It seems the easiest thing for Ike to have done is told Monty "I don't want to hear about any major offensive until you've taken the Schelt and cargo is coming through Antwerp". I can't figure why he didn't say that.

@dmbeaster

Жыл бұрын

He was also seduced by the presumed utility of paratroopers. Montgomery's goal was Berlin, which Eisenhower knew was nonsense, but Eisenhower was persuaded that a crossing at Arnhem could enable a prompt seizure of the Ruhr which was not far away, and could end the war promptly. Eisenhower discusses this in his memoir.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Because it would have been a stupid thing to say. Even Eisenhower couldn't get to four-star General by being that daft. Eisenhower endorsed Market Garden because it fitted in with his broad front policy of advanccing to the Rhine with all armies and then crossing it at multiple points. He was happy to delay the opening of Antwerp because to do so would require a delay in 21st Army Group's advance to the Rhine. By advancing to the Zuider Zee and cutting off all German forces in the Netherlands, Market Garden would help the clearance of the Schedlt to open up Antwerp. Eisenhower didn't accept that analysis, because he wasn't as smart, but he did approve the operation because it met his own immediate objectives. What Eisenhower rejected outright was Montgomery's narrow thrust to Berlin proposal.

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

@@dmbeaster . Berlin was never on the cards , Berlin had been given to the Russians by Roosevelt at the Yalta conference!

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

Market Garden was not Montgomery's operation! Montgomery planned operation Comet but cancelled due to his intelligence finding panzer units in the area of operations! Eisenhower insisted that the operation go ahead and handed the operation to Brereton USAAF! Montgomery's only contribution to Market Garden was supplying tanks !

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@garythomas3219 - that's not the way I read it. Montgomery cancelled Comet because of the evolving intelligence picture and on the same day met with Eisenhower at Brussels airport to argue again for his narrow thrust to Berlin, which Eisenhower rejected. He did endorse Montgomery's presentation for Market Garden, which was the three division upgrade of Comet, because it fitted in with Eisenhower's broad front front strategy of all armies advancing to the Rhine. "I pointed out that Antwerp, and the approaches to the port which we had not yet got, lay behind the thrust on the left flank which I had advocated on the 23rd August - nearly three weeks ago. There were two possible plans - Bradley’s and mine… The quickest way to open up Antwerp was to back my plan of concentration on the left - which plan would not only help our logistic and maintenance situation but would also keep up the pressure on the stricken Germans in the area of greatest importance, thus helping to end the war quickly… It was obvious that he disagreed with my analysis. He repeated that we must first close to the Rhine and cross it on a wide front; then, and only then, could we concentrate on one thrust… But Eisenhower agreed that 21 Army Group should strike northwards towards Arnhem as early as possible, and he admitted that successful operations in that direction would open up wide possibilities for future action." (The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (1958) - Chapter 15: Allied strategy North of the Seine) Market Garden was Montgomery's operation because 1st Allied Airborne Army (Brereton) was subordinated to 21st Army Group (Montgomery) for the operation, but the only parts involved were I British Airborne Corps and British 2nd Army. Brereton's people were involved in the detailed air planning because it involved the American Airborne and Troop Carrier Commands, and it was a combination of planning for cancelled operations Comet for the operational area and Linnet for the airlift.

They should have given Patton the ground element of the operation Speed and aggressiveness is right up his alley.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

So what would Patton have done differently when he gets to Nijmegen and find the bridges still in German hands and not the 82nd Airborne's?

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

Speed and aggression worked when he was chasing a routed army, it didn't work when he was confronted by dug in troops that fought doggedly.

@nickdanger3802

Жыл бұрын

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Who was bogged down on the east coast of Sicily while Patton took most of the island?

@nickdanger3802

Жыл бұрын

@@davemac1197 So what happens when he gets to Arnhem and finds a few hundred men who are out of ammo, food and water?

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

@@nickdanger3802 In that campaign, Patton disobeyed Supreme Command's orders to protect Monty's flanks and turned the entire campaign into a race. Between Patton and Monty, Patton ultimately won... but it violated the original plan and was fuelled by Patton's own ego. The Germans had abandoned that territory except for scattered Italian units while they concentrated on holding up the main British assault and keeping the ports open so they could withdraw their forces.

Being the Germans it just made sense to have your best troops guarding the Ruhr

@burnsmatkin9606

Жыл бұрын

They were there to refurbish, repair and rest not to defend. The bridge was far, far behind the front.

@lewcrowley3710

Жыл бұрын

@@burnsmatkin9606 The Germans , by this time in the war, knew any unit, anywhere was subject to a ALARM, and could be deployed. No vacations unless at home. Your point, possibly moot, is taken as such.

@markjones464

Жыл бұрын

War is like in Generals minds a Big Game of Chess , if your troops need Rest and Rebuilding it make sense to Put them well back , but also in position That they blocked the Ruhr , it not the First Time the British Reckonise a weak spot ( Churchill said the Turks were weak underbelly ) it Happen in Italy , Weak Underbelly , as I said it Game of Chess . Got wrong Again , The part that makes me Sick is , we Talking about Men's lives It not a Game of Chess !!!! Ps I think we all Watched the movie a Bridge to Far , the part it has the German General makeing the Decision were to Put the Troops is made for the movies We Don't now there Reasoning , but it bit more than just put them there , The Germans new the importants of Bridges And production (Rhur)

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

But it also makes sense to flank around a line of defences ( the West Wall) and not bash head on into them in a frontal assault.

@norwayitalo

Жыл бұрын

hardly the best units

Well, XXX Corp got to a certain bridge on time. It should of been taken, but was not. We all know the bridge and who was in charge of taking such.

Market Garden was NOT the heaviest defeat in Europe That was the Battle of Hurtgen Forrest almost 3 times the casualties of Market Garden

@nickdanger3802

Жыл бұрын

Hurtgen Forrest 19 September - 16 December 1944 Market Garden 17-27 September 1944

@johnbox271

11 ай бұрын

The Battle of Kiev - The Soviets lost four field armies, forty-three divisions, and 452,720 soldiers.

@jacktattis

11 ай бұрын

@@johnbox271 Yes they took the brunt of the enemy

@jacktattis

11 ай бұрын

@@nickdanger3802 Yes Nick and ??????

@nickdanger3802

11 ай бұрын

@@jacktattis And blomee fuk wit.

A combination of the Germans being incredibly lucky and the Allies being too overconfident in victory... which would cause problems again a few months later. Also, fun fact: General Gavin, for whatever reason, believed the bridge at Nijmegen to be a secondary objective. He was convinced a large German force would attack the heights. At the time of landing, only a handful of Germans were guarding bridge, and by the time Gavin sent a force to take it, they arrived roughly at the same time as the 10th SS.

@tankmaker9807

Жыл бұрын

Fun fact, the fire and munition explosions on the Arnhem bridge, and the troops left by Grabner, prevented Frost from taking both ends of the bridge. Once Frost was stuck on the north end, and unable to engage with the Germans on the south end, the operation was over. All the Germans had to do was blow up the end of the bridge they had control over, and 30 Corps wasn't crossing. None the less, could have, would have. We will never know.

@darth_elsa6681

Жыл бұрын

@@tankmaker9807 that I didn't know

@tankmaker9807

Жыл бұрын

@@darth_elsa6681 Col. Frost's report on the Arnhem bridge is on the net. I found it a few months ago. He describes his men getting fire from an armored car on the south end of the bridge during the attempt to cross and take both ends. There is a lot missing from movie (which is a really good movie over -all), including some Germans trying to cross the bridge during the evening and getting wiped out. All in all a waste of some fine young men.

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

The collapse of the broad front strategy

@dmbeaster

Жыл бұрын

Gavin did not "believe" that. He was specifically ordered by Browning and others that the Groesbeek Heights were the most important objective, and the Waal bridge secondary after securing the Heights. Most of his force was dropped at the Heights, with the Waal bridge being the most distant objective. Remember that Browning also dropped there, and was overall commander above Gavin. Allied planners believed that the greatest danger to the plan were German forces across the border at the Heights. German control of the Heights interdicts the road and bridges, and wrecks the offense. Artillery on the Heights dominates the area. And significant forces did attack Gavin at the Heights during the battle just as anticipated, resulting in fierce fighting for the Heights. Gavin on his own sent a spare battalion promptly to the Waal bridge. They got to the bridge with the same timeliness that the 1st got to the Arnhem bridge. They were dropped too far from the Waal bridge to exploit the small number of troops in the immediate area. And just like at Arnhem, SS troops that were not supposed to be there promptly deployed to protect both bridges. Only Frost's tiny force made it to one side of the Arnhem bridge, which could also have been blown at any time by the Germans. Model ordered both bridges not be blown at the outset unless subject to imminent capture. In any event, the Germans just blow the Waal bridge if subject to capture. It was pre-wired for demolition. Ironically, later when subject to capture, the Germans did try to blow it, but something in the interim had disrupted the charges. There are different accounts as to how it was disrupted, but it seems clear that the delay caused by fighting also saved the bridge. The idea that the offensive would capture all bridges intact was stupid from the beginning since the plan did not include any effort to drop close enough to permit a coup de main as to any bridge (except perhaps at Graves, which was Gavin's idea). The plan was done very hastily, and the drop zones far from what was needed. They promoted locations that would maximize a successful drop, and the drops were highly successful, but not where needed to give the plan any hope. The plan also assumed minimal and disorganized resistance, which was proven very untrue. It took only modest resistance to wreck the plan.

they brought the wrong bloody crystals

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Affected two VHF radios sent to Arnhem with the USAAF Fighter Control Teams. Don't let the hype hang you up.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

*R. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September (London, 1990), p.231-233* on the 1st day of the landings the Hohenstauffenn captured a British Officer in possession of the ground marking instructions to indicate drop zones

@jamesroachjr4074

2 ай бұрын

Crystals? I think I missed that.

