there should have been someone manning the camera to zoom in on the maps and charts when Robert Rubel was speaking about a particular place on the map - which would have also made his laser pointer visible. Regardless of the technical glitches - I did enjoy and appreciate the lecture.

Very proud of you my dear son luet commander Deon Henry of st Vincent and the grenadine lots of love and God's blessing

Thanks for sharing this, please share more. thank you.

Good work here. A defective tactical deficiency when delivering a talk is walking away/staying away from your microphone during the talk. A learning moment. I enjoyed the theories, and explanations for them. Thank you for this.

@marjoriedavidson4538

4 жыл бұрын

Bud Fields Right On! This comment cements the instruction in my memory by a most prudent example.

@refuge42

2 жыл бұрын

He does deliver his ideas rapidly and sometimes it's hard to hear. Sort of like a machine gunner who doesn't let up on the trigger until the barrel is melting down. Gettysburg and Midway are two favored battles which I have looked at closely, and so has he. Thus I was able to follow many of his quick references and allusions but only just barely. I especially like his crossover between battlefield tactics and war strategy. Great stuff he really knocks it out of the park.!

Videographer(s) should be praised for showing Dean Rubel's slides: Rubel obviously went to some trouble to add a pictorial element, and the excellent presentation is enhanced by the videographer(s) skilled inclusion of those slides. Rubel's comparison of the United States commanders' and forces' tactical and operational effectiveness, as demonstrated at Gettysburg in July 1863 and at Midway in June 1942, is quite illuminating. One of the important things to remember about Midway was that the US Navy's June 1942 victory was fought and won substantially by the most modern elements of Navy which was already in place when the war began. The ships were those which were already built and worked up. The US Navy's carrier-launched aircraft at Midway were, for good and for ill, types which were in service when the war began. The sailors, airmen and officers were, by and large, those who were already trained and in service in December of 1941.

Well done!

I regretfully disagree with Prof. Barney regarding Yamamoto Isoroku, and his decisions regarding decisive battles. There has been a chronic over-estimation of Adm. Yamamoto's Pacific war strategy, and the effectiveness of the Japanese Navy. As military historian Jonathan Parshall argued on the same stage, Yamamoto lost the war when the first bomb struck Pearl Harbor. At issue, ultimately, was not any decisive battle, but Japan's ability to survive in the face of American and allied political will coupled to overwhelming superiority of material and human capital. Parshall argues that Yamamoto's end game, as we are now coming to understand, was the occupation of Hawaii after a victory at Midway. This, he believed, would force the U.S. into a negotiated settlement. His strategic reasoning was faulty, but not absent as Prof. Rubel argues. Parshall suggests that even Yamamoto's often vaunted assessment of Japan's long term inability to overcome a continental power, with its concentrated access to resources and human capital, failed overwhelmingly in its assessment of American (and Allied) political will. I would add further that Yamamoto's assessment of his own ability to effect change in the Japanese war cabinet was faulty as well. He failed to recognise that Japan's early successes, particularly at Pearl Harbor, and the overwhelming victory against a large American field army in the Philippines would feed the war mythos already endemic in Japan's leadership. These early victories convinced the War Cabinet that Japan was capable of genuine, lasting victory over the United States, China, Gt. Britain, Australia and even the USSR because of the inherent superiority of Japan and the Japanese military. This misapprehension survived early Japanese failures at Midway and Guadalcanal where an Army dominated War Cabinet disregarded the losses as the result of failings of individual commanders, or more broadly as a "Navy Problem." More importantly, even had Yamamoto won both at Midway and again in a final reduction of Hawaii, Japan could not have won, not only because of America's material superiority, but because his nation's political leadership would have insisted on continuing the war in the pursuit of an ever larger Japanese hegemony. We know, from good evidence, that assaults on Australia, India and the USSR were on the table..

I never could be a commander. I would have demanded a submarine guard band from north to south in a half circle/half ring about 150-200 mile radius of Midway to scout for trouble. It is still crazy not to have a plan for a replacement scout plane if one has a mechanical problem.

The guy doing the "opening" was wrong. Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders took off fron USS Hornet. USS Enterprise WAS there as support, but no bombers left her decks as all sixteen were aboard Hornet.

Surely wish the pictures/maps could have been more clear.

The Japanese and even the Americans still thought of battleships as the main strike force. It would make sense to the Japanese of the day to use carriers as scout/skirmishers, even though they should have known better since they were mostly winning using carriers, not the big battleships both admiralties were in love with. The Americans only "saw the light" regarding carriers because we essentially HAD no battleships available.

The "Liddell" in Liddell-Hart is pronounced like "little."

Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were excellent in analyzing how to run a war. Hideki Tojo and AH did not follow the advice of those two historians.

Doolittle took off from the Enterprise? Huh, someone didn’t do the assigned reading.

Great presentation! Excellent analysis. But ..... smooth bore musket 200 yards just ain't right. Very lucky at 50 yards. Just saying

Schwarzkopf in Desert Storm did what the UN mandate told him to do. Taking over the control of the whole nation of Iraq was not his mission. That was clear to even the lowest ranked soldier. Having the capability is different from having the authority to do so.

@marchess286

3 жыл бұрын

I think he was referring to 2003

I heard my whole american life about Gettysburg and Gen Lee. Then I finally went there. Standing in Gettysburg's and looking across to Harrisburg was when it finally dawned on me that Gen Lee was a total failure. What the Rebel leader should have done was march into Harrisburg and burn, rape and pillage the city and then run back into Virginia. Instead Lee did the stupidest thing he could which was to stand, fight and ultimately die in Gettysburg. Nothing about Gettysburg and Midway make sense to compare to each other. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was the burning of Harrisburg Lee should have done and in the end the Japanese were chased all the way back to their home islands where they were burnt like Atlanta and Sherman's march to the sea. The only comparison should be that the Japanese were no better at winning a war as was the South. The only thing both did well was in starting a war... They both did that great. But the truth of war is maybe this... If you want to win, you best be ready to march directly into the enemy capital, burn it and kill all it's leaders right after you fire the first shot of a war.

I disagree with this argument. It is really southern apologist.

@marchess286

3 жыл бұрын

how so?