@zillsburyy1

2 ай бұрын

@@jamesroachjr4074 for the radios

Even Patton thought Montgomery was overrated his biggest screwup where many men were killed with market garden they knew there was panzer divisions that were located there before they even did the first drop and if the Germans discovered the plants in a crashed glider it was never any hope for success what a horrible waste of men and equipment on a mission that was failed from the beginning

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

Not Montgomery's operation! Brereton USAAF carried out Market Garden!

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

The 1st Airborne Division and Polish Brigade took more anti-tank guns to Arnhem (83) than the Germans could send tanks to Arnhem (I count 71, including obsolete tanks in training units and captured French tanks from a security unit). Model had less than 100 operational front line tanks in Heeresgruppe B, opposed by 2,400 in Montgomery's 21st Army Group. II.SS-Panzerkorps were known to be refitting in the Netherlands and the two divisions were known to be reduced to a regimental battlegroup with few, if any tanks (SHAEF Intel Summary #26, 16 Septembr 1944). The intelligence assessments were mostly correct, and at Arnhem in particular were very accurate, although the speed of the German response was underestimated. The glider carrying the 101st Airborne's liaison officer and his Comms team to Browning's Corps HQ at Groesbeek crashed near General Kurt Student's HQ and probably contained a resupply schedule document for the 101st. Student was able to interpret the schedule to predict the subsequent airlifts. He was unable to convince Model but alerted Luftwaffe units to intercept the transports, which were delayed by bad weather and arrived later when the Luftwaffe fighters were back at base being refuelled. The captured documents probably helped the Airborne. The operation was let down by the failure to secure the Nijmegen highway bridge on the first afternoon when it was reltively undefended in a city evacuated by the Germans. This blunder allowed the Germans to reinforce the bridges with SS-Panzer troops and delay the tanks from getting to Arnhem. I refer to Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR - Put Us Down In Hell (2012). Not Montgomery's fault at all. Montgomery, the 1st Airborne Division, and XXX Corps, were all badly let down by two officers in 82nd Airborne, and blaming people not at fault is either ignorant or malicious. I have no idea what people think Patton would have done differently, and they are remarkably silent when challenged to do so.

@mathswithgarry7104

Жыл бұрын

All of tee Americans thought the Brits were over-rated, and vice versa. Patton's opinion doesn't really count as evidence.

@joelbell9082

Жыл бұрын

@@mathswithgarry7104 why did Market Garden fail They had problems with the radios for communication The plans were discovered by the Nazis in a crashed glider Headquarters knew that they could possibly be a SS Panzer groups in the area but went along with the plans anyway paratroopers dropped too far from thelr objectives and the tanks and support were to slow to be of any help and brave men died for an ill-conceived plan

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

And Patton failing to get out of the Lorraine in 4 months of trying, suffering 55,000 battle casualties against a second rate ragtag German army is what? How long to take Metz again?

It failed because Monty wanted the accolades for being the hero general. He ignored intelligence, failed to plan properly, refused to use the Polish forces in a significant role (eventually squandered them) and relied on equipment that wasn't suitable for this type of incursion. It was a very poor plan. Monty usually attacked with a massive advantage in numbers (of everything) he was good at that, he was not good at pin point strikes with number disadvantages. I suspect most of the other allied generals would have done better. Having said all that, getting past all the bridges but one did speed up the liberation of more northern countries.

@thevillaaston7811

Жыл бұрын

'he was good at that, he was not good at pin point strikes with number disadvantages.' So who was good at 'pin point strikes with number disadvantages'?

@kentleytaggart5816

Жыл бұрын

Yes he wasn't that good,sorry if facts tick u off

@thevillaaston7811

Жыл бұрын

@@kentleytaggart5816 What facts?

@billballbuster7186

Жыл бұрын

Typical idiotic remarks we have come to expect from Americans who get their history from the tv.

@thevillaaston7811

Жыл бұрын

@@kentleytaggart5816 'he was not good at pin point strikes with number disadvantages.' Your words. You mean apart from Alam el Halfa? Where Montgomery's four divisions beat Rommel's six divisions. 'I suspect most of the other allied generals would have done better.' Your words. And what evidence makes you suspect that?

Operation Market Garden fell far short of expectations but it wasn't a total failure as it advanced the front in that sector by around 90 miles and inflicted almost twice the number of casualties on the German's than what the Allies suffered. It was certainly a better operation than Bradleys Hurtgen Forest campaign.

@joelbell9082

Жыл бұрын

The Hurtgen Forest cost a lot of good American lives to be lost we gave up all of our advantages to fight in a closed Forest where the enemy had all the advantages there are a lot of Commanders that should have been court-martialed the first one should on my list should be Admiral King So many men died because he refused to organize a convoy system at the beginning of World War 2 but nothing happened to him many ships war material that was desperately needed was lost along with brave men

@mathswithgarry7104

Жыл бұрын

@@joelbell9082 Amen brother, I think King should have, at the very least, been reliieved of his command when the convoy system was introduced. Major ballsup.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

And the Hurtgen Forest wastage in men directly lead to a thinning of the American front line, a retreat and a further near 100,000 casualties in the Ardennes.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Told you before Lyndon latrine the Tommies were no where around during those operations. And they didn't retreat.The war was now up to the Reds & GIs as Monty wasn't going anywhere as George Marshall wasn't going to allow The troubled Tart Monty run his soldiers thru his polluted plans like Churchill did with the Tommies Look at a map you don't get it - where the hell do think they were going to punch thru?THEY HAD TO FIGHT THRU - that is why it's called a war. Stalin himself pointed this out to Churchill at Tehran and accused the British of stalling - look that up. The Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec, not just 9 days and took 55,182 casualties in over 3 months but they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at Market Garden (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success - it was a failure. *UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II* *The Siegfried Line Campaign* *by Charles B. MacDonald* The Battles of Achen and the Hurtgen Forest cost both sides dearly with losses neither side could absorb.The Allies and Germans were running low on manpower but by stopping the advance in the Hurtgen and Stolberg Corridor had bought time to strengthen the defenses along the Siegfried Line.But it also weakened the German Forces ready to attack thru the Ardennes. Reserve forces that would have been used to bolster the Germans in the Ardennes were ground down in the Battle for Achen and the Hurtgen Forest. *UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II* *The European Theater of Operations* *THE LORRAINE CAMPAIGN* *By Hugh M. Cole,Ph.D.* p.31-32 Western Front during August, or the numerous separate replacement battalions. It is probable, therefore, that the 49½ German divisions and supporting troops in the West at the opening of September numbered over 700,000 One German division, it may be noted, was reckoned as the equivalent of two of these allied divisions.

@jacktattis

Жыл бұрын

And Hodges

One of those times that overcaution allowed victory to slip away, you don't plan an ambitious breakthrough based on surprise elements and rapid mobilisation and then pile on delays and shortages by trying to engineer niceties like dropping men on higher ground, establishing airfields behind enemy lines and spreading out drops to avoid the worst of the weather and ground fire.

@davemac1197

11 ай бұрын

The original Operation Comet plan made by Browning's British I Airborne Corps was compromised when it was taken over by Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army. If you look into the history of the cancelled operation the expanded three-division air plan was based on - Operation Linnet II - and for that I suggest Roger Cirillo's PhD thesis on the Market Garden Campaign (you find it online), Brereton was seemingly trying to replace Browning with Matthew Ridgway (82nd CO in Normandy) and his new US XVIII Airborne Corps established in August 1944 by preparing an operation nobody asked for (as an alternative if Linnet was cancelled), on too short a notice to print and distribute maps to the airborne troops. Browning threatened to resign and then had to withdraw the threat when it became clear Brereton would accept it. Fortunately, the operation didn't go ahead as the drop zones were overrun by ground forces. So when Brereton removed some of the more crucial aspects of the cancelled Comet plan for Market, like the glider coup de main attacks on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges, and the double airlift on the first day, he could hardly threaten to resign again. In spite of the difficulties, the British Airborne held the Arnhem bridge for 80 hours, the highly experienced 504th PIR Commander Reuben Tucker insisted on a coup de main drop zone for one company at the southern end of the Grave bridge, and the Nijmegen bridge was missed because of the poor field commander leading the 508th PIR.

@bigwoody4704

7 ай бұрын

Old Monty...at least the Japanese commanders had enough decency to disembowel themselves after failures like this. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.​ Monty demanded this operation then with all the backbone of a gummy bear doesn't show up for it when the early results start tumbling in. Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.

@GregWampler-xm8hv

4 ай бұрын

Monty should've been a quarter master never a combat general. Frankly El Alamein win should've been credited to Malta. It protected Monty's supply convoy's and sunk loads of German tonnage. Allowing M to build up overwhelming numbers.

@bigwoody4704

Ай бұрын

@@GregWampler-xm8hv He might as well have been because the took everthing he could from US supply depts but a red hot stove

82 AB wasting 24 hrs in not taking the bridge @ Nijmegen screwed 30 Corps' potential relief at Arnhem. Monty never complained of US failure.

@jerryg53125

11 ай бұрын

Gavin was under Browning.Gavin and the 82 did what Browning told them to do.Take the Groesbeek Heights and wait for 30 Corps.30 Corps wasn't even close to Nijimegen at the end of day two.There was no way this plan was going to work.

@nickdanger3802

11 ай бұрын

In military strategy, a choke point (or chokepoint) is a geographical feature on land such as a valley, defile or bridge, or maritime passage through a critical waterway such as a strait, which an armed force is forced to pass through in order to reach its objective, sometimes on a substantially narrowed front and therefore greatly decreasing its combat effectiveness by making it harder to bring superior numbers to bear. A choke point can allow a numerically inferior defending force to use the terrain as a force multiplier to thwart or ambush a much larger opponent, as the attacker cannot advance any further without first securing passage through the choke point.

@givenfirstnamefamilyfirstn3935

6 ай бұрын

@@nickdanger3802 …. like a bridge?

@nickdanger3802

6 ай бұрын

@@givenfirstnamefamilyfirstn3935 Like 64 miles on a single road surrounded by polder (mud) making flanking maneuvers required for rapid advance impossible. Capturing intact bridges over three major rivers for that single road and more than a few bridges over smaller rivers and canals. Putting up a Bailey bridge at Son took about 14 hours. It was a poor concept based on wishful thinking and Monty wanting to lead the "British Army" to Berlin and Victory in Europe.

@andym9571

3 ай бұрын

​@@jerryg53125 Gavin admitted that it was his decision backed up by his Corps commander.

The one issue for Market Garden’s failure was communication. I don’t know if you mentioned this, or maybe just a bit. Communication, there are two types, was poor during the operation. The British 1st Airborne had trouble with their radios and couldn’t get in contact with any of their forces within Arnhem, or even outside the area. The other communication problem was the forces of American and British soldiers working together. Whenever there was and heavy action and the Americans wanted to get the job done the British would not take part and followed their own orders despite being in a combined force. American paratroopers and British tankers didn’t work together so well in the field.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Who on earth told you that American paratroopers and British tankers didn’t work together in the field? Here is testimony from Lt Col Ben Vandervoort of the 505th PIR of the US 82nd Airborne. John Wayne played Vandervoort in The Longest Day. "" We were honored to be a momentary part of their distinguished company (Grenadier Guards). For soldiers of different allied armies, it was amazing how beautifully the tankers and troopers teamed together. It was testimony to their combat acumen as seasoned veterans-both Yanks and Tommies. It required an intuitive sense of balance not to exploit the tanks as protection for the infantry, nor to preoccupy the infantry with screening the tanks. That depended on a lot of individual initiative. Lieutenant] Colonel Edward H. Goulburn, a perceptive commander, more or less turned individual tanks loose and let them go up the alleys and through the yards with the infantry. The spearhead of the British column, which included the paratroopers, blasted its way up the avenue and into the side streets as required by the enemy dispositions.” - Ben Vandervoort, "Echoes of the Warriors" (from "All American, All the Way, A Combat History of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II, From Market Garden to Berlin" - Nordyke). Clearly Lt Col Vandervoort disagreed with you.

@GregWampler-xm8hv

4 ай бұрын

Oh Christ don't start that crap. This topic is swarming with Monty cheerleaders saying T'wasn't his fault and such. And let's face it coalition warfare is a nightmare and Ike did a remarkable job. Flag ranks are invariably huge prima donnas and that includes every nation. 😎

@bigwoody4704

Ай бұрын

@@GregWampler-xm8hv that lump lyndon runs from board to board switching in and out of alias acccounts agreeing with himself and displaying his lack of self esteem by belittling Americans.That came 3500 miles to help the Crown go the last 30

Not even close to being the biggest defeat. I would call it a draw

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Except the allies gained 100km and the Germans lost 100km including Eindhoven, Nijmegen and the Waal crossing.

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 And it's not like the Allies were forced back into a retreat back to Normandy, the Allies advanced and the Germans lost ground.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

oh really falling back to the Scheldt Estuary a month after Horrocks could have took it but monty halted him. Try some history instead of the Crown's coloring books

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 The Canadians were expected to clear it out. Horrocks was focused on getting over the Rhine.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- I've already addressed this long ago - that was Monty's bullshit after HIS masterpiece fell apart. You can't find them ordering the canadians to do it because everything went into the advance.It's amazing you slappies take Monty at his word as he was sued for libel and had to retract some of his 1st memoirs

Simply put...Monty began believing in his own Legend. Others ignored a pattern: "I knew Monty couldn't take Caen on D-Day...I knew he wouldn't have it by D-Day-Plus-10." George C Scott as PATTON.

@thevillaaston7811

Жыл бұрын

Its a definite no.

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

How long did it take the Americans to take St Lo ? And against lesser opposition!

@mister-v-3086

Жыл бұрын

@@garythomas3219 Two days of Aerial Bombardment (July 16 & 17,) Followed by a ground assault on the 18th -- Americans entered the city that day.

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

@@mister-v-3086. Caen was taken before St Lo

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

Shame Patton couldn't take the 2 Atlantic ports allocated to him ! Patton's Lorraine campaign 3 months to take 60 miles of nothing!

Oh yeah, great thinking Monty. Paratroopers dropped ringt into two SS Panzer divisions that were being rebuilt. The SS Panzer Division, the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstauff and the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsburg were at about 40% strength. And British paratroopers practically dropped right on top the panzer division. Plus other German units in the area also fougt the British and American paras. One unit was the FallschimPanzerKorp Herman Goring's training brigade. The training brigade fought well.

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

@Brian Korbelik The British had been preparing their airborne brigades to face German tanks, so each British para brigade was accompanied by an air landing antitank battery (equal to a battalion) of 24 anti tank guns. So the British Airborne division had 48 guns with it plus another 24 guns in the attached Polish Parachute air landing antitank battery. Better yet, the British (and Polish air borne) 6 pounder guns were supplied with both HE and APDS, which could penetrate the frontal armour of German heavy tanks (except King Tiger) at a decent range. Moreover, only 2/3 of the British guns were the 6pounder, the remaining 1/3 were the extremely effective 17 pounder gun, which could punch through a King Tiger's frontal armour at over a mile. (King Tiger front armour was 180 mm)

@roybennett9284

Жыл бұрын

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- there is too many yanks disregarding monty.after all they did sweet fa from 1939/1941,a bit like now in the Ukraine if NATO started to move,and made Ukraine a member the rabble would stop, Sorry Russians(hospital bombers)

@dsan8742

Жыл бұрын

​@roybennett9284 To be fair Ukrainians do love sitting in schools and civilian buildings, it's the same as how Americans would frequently smuggle war materials on civilian ships during both world wars.

@roybennett9284

Жыл бұрын

@@dsan8742 please provide evidence,hows that peace keeping going for you,in Ukraine, funny how most notable and normal countries hate Russia and don't want their shitty gas

@briankorbelik2873

Жыл бұрын

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Yes, however the Brit Para division was scatered hither and yon, the accounts that I have read, tell of PIAT rockets by the nature of their propellent, causes the effect of the anti-tank rocket pretty much being lobbed at enemy tanks. And it doesn't matter how many AT guns the paras had, when they are being parachuted right on top of panzer divisions, being rebuilt or not.

Monty never listened to the intel, he was to big headed and arrogant to acknowledge he could be wrong, it wasn’t the first time. In North Afrika he got the name, but the Yanks pondered the Germans already for months, Rommel’s troops were on the way back due to simpel logistics. Monty let them escape, simpel as that. Then his political play, he wanted the whole army to command, thank god Ike told him to fuck off, only the Queen made sure Monty had something to command, because all other Allies wanted him gone. On and after D day he didn’t do what was told, he thought he knew better and this cost a lot of casualties. We in the Netherlands consider the Canadians and Poles as our liberators, not the Brits. Monty was the big star to blame all others to hide his incompetence.

@andrewkatai521

Жыл бұрын

It's a pity you didn't try harder yourselves then isn't it ! Most of you joined the Germans anyway !

@todd3285

Жыл бұрын

You got that right . By the way has Montgomery taken CAEN YET?!?!

@Fish-tz8yn

11 ай бұрын

@@todd3285 By the way, did you know that the vast majority of German divisions in Normandy were heavily concentrated around the Caen area and the British and Canadians could not realistically push forward without a blood bath? Did you know that?

The state of play on the 17th, D day, was: *1)* the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear; *2)* there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally; *3)* there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen; *4)* a few scattered about along the road; *5)* there was no armour in Arnhem. That was it. *i)* XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven; *ii)* 101st from Eindhoven to Grave; *iii)* 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen; *iv)* British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine; XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made _remarkable_ progress. The US 101st took *3-4 hours* to move about *2 km* to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it. XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed *10-12 hours* at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse. XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them *2hrs 45 mins* to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous _carpet_ for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. *The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.* XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match. On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another *36 hours.* This was now a total delay of nearly *two days.* In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem. XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units *failed* to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed. According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Put that thing out Johnny you'll burn your fingers. Why did Monty cross the Road?To help Burns with the ankle monitor

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. What US general wrote, _”I not only approved Market Garden, I insisted upon it.”_ 20 points for the correct answer.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@johnburns4017 - do you do more difficult quizzes for people who went to school in Europe?

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@davemac1197 Rambo has been a fine contestant so far.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@johnburns4017 - I'm indebted to an American TV movie for similar use of the expression "solid citizen".

oh, and darth, browning told gavin he should take the grave bridge and the high ground near the lz first, the go for the nijmegen bridge. the fact that he would have just over half his division on day 1, gavin was forced to agree with browning.

@johnburns4017

4 ай бұрын

You are very wrong..

@bigwoody4704

4 ай бұрын

Poor Johnny took this from a New Zealander - Andrew Brown: YAWNING this makes me sleepy,More Englishmen turned and ran than any other point in the war. The Poms are next to useless whenever there is an armed force oposing them that is perhaps even half as strong in men and material. The poms' most glorious land battles have been historically fought against tribesmen with spears. When it came to WW2 Britain was so unimportant in the grand scheme that it didn't matter what Churchill or Montgomery thought. Britain had no money, compared to USSR and USA and limited production capability and not all that many men really. In reality the UK played a very small part. It was the Russians that fought the Germans.They had more casualties in the last battle of the war than the UK had in all the war. Britain served as an unsinkable carrier for the GIs during the French invasion - and that's about it. I know it hurts - the truth often does You seem to think that Britain was important to WW2 and that people like Montgomery were important characters. Wrong. *Montgmery was an uppity little nothing who thought rather too much of his own position in things. Churchill knew the score and treated him exactly as his paymasters (USA told him too. British Field Marshall? He was about as important as a soviet latrine digger.)*The USSR would still have required support in material from the States. You're the worst of commentators because you're always looking to get a swelled chest and misty eyed over the perceived glory of your own fighting forces. The reality is that the UK and commonwealth played a very very small role in the whole war. You don't want to see it because history is not important to you. You want to watch rousing movies that make you think you won the war when in reality you barely had a part in it. As for Poland - look where it was in 1939 and where it was left by its allies in 1946. Do you really think Britain discharged its obligations by abandoning Poland to the Russians at the end of the war?? Or abandoning the Czechs to the Reich in 1938 for that matter - Good Grief your view is shallow.The weak, whiney, whingey, broke Poms had a treaty with Poland.Do you understand now when I say abandoned by the Poms??? Also, what was it that Britain did before 1941? Not much. There was the phony war followed by the Dunkirk fiasco followed by the Battle of Britain - the most overblown event in WW2 and some skirmishes in North Africa. Really... you've got to stop watching all those WW2 movies that like to make out that England was the brightest light in the whole war. Actually, the hopeless hague afflicted poms would have lost WW1 without the yanks. The poms leadership was so poor that without the Pershing lead yanks they would have run from the field of battle in ever larger numbers. The poms deserted in more numbers than any other force (even more than the French!!!!) in ww1. Spring Offensive, More Englishmen turned and ran than any other point in the war. Shameful - but expected.

@davemac1197

4 ай бұрын

Browning simply cautioned Gavin “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.” (September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus 2012) It is nonsense that Browning could force Gavin to do anything - they don't serve in the same army! Browning could only request that Gavin drop a battalion on the north end of the Nijmegen bridge, but could not force him to do it: 'The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.' (Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967. James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) As John says in response to your previous comment, you really need to do some reading.

@johnburns4017

4 ай бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the British general who had to take command of two shambolic US armies in the German Bulge attack? 20 points for the correct answer.

@bigwoody4704

4 ай бұрын

@@davemac1197 Fanboi ALERT!!! more bullshit - that was a direct order.Many times the waterhead johnny here from the special needs center try corrupting this with his scribblings inserting his POV. So if anyone(outside of you revisionists) wants to find it there is the exact quote from the proper page. Bubble head burns is getting creative though deleteing many of his fraudulent accounts and making up new ones - to agree with his caterwauling *UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II* *THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN* *By Charles B. MacDonald* *P157* *General Browning, was "clear and emphatic" to the effect that the division was "not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished* *In his formal order General Browning stated: "The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Groesbeck is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task."* ---------------------------------------------- And again from New Zealander - Andrew Brown: YAWNING this makes me sleepy, The Poms are next to useless whenever there is an armed force oposing them that is perhaps even half as strong in men and material. The poms' most glorious land battles have been historically fought against tribesmen with spears. When it came to WW2 Britain was so unimportant in the grand scheme that it didn't matter what Churchill or Montgomery thought. Britain had no money, compared to USSR and USA and limited production capability and not all that many men really. In reality the UK played a very small part. It was the Russians that fought the Germans.They had more casualties in the last battle of the war than the UK had in all the war. Britain served as an unsinkable carrier for the GIs during the French invasion - and that's about it. I know it hurts - the truth often does. You seem to think that Britain was important to WW2 and that people like Montgomery were important characters. Wrong. *Montgmery was an uppity little nothing who thought rather too much of his own position in things. Churchill knew the score and treated him exactly as his paymasters (USA told him too. British Field Marshall? He was about as important as a soviet latrine digger.)* The USSR would still have required support in material from the States. Oh there is more but I'm tired lots of research you choads ould give it a try

0:33 Several German soldiers using captured Sten guns.

If Monty had driven straight through Antwerp and seized the Scheldt it would have shortened the war.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

It would still have taken a long time to do open Antwerp. It took nearly a month just to clear the mines. If Market Garden was successful it would have facilitated an earlier capture of Antwerp. The goal of Market Garden was not just to get a bridgehead across the Rhine, but to also move north to the sea, cutting off the Netherlands, thus the German forces around the Scheldt. Not that opening Antwerp was the magic wand. Antwerp was opened in late November, yet in December the Americans still failed in Operation Queen and in the Lorraine, then got pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes. Antwerp open didn't prevent any of that. It was no game changer.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Lyndon you slappy what part of him admitting *a bad mistake on my part* didn't you understand - try one of the other alias accounts

@angloaust1575

7 ай бұрын

If d.day was launched in Belgium and Holland and Not france!

@bigwoody4704

6 ай бұрын

Yes they could still have had it but Monty montied

Try Dunkerque and and flippin Malaya..

@alzaidi7739

Жыл бұрын

Yup. Singapore. Operation Bastard Hunt. There are numerous 'worse' Allied defeats in WWII.

@enyanyea4226

Жыл бұрын

the fall of France too

sorry to be picky, but your ad line should read the Biggest Western Allied defeat of WW II. The Soviets had losses in the early days of Operation Barbarossa that made Market Garden look inconsequential

@thevillaaston7811

22 күн бұрын

MARKET GARDEN losses were modest compared to Aachen, Lorraine, the Hurtgen Forest, and the Ardennes.

How does Market Garden compare with the Hurtgen Forest in terms of lives lost?

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Far fewer casualties for more ground taken. Hurtgen Forest suffered 40,000 plus casualties (minimum, more modern evaluation says 50,000 plus), got next to nowhere in autumn 1944 and directly lead to the retreat in the Ardennes and another near 100,000 casualties. Market Garden was a rip roaring success in comparison.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Pinhead John Cornell err I mean Lyndon you keep repeating your retarded drivel 9 days =17,000 casualties @ Monty Garden. Hurtgen was 34,000 in 3 months - do the math not the meth and not a limey helping out either - piss poor monty planning

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

​@@bigwoody4704 The Hurtgen Forest was hell though, have you ever watched the film called when Trumpets fade? The First Army should never have been thrown into that meatgrinder, poor blokes running head on into fortifications in forests getting cut to pieces, any of the GI's that managed to survive that battle were extremely brave, and despite the decision of the leaders, the soldiers do have my respect. In terms of casualties it was one of the bloodiest actions in US history alongside some of the battles of the American Civil War like Antietam etc.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- absolutely the only good thing to come out of it was taking out troops that unknown to Bradley were heading to the Ardennes. Problem was they were about to enter The Reich and the fighting was going to get even filthier. The GIs realized what the Russians were experiencing,as the Western allies had stated Unconditional surrender. So Goebbells started going to work about the Jews in the West and Bolsheviks in the east were going to do to the Aryans

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Bullet Tooth-Tony And the Hurtgen Forest debacle directly lead to the Ardennes retreat with another 80,000 unnecessary casualties.

Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand: _‘It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by XXX Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.’_ And what the Germans said: MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 by NIGEL HAMILTON, page 98 _‘General Student, in a statement after the war, considered the ‘Market Garden’ operation to have ‘proved a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant that the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of war.’ Student was expressing the professional admiration of an airborne commander - ‘those who had planned and inaugurated with complete the first airborne operations of military history, had not now even thought of such a possible action by the enemy…_ *_the Allied Airborne action completely surprised us. The operation hit my army nearly in the centre and split it into two parts…In spite of all precautions, all bridges fell intact into the hands of the Allied airborne forces - another proof of the paralysing effect of surprise by airborne forces!’_* _As for hindsight, the only part of that would interest me would be to judge the actions of those people at that time in the situation that they found themselves in. As far as MARKET GARDEN was concerned, the German V-2 rockets on London alone justified the attempt, even without the other, good reasons for making the attempt._

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

And a British 2nd Army advance to Nijmegen later on in, say, late October or November would have been more difficult, slower, in worse weather and with likely more casualties.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Burns you polluted rube putting your words in italics doesn't make it history here is what Hamilton really said: The Guardian Book review of "The Full Monty" Prof Hamilton, who was befriended by the field marshal at age 11 and knew him well for the last 20 years of his life, has no doubt of the nature of Monty's feelings. "These were quasi love affairs. He became really passionately involved with these young men - and then, more and more, boys, who he would call 'my sons'. They were nothing of the kind, of course, but in his own personality he would frame them in this way. "I myself have more than 100 very loving letters from him. My relationship with him wasn't sexual, in the sense that it wasn't acted upon, but I had been through enough years at British boarding schools to know what kind of enormous affection and feeling he had for me. "And I wasn't alone, this was a consistent pattern in Monty's life." One boy was Lucien Treub, Montgomery's "little Swiss friend", who met him at 12, and told Hamilton how the general would bathe him personally and rub him down so he would not catch cold "I've interviewed him several times and he was quite clear he didn't feel there was any molesting going on, but it's a tricky area," Prof Hamilton said. Second world war hero had platonic love for soldiers and boys, claims friend and biographer .The Full Monty, by his official biographer, Nigel Hamilton, claims that Montgomery felt passionately about fellow soldiers and boys, some not yet in their teens. So decreed Field Marshal Montgomery as he urged the House of Lords not to legalise gay sex and warned that the 1967 homosexuality bill would be a "charter for buggery". More than 30 years on, the gay age of consent has been equalised to 16, homosexuals are allowed to serve in the military - and Britain's most famous wartime general has been outed as a repressed homosexual who had "quasi love affairs" with boys and men, according to a new book. One can see why you are a big fan Burns

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the US general who engaged in incestual relationships? 20 points for the correct answer.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

This one's barking, why wasn't Monty arrested for Buggery? Because it was the best time of John Burns life !!!

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 *BZZZZZZT!* Wrong answer. Rambo the US general who engaged in incestual relationships was.... 🩸🍾🎊 *General Patton* 🩸🍾🎊 Zero points Rambo. Zero. Better luck next time.

It's also worth noting that the 9th and 10th SS Pz were licking their wounds from the fighting at Falaise and were seriously below their complement. 82nd Airborne also failed to take the Nijmegen in a timely manner. It wasn't totally XXX Corps's fault.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

It wasn't XXX Corps fault at all. They linked up with the 82nd more or less on schedule. Nearly 90km in 42 hours. It was Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst who killed the operation.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 nope Monty ignored them you repeat rubbish until someone as vacant as you believes it. You lying hound as soon as the formations hit the coast it was radioed back by the troops in the Scheldt - total surprise was lostThe Operation was approved by who? If Bernard was a real Field Marshall like Model he would have made his battle assessments and made any necessary alterations. But the dim bulb did not. So almost 2x as many flights with just under 3 less hours daylight on September 17th than on June 6th then the flights were much longer(300 miles) into N.E Netherlands instead of just across the 30 mile channel. Quit reading your coloring books.They could hardly get the same amount of flights in the same day with the afore mentioned detriments Excerpt FromThe Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe, 11 September 1941-8 May 1945 “There were several undesirable features of MARKET. General Browning, who had been charged with planning for MARKET with the 21st Army Group, *informed me that at General Montgomery’s insistence he had virtually agreed to drop the 101st Airborne Division in seven separate areas along an axis 30 miles in length to seize key crossings. I objected to this because such dispersion destroys the tactical integrity of a division, presents an insurmountable supply problem, and renders the smaller groups susceptible to being destroyed in detail without accomplishing the mission* I decided that General Taylor, commanding the 101st Airborne Division, would see General Montgomery about a more concentrated landing. If, after the disadvantages of the first maneuver have been explained to General Montgomery, *he still insists, we will go in as planned* ”Excerpt FromThe Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton It absolutely was a plea to change the order. *A division commander would not fly to the continent in wartime four days prior to a major operation for a purely social visit bad plan but monty insisted both he and IKE should have been reassigned. But at least IKE liked Irish women and not swiss boys

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

*My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617* July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day.Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken. *IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile?The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress* *My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632* August 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day" *My Three Years with Eisenhower," by Captain Harry C. Butcher,p. 651* On August 21, 1944, Butcher wrote about the British reaction to the news that an American General, Omar Bradley, was now equal to their own General Montgomery within the Allied command. "I find that British pride, which seems to have been hurt by the relative slowness of advance of the British-Canadian front as compared to the more newsworthy break-through of the Americans at St. Lo and subsequent end runs, has been hurt even more by the misunderstanding as to Montgomery's command. The 82nd crossed the Waal and hooked up North of the Bridge. *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 201* SS Captain Carl-Heinz Euling came to a decision *"the 1st enemy tank was able to pass over the road bridge during the evening of 20 september the railway bridge had already fallen *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 215* Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked *"the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221* SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.' *It was a lost chance* ' *'It never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193* The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. *A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900 There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North. * *It Never Snows in September" page 306 Robert Kershaw.* XXX Corp advancing along one easily defended road was never able proportionally to match the German build up,and achieve the odds ratio necessary for rapid success More specifically it was never able to push forward sufficient infantry by ground or fly them in by air,to secure what were essentially infantry objectives

@paulrasmussen8953

Жыл бұрын

It was montys fault.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

@@paulrasmussen8953 No it wasn't. The planning was taken over by others and the main decisions were made by others. If only Montgomery DID plan it. It probably would have suceeded.

bruceironside, sorry, but the objective of the plan has to be achieved for it to be a success. the objective for market garden was to cross the rhine and drive into germany. this did not happen, therefore it was a tragic defeat. it was some months later before this was done.

if you put together a list of things not do in an offensive, market garden would have most of them. only one road usable main road, ignoring intelligence about enemy forces, over dependence on good weather, and too much dependence on everything going just right (which almost never happens). combined with a shortage of transport aircraft, which forced all the airborne units to be flown in over a three day period (which was unavoidable, not brereton's fault), and the failure to cut off the german 15th army by clearing the scheldt estuary, which enabled them to join the battle as they arrived. the 82nd landed where it did and operated the way they did, was to seize vital high ground near the lz. the lack of artillery for the 101st was due entirely to the lack of aircraft. because they had to take their bridges fast, they decided to have troops on d-day, the guns following the next. this risk was taken due to 30 corps supposed to arrive after only 2-4 hours, not the next day as happened, due to heavy resistance. the responsibility for this tragic defeat falls on montgomery most of all, as it was his idea and plan, which ignored the advice of several other officers, among the the co of 2nd british army, dempsey, and ike's chief of staff, beedle smith. as to ike's giving the plan his ok, he was kind of between the rock and the hard place. it was a risky operation, but he was under pressure from marshall and hap arnold to use the newly created 1st allied airborne army in a mass combat drop. and montgomery was given priority in supplies, which caused 1st and 3rd us armies advance to slow to a snail's pace. this also had the effect of enabling the germans to send most of their reserve forces to oppose market garden, because they weren't really needed elswhere.

@johnburns4017

4 ай бұрын

You really need to do some reading.

@bigwoody4704

4 ай бұрын

Johnny did Bernard forget to give you the full monty? Like he forgot to show up for Monty Garden

@johnburns4017

4 ай бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the British general who took command of two shambolic US armies in the Germans Bulge attack? 20 points for the correct answer.

@bigwoody4704

3 ай бұрын

what supposed field marshall had to write 2 letter's of apology to IKE for lying about his absent self having a role in Allied advance? Tough one take your time - He had been dunkirked and didn't cross a channel for 4 full years. After the GIs crossed an Ocean and did it for him?

Hiii thank you for doing the Pershing video the other day as I asked! ❤ I am also very curious about how Montecasino was taken and the general Anzio event of the war! Thanks in advance!

@jacktattis

Жыл бұрын

Mont Casino taken by Poles with Kiwi and Indian help The US Army had failed twice

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

tatters,Wrong notice Monty set them in insread of getting his boys wacked.he was worse at commanding than you commenting

Hurtgen Forest, Operation Queen and the Lorraine were bigger defeats in autumn 1944. Market Garden took 100km of German held ground in 3 days. This was the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

John Cornell thicko those were 3 months Monty Garden was 9 Days do the math not the meth. Where were you laggards going to come thru - NO WHERE. Monty like you was a fraud Germany 1st ya right then run away in the Desert then sit it out until the Big Boys are engaged and try to slide in on the credit

Monty caused more deaths then the Germans could do, they were happy he was in command because with him we didn’t need the Germans as an enemy.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Market Garden suffered far fewer casualties than the disasters in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine at the same time. Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Your favorite Poof Bernard had the spine of a Gummy Bear doesn't even show up for his own operation trying to distance himself after yet another pathetic setback following Sicily,Caen,Falaise debacles - so one can see why you like him

@chrisstaves1473

9 ай бұрын

​@@bigwoody4704Do one!!@

FactBytes educates us that the fall of France in 1940 was less important than not getting that bridge. Thanks for correcting the popular misconception.

The actual plan that Montgomery devised was called Operation Comet which utilised the 1st British Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade landing to capture the same bridges as Market Garden. Montgomery cancelled Comet on the early hours of the 10th September due to the stiffening German resistance and reports of the armoured units at Arnhem. Eisenhower picked up the Comet plan and gave it to 1st Allied Airborne Army to plan. Lt Gen Brereton brought in the 2 US Airborne Divisions. The decisions taken by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst on the airborne lift were the main reasons for it failing. They refused to fly 2 lifts on the first day, double tows on gliders and a Coup de Main against Arnhem bridge. These decisions and the failure of Gavin to capture Nijmegen bridge on the first day were what caused the operation to fail. XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen on schedule and then had to fight to take the town and bridge at Nijmegen. The German units in and around Arnhem didn’t have any tanks, in fact the Panzer battalion of the Hohenstaufen were acting as infantry. The only unit with any armour was the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion who had half tracks. All the German armoured units that arrived from the Tuesday onwards. 1st Airborne Division had around 40 6 pounder anti tank guns and 12 17 pounders, plus each platoon had a PIAT, plus the 24 75mm howitzer could be used in the anti tank role, which is hardly I’ll prepared.

@cwcsquared

Жыл бұрын

The Germans had 6 tanks and or STUGS

@dmbeaster

Жыл бұрын

This is fictional. Read Montgomery's memoir which demonstrates that this narrative is false. If you are going to be a British partisan, try not to contradict your hero

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Same bridges at Arnhem, Nijmegen and Grave only. The canal bridges in the 101st Airborne sector of Market Garden were not originally included. Comet was initially postponed due to weather and then cancelled by Montgomery on the morning of 10 September due to the worsening intelligence picture in the Netherlands. Montgomery then presented at his meeting with Eisenhower later the same day the plan for Market Garden, which upgraded Comet from one to three airborne divisions. Once approved, the plan was then passed to 1st Allied Airborne Army (Brereton) and British 2nd Army (Dempsey) for detailed planning to be conducted that week by combining the air plan for Operation Linnet II and the drop zones for Comet. II.SS-Panzerkorps tanks on hand on 17 September: SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 at Saksen-Weimarkazerne in Arnhem - 3 x Mark V 'Panther' (dispersed under trees on Heijenoordseweg since 15 September). 2 were knocked out by 3rd Parachute Battalion in western Arnhem on 19 September. SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 at Vorden - 16 x Mark IV concentrated in 5.Kompanie, and 4 x StuG IIIG concentrated in 7.Kompanie. StuGs were deployed to Nijmegen via Pannerden ferry, but the Mark IV were too heavy for the ferry and held back until the Arnhem bridge was cleared on 21 September. By 12 October they had lost 6 of the Mark IV and 1 StuG, but had received 20 new Panthers from the factory, crewed by the 'Alarm Kompanie' from 9.SS-Panzer-Regiment and concentrated in 8./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10, losing 5 in the Elst area by 12 October. Anti-tank guns taken to Arnhem = 83 This breaks down as 8 x 6-pounders in the Support Company of each Airlanding Battalion, total = 24 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery = 16 x 6-Pounders, 8 x 17-pounders 2nd Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery = 12 x 6-pounders, 8 x 17-pounders Polish Anti-Tank Squadron = 15 x 6-pounders (1 was left behind or attached to the Sea Tail) Considering Model had less than 100 operational tanks in his entire Heeresgruppe B, facing Montgomery's 2,400 in 21st Army Group, 1st Airborne Division was well equipped with anti-tank guns and took more of them to Arnhem than the Germans were able to send tanks there.

@dmbeaster

Жыл бұрын

@@davemac1197 Unfortunately most of those antitank guns did not make it to where they were really needed at Arnhem. Still, Frost's small group did great with the limited antitank weaponry they had.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@dmbeaster - the anti-tank guns supported all the infantry units of the Division, so they were allocated to all of them. Not only did Frost have all four of the 6-pounder guns of B Troop 1st Anti-Tank Battery allocated to his battalion, he also had another gun from C Troop that had attached itself when it couldn't find the 3rd Battalion rendezvous on the drop zone. Appropriate, since C Company of 3rd Battalion also got to the bridge. It was two 6-pounders covering the bridge and the artillery of the Light Regiment firing from Oosterbeek that did most of the damage to Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 on 18 September, despite the Hollywood propaganda film giving the false impression that Frost had nothing but his battalion's PIATs at his disposal.

The only reason why the allies were even IN Belgium in early September was because of Montgomery, commanding all ground forces, being well ahead of schedule. Only Paris was supposed to be reached by early September, not Brussels and Antwerp. Unfortunately, Eisenhower then took over command of the battle in early September and everything slowed and stalled for the next six months due to his broad front disaster. Eisenhower of course, after insisting on taking over command of the battle, didn't even move his command HQ from the Cherbourg area in early September. He remained 600km away from the front and never had his finger on the pulse. He had poor communications and it took nearly a week just to get back to Montgomery with his proposal to bounce the Rhine. This shows how much an inexperienced desk man Eisenhower was. A battlefield commander should never be 600km from the front.

This is a Monty intelligence failure... Aside that the whole plan was been compromised when the Plan Map of Airborne dropping fell in the Germans hand.

@gunfisher4661

Жыл бұрын

That was always Monty`s problem. As written in many writings after the war, Monty was always known for taking to much risk with his troops loosing many unnecessarily all in his attempt to gain personal fame during the war.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

It wasn't an intelligence problem. The problem was German reinforcements that were quickly sent in from GERMANY in the days that followed. These units could not be identified by intelligence because they were deep inside Germany.

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@gunfisher4661 You made that up.

@gunfisher4661

Жыл бұрын

@@johnburns4017 There`s documentaries out there that have mentioned it .

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@gunfisher4661 No. You made it up.

monty was just looking for prfaise and glory and where will the cameras be?

I wouldn’t even count it as a defeat. They achieve 90% of objectives and they ultimately just missed the last task. 90% is a win in most peoples book. They inflicted heavy losses on the Germans pushed them mostly out of the Netherlands and created another front that the Germans had to watch and man, pulling troops from other regions.

@GregWampler-xm8hv

4 ай бұрын

The objective was to take the last bridge. Another Monty apologist. Just like Monkey said he'd take Caen on D-Day but he F'd that too. Claims he was pulling all the German units on to him. B*LLSHIT! He F'd.

@darth_elsa6681

4 ай бұрын

That last task as you call it cost the lives of nearly 10,000 men

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

4 ай бұрын

@@GregWampler-xm8hv " Claims he was pulling all the German units on to him." Stop it, it's already been proven that it WAS the case kzread.info/dash/bejne/pmFko9qukrSrh7A.html Hollywood and their lies are NOT FOOLING ANYONE.

@davemac1197

3 ай бұрын

The last task was achieved - secure and hold the Arnhem bridge for the 2-3 days it was expected XXX Corps would take to get there. The previous task of taking the Nijmegen bridge was not even attempted on the first day unil it was too late, due to a command failure in the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment. The delay allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce Nijmegen and its bridges and delay progress of XXX COrps sufficiently to retake the Arnhem bridge and destroy 1st Airborne Division.

@bigwoody4704

3 ай бұрын

pull your very dense head out of Bernard's backside. It accompilished nothing - how abouth the Germans there who recognized what a debacle this was - MONTY GARDEN *'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J. Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.* The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. *A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North.* *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215,Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent* If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."* 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.* They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. *'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance*

1st airborne never ran out of at ammunition

@dmbeaster

Жыл бұрын

Its anti-tank weaponry was essentially depleted. that was the point.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@dmbeaster - 'several' anti-tank guns were still operational at the time of the withdrawal, and that's just based on the war diary of 1st Anti-Tank Battery. I don't have a figure for the total in the division still operating. The division frankly needed reinforcement, not withdrawal.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

not really the panzers/artillery coming could easily spot at guns in copse of trees. Unfortunately quite easy to spot

The simple answer is that the Germans were too strong.

remember xxx corps was in nijimgen by the morning of the 3rd day

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Or put another way - in about 43-45 hours elapsed time, for the armoured cars and tanks respectively, still on schedule to get to Arnhem in 48.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Yes, it was very good going especially considering German ambush, bottlenecks, narrow road, no bridge ready at Son and thousands of Dutch civilians clogging the road in celebration. XXX Corps advance in Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

you girls and your knitting circles."SIGH" - again for your edification. It's the truth it took 16 days for Rommel to kick Bernies ass into the sea and 4 yrs for the laggard to come back - after the GIs came across an ocean. You revisionist rubes are a human version of the Hindenberg,gonna explode any moment. Go tell your tales to Poland and The Czechs who you cowards like lyndon abondoned to the Reich and the Russians. Your inferiority complex bleeds out in every post

There were a few key issues that led to the operation failing by the finest of margins: - 1) Delays in giving it the go-ahead 2) Montgomery's original plan was corrupted in its execution by general Brereton who refused 2 drops in a day even tho RAF wanted to do that. This meant part-strength forces being dropped. 3) Capture of Allied plans on an American soldier in a British glider crash despite being told not to carry any such plans. 4) 82nd Division concentrating on Reichswald Heights and abandoning taking Nijmegen Bridge until 30 Corps arrived 44 hours after setting off (under 2 days). END

@davemac1197

9 ай бұрын

1) not sure what you mean by this. 2) totally agree, but this was the judgement of Brereton and Williams (1st Allied Airborne Army and US IX Troops Carrier Command respectively) based on the USAAF's reduced capabilities compared to the RAF's for Operation COMET. 3) It was an American WACO glider crash near Student's HQ at Vught carrying the 101st Airborne's liaison officer and comms team to Browning's Corps HQ that was involved and was the reason Browning had no contact with the 101st during the operation. The documents were not the complete operational plans as shown rather melodramatically in the Hollywood film, but a number of administrative documents that included a resupply schedule for the 101st Airborne. When Student had the documents translated, he understood the significance of the resupply schedule as an airborne commander himself, and he was able to extrapolate the airlift schedules for all three divisions from this one document. Model was famously unconvinced, but Student used his own Luftwaffe chain of command to have fighter aircraft over the drop zones at the scheduled times, and because of the weather delays to the subsequent airlifts the fighters were back at their bases in Germany being refuelled when the transports finally arrived. The document actually helped, not compromise the operation. 4) Gavin had instructed the 508th CO to send his 1st Battalion directly to bridge as soon as possible after landing, but this instruction was not interpreted correctly by the CO, who was a poor field commander. By the time Gavin found out the battalion was not moving on the bridge, it was too late and the 10.SS-Panzer-Division won the race to secure the city and its bridges. Gavin had actually spoken on this to Cornelius Ryan in his 1967 interview for A Bridge Too Far, but Ryan did not make clear this was a blunder and missed opportunity in his book, and of course it would never be accepted in a Hollywood film made for an American market.

@bigwoody4704

7 ай бұрын

More British Bollocks the same type of plan that got the BEF(Back Every Friday) run off the continent in the 1st place *BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p402-03 The British troops had arrived on 4 September,but were then ordered by Montgomery to halt for 3 days to prepare themselves for a push to Arnhem and to link up with First Airborne Army.But it would have been perfectly easy to get the British troops across the Albert Canal. General Brian Horrocks declared "the halt ordered by Montgomery was a tragedy because the only troops available to block our passage northwards consisted of one German Division,the 719th composed entirely of elderly gentleman who had never a shot fired in anger. This meager force was strung out over a 50 mile long front along the Canal* *BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p414-19 Almost every feature of Operation Market Garden,in fact simply reaffirmed what already had become evident in North Africa that Montgomery was generally incapable of conducting anything but solid defenses or attacks with generous lead times,massive materiel superiority and no urgent dead lines. Market Garden had revealed Montgomery' serious lapses in planning as well as severe shortcomings in in operational and tactical command. There was little cooperation between the various staffs responsible. Also lacking was any liaison between the Airborne Army and and those units responsible for ground troops and tactical air power.* *BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p418-19, Montgomery's operation timetable was ambitious to the point of recklessness.* Montgomery the man whose main criticism of Eisenhower was his lack of grip,remained remarkably out of touch with day to day operations and incapable of controlling events.He only got as far as Nijmegen and even then never got across the Waal. At no stage during the battle did he visit XXX Corp HQ and not until 23 September when it was almost over did he visit Dempsey at Second Army HQ. According to Freddie DeGuingand,CoS, Montgomery appeared to let things go their own way. *How could anyone suppose that Montgomery and his army would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of force capable of conducting a fast, concentrated, mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image*

@bigwoody4704

6 ай бұрын

That's why Monty fessed up to it after the war and all of HQ including Brooke blamed Bernard. Another in a long line of his cock ups Sicily/Italy/CAEN/Falaise/Monty Garden but British Mythology appoints the tainted waif Field Marshall . Ya sure we'll go with that

What off the battle of the Bulge I believe Monty pulled the fat out of the fire there, as for Gavin what was he up to on the high ground and how close did Patton come to being sacked, what of Cherbourg which was not taken as timely as required and the Mulberry harbour, British invention, saved the day no Mulberry no supplies, it’s easy to point fingers and the US are good at that but go read the history. And while we are at it Monty did not take Caen on day one or soon after but he did keep the SS Panzer divisions off the US forces in the west and allowed them to break out of the beachheads. It was a team effort and all sides made cock ups, and it goes on review recent history, Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and on. People in glass house should not throw stones

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Gavin's divisional plan called for the 508th to send a battalion to the Waal highway bridge at Nijmegen as soon as possible after landing and securing their initial objectives on the Groesbeek ridge. This the CO of the 508th failed to do, and he had a history going back to Normandy as well. Gavin did not wish to publicly throw a subordinate offcier under the bus and sought to take responsibility for the failure of his division on his own shoulders. The reasons are complex but 82nd historian Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) goes a long way to explain the problems in the regiment's command in Normandy and the failure at Nijmegen.

@GregWampler-xm8hv

4 ай бұрын

He said throwing another stone. And yes Monkey absolutely F'd it as Caen. His objective was not the lie that he drew Germans away from the Americans. Frankly, and I read up on this subject a lot, I just don't see or read all the whiny stone throwers like the small % of Brits. Check out tic/schlock for unabashed Monkey cheerleading. Americans were thankful for our allies and I believe the vast majority of Brits were too. Don't ruin it with you childish petulance.

There are dozens of factors that combined to make MG (10%) unsuccessful. I think a big one that is a bit overlooked was just how many operations, specifically airborne ops, had been cancelled prior to Market. This created a mentality that Market was happening no matter what. It blinded them to anything that was not in favor of it. In the end it made it difficult for the Allies to accept that it ultimately failed because they still held hells highway, there was no retreat back to the start. It’s like if the German forces, after failing to take Antwerp had still managed to hold onto the ground they took during the battle of the bulge. Yes they were stopped but imagine the ground situation for the Allie’s if that happened. Well that’s pretty much what did happen following market garden. So it’s hard to blame them for calling it a 90% victory.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Yes, the First Allied Airborne Army was sitting on its backside in England doing nothing and itching to get back into the war. Only Montgomery had any ideas of using them at the time.

@toms9864

Жыл бұрын

If I remember correctly, there was a long time delay from when it was suggested to when it was implemented. This delay could have made a big difference in the outcome.

@spannerpasser

Жыл бұрын

@@toms9864 the operation which was the largest airborne operation planned at that time was planned in 7 days. Much of the Operation Comet stuff for the 1st Airborne Division was reused aircraft loading schedules and manifests for example. The DDay drop took months to plan.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Tom S It was made worse by Eisenhower, who took over hands on command of ground strategy on September 1st not moving his HQ from the Cherbourg area. It had bad communication lines and he took nearly a week to get back to Montgomery concerning Montgomerys idea to bounce the Rhine. That week made a big difference. That week was turned into two weeks before it went ahead. Eisenhower did not have his finger on the pulse. He was 600km away from the front line. It made no sense for him to insist on taking over command of the battle, and yet isolate himself from the actual battle. This shows how much of an inexperienced desk man he really was.

@toms9864

Жыл бұрын

@@spannerpasser From when the plan was initially suggested to when it was accepted was more than 7 days. Things change in the meantime. I am not blaming Monte for this operation being unsuccessful. However, wasn't this the time when Patton was held up due to lack of supplies for this operation?

Feel so sorry for Eisenhower. He shouldn't compromise so much to politics from Brits. Heart go with those otherwise should have been saved ally soldier lives.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

But he wasted far more lives in the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Operation Queen and then fell asleep allowing the Ardennes disaster to occur. Eisenhowers lack of strategic savvy cost the allies a couple of hundred thousand casualties in autumn 1944 with his broad front calamity which totally failed. Montgomerys Scheldt campaign was the only allied campaign of autumn 1944 in NW Europe to achieve its objectives.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Lyndon latrine - grab your loofah and jump in the channel with Bernard, he may give you the FULL MONTY

@jacktattis

Жыл бұрын

The Brits had no say in The Battle of the Hurtgen Forrest or the Lorraine Campaign by Patton

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Because they were tagging along and slowing the GIs down - fine soldiers but their Failed Marshall was ASS - like you in the comment sections

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

@@jacktattis Yep. All American failures those.

Ridiculous to say Montgomery wasn’t trusted to lead an operation after this; he was given command of the Northern sector at the battle of the Bulge. It was a bad plan but would likely have worked if XXX Corps made Arnhem when Frost still held the bridge. They would likely have done this if the 82nd had captured the Nijnmegan bridge and city before they arrived there and had to fight through it themselves. The plan would probably have worked if Browning and Gavin had prioritised capturing the bridge at Nijnmegan. This doesn’t seem to come up much as Gavin did a good job controlling the popular narrative after the war.

@davemac1197

7 ай бұрын

The Airborne planning for MARKET was done by Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army, which compromised Browning's original planning for the cancelled operation COMET. Key components of the COMET concept were the double airlifts on D-Day and the dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges. Brereton's air plan for MARKET was based on his earlier LINNET and LINNET II air plans for a three-division operation, but Browning was unable to object to changes since he had already threatened to resign over LINNET II being scheduled too soon for maps to be printed and distributed. Thankfully that operation was also cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident, but Browning knew that Brereton had planned to accept his resignation as deputy commander 1st AAA and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation. In other words, Browning was now politically neutralised and could not significantly influence the air planning for MARKET.[1] The only thing he could do was move up the delivery of his Corps HQ to the first lift (in place of some anti-tank guns going to Arnhem) and hope to influence events once he was on the ground. Gavin, for his part, told Cornelius Ryan in his interview for A Bridge Too Far that the British requested he drop a battalion on the north end of the Nijmegen bridge, and after toying with the idea he eventually dismissed it because of his experience in Sicily. There, the Troop Carriers had misdropped his 505th regiment over a huge area and he landed with just four or five men to command, and the division was disorganised for days.[2] He chose instead to deliver his three parachute regiments in a 'power center' and have the battalions fan out towards their objectives. For the Nijmegen mission, Gavin assigned the 508th PIR, with initial objectives on the Groesbeek ridge at De Ploeg (1st Bn), De Hut (2nd Bn) and the village of Berg-en-Dal (3rd Bn), cutting the main routes south out of Nijmegen. As Gavin had written to US Army Historical Officer Captain Westover in 1945, and confirmed to Cornelius Ryan in 1967, as the plan was shaping up he thought it was worth the gamble to send a battalion directly to the highway bridge in Nijmegen, so in the final divisional briefing he instructed Colonel Lindquist to commit his 1st Battalion to the bridge as soon as practical after landing. In this he was in agreement with Browning, who told him “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.”[3] There is no question here that Browning de-prioritised the capture of the Nijmegen bridge. That happened on D+1 when Gavin proposed a second attempt to take the bridge, and Browning rejected the idea in favour of waiting for armoured support to arrive from XXX Corps. This gets conflated with the pre-flight planning in many historical accounts. Officers who were present at the briefing were clear on Gavin's instruction to Colonel Lindquist - the Division G-3 (Operations) Officer Jack Norton recorded - "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion." Norton also recalled that Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him the route he wanted 1st Battalion to take to the bridge, avoiding the city centre and going over the farm area to the east.[3] The 508th's liaison officer to Division HQ, Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham also recalled the briefing - "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the [east] farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation."[4] The only officer present at the meeting who did not seem to understand this was Colonel Lindquist. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote, but Shanley was not present at the briefing. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge."[3] On D-Day, the 1st Battalion (Lt Col Shields Warren) and the 508th Regiment HQ (Colonel Lindquist) reached De Ploeg against little opposition. There, Lindquist was met by Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees, who told him the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left the highway bridge defended by an NCO and 17 men. Lindquist and Warren then organised a pre-planned recon patrol based on Lt Robert Weaver's 3rd Platoon of C Company and the Battalion S-2 (Intel) Section, to recon the bridge and report on its condition. The patrol got split up and only three scouts from the S-2 Section led by PFC Joe Atkins pushed though the crowds of jubilant Dutch civilians and found their way to the bridge. They surprised seven guards at the southern end of the bridge without firing a shot and waited an hour until dark for the rest of the patrol to arrive. When nobody showed up, they decided to withdraw and could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end of the bridge as they were leaving.[5] When Chet Graham decided to obtain a progress report on the Nijmegen bridge - "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the [1st] Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' " Only after Gavin's intervention did Colonel Lindquist order Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge at 8 PM. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.”[4] [1] The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: Allied operational command in northwest Europe, 1944 (Roger Cirillo PhD Thesis, 2001 Cranfield University). [2] James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University. Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967. [3] September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012). [4] Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012). [5] The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs (2013), chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge.

@nickdanger3802

6 ай бұрын

When XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem away from Arnhem having averaged just over 2 miles/3k per hour during daylight hours to that point. On day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water and he was told no more attempts would be made to reach him. The rest of 1st AB withdrew into The Pocket. The RAF provided all of the tugs and gliders for 1st AB and picked those zones because they were the only areas large enough for that many gliders. Doctrine was for gliders to land first to secure zones for jumpers. LZ Z was four miles from the rail bridge and yet it took 1st AB six hours to reach it just in time to see it blown up. The only reason the road bridge was not reinforced or destroyed being the local commander was KIA on his way back to his HQ after a meeting with Kraft. Two lifts were not possible on day one because there were not enough hours of daylight (round trip over 8 hours) to get men on the ground before sunset.

@nickdanger3802

6 ай бұрын

"By the time the German opposition had solidified on D+1, with mortars, light flak and armoured vehicles, there was really no chance of relieving Frost at the bridge, even with communications at their best." page 51 Canadian Military History PDF Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden Map Air Routes and Flak c8.alamy.com/comp/T2JPCF/battle-of-arnhem-airborne-divisions-fly-in-routes-september-1944-1968-old-map-T2JPCF.jpg

@davemac1197

6 ай бұрын

@@nickdanger3802 - they started that advance from the Son bridge at 0615 hrs on 19 September and arrived at Grave at 0820 hrs (you disingenuously forgot to mention they didn't stop there and went on to Nijmegen) - a journey of 42 km (26 miles) done in 2 hrs 5 mins and still less than two days elapsed time since the operation began. So the average speed taking into account the German resistance between Neerpelt and Eindhoven is not an indicator of how long it would have taken them to complete the last 18 km (11 miles) to Arnhem if the Nijmegen bridge(s) were in American hands. 1st Parachute Brigade dropped on DZ 'X' not LZ 'Z' between 1345 and 1400 hrs, 9 km (5.5 miles) from the Oosterbeek rail bridge and began their road march at 1500 hrs. The rail bridge was blown at 1800 hrs with British paratroops on it, so it was three hours not six, to reach it. The bridge had been prepared for demolition after the Normandy invasion in June and the sprengkommando of 11 men under an NCO had been stationed there for months. Dropping any closer or earlier would not have made any difference. The same thing happened with the rail bridges on the River Maas at Mook and Ravenstein. The Arnhem highway bridge was not prepared for demolition, so it couldn't be destroyed on 17 September. Same situation with the Nijmegen highway bridge in fact, which was 3 km closer to the 508th's DZ, the 508th landed 30 mins earlier than 1st Parachute Brigade, and they had virtually zero opposition on their route march before they stopped and dug in on the Groesbeek ridge, compared to Frost's battalion being harassed by MGs, mortars, and armoured cars on their route into Arnhem. The Nijmegen highway bridge was even guarded by fewer Germans than the Arnhem road bridge - 18 as opposed to 25. Frost carried out his mission successfully, Lindquist failed to even send his 1st Battalion as instructed by Gavin. Most of his recon patrol got lost and couldn't find the bridge, and the three scouts that did find it and held the southern end with seven prisoners for an hour without firing a shot, proved the whole battalion could have done the same if sent in good time. No reason why the first lift can't take off and the second lift return to base in the dark on the same day - just as Operation COMET had been scheduled to do. Fact is the Americans didn't have enough navigators in IX Troop Carrier Command trained for night flying. In fact only the leading aircraft in each serial even had a navigator in their C-47 crews. The Americans expanded their forces rapidly in order to achieve mass and bully their way into being the 'senior partner' in the Allied war effort, based only on numbers (and a huge amount of ego), but they only achieved this mass by sacrificing capability.

@bigwoody4704

3 ай бұрын

sorry dave hack XXX Crawl err,I mean Corp was suppose to be at the Nijmegan bridge in less than 2 days - not the almost 4 that it took. You're just pumping your little island's role in the big picture - shameful but expected Monty admitting it *The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part -I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we couldget free use of the port."* *(Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​* *A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198* Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. *"We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."* Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.

Monty's ego got in the way of reason

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

What ego? He was aiming for a bridgehead over the Rhine when the opportunity looked promising. How is that ego?

@alexlanning712

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 that was the plan, and it was folly

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@alexlanning712 I think it was Ambrose who said Monty had a big ego, then they all said the same thing.

@alexlanning712

Жыл бұрын

@@johnburns4017 Quite True--I'll withdraw from the argument

@alexlanning712

Жыл бұрын

@@johnburns4017 Plus "ego" is a huge part of the equation in any generals' makeup

That video contains too many inaccuracies to mention, including the final nonsense statement that Montgomery wasn't trusted to lead any further operations! That is absolutely not true. Another major untruth is that British XXX Corps were slow. In fact, despite all the delays, they reached Nijmegen six hours AHEAD of schedule. If Gavin's US 82nd Airborne had assaulted and taken that vital bridge immediately upon landing, the British tanks could have gone straight across and been in Arnhem within hours.

It seems the Germans were waiting for the allies to attack there. The cover story that a German soldier found the plans in a crashed glider is possibly true but the most likely scenario is a double agent possibly in the resistance who tipped the Germans off.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

The latter is not true. The crashed glider story is true and it belonged to the 101st Airborne's liaison officer to Browning's Corps HQ at Groesbeek, and the captured documents were the resupply schedule for the division. The glider had crashed near General Kurt Student's HQ at Vught, and as an airborne commander himself he was able to interpret the documents and extrapolate the airlift schedule for the operation. Model was not convinced, but Student asked his Luftwaffe chain of command to ensure fighters were over the landing zones when the transports were due to arrive, and fortunately the 2nd lift was delayed by weather in England so the fighters were back at their bases in Germanay being refuelled when the transports finally arrived. If the Germans had truly been tipped off about the airborne operation then they would have reinforced the bridges before they could be captured. This only happened at Nijmegen because the Airborne were too slow.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

No it isn't British Pathfinders were taken prisoners along with their radios. You're going to have to make up a bunch of wonderful new lies or people are not going to want go on reading

@alexbowman7582

Жыл бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 two armoured divisions refitting in the area?

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@alexbowman7582 and Bernard ignoring ULTRA pointing out precisely that. Walter Bedell-Smith brought that to his attention and the arrogant arse brushed him off. BTW my previous post was to the guy right above

@alexbowman7582

Жыл бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 Boy Browning ignored ULTRA evidence from Major Urquhart (who only died last year) but there were failures right through the officers.

it failed for three reasons:1)gavin doesnt take the nijimgen bridge on the 1st day,2)1st airborne wasnt dropped beside the bridge or south of the bridge and 3) the single resupply road

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

2) was not possible because of remaining flak, unsuitability of the drop zone for large scale glider landings (ground assumed too soft, with numerous ditches and limited access for wheeled transport) and unsuitable for paratroops on D-Day due to high tension lines crossing the zone, assumed would be cut and Flak cleared by the time the Poles were due to use the zone on D+2. 3) the single road routes for divisional advances were used by British 2nd Army since its breakout from Normandy very successfully and worked for Market Garden as far as Nijmegen, where it was stopped only by point 1). The Guards used their customary 'Club Route' to lead XXX Corps, with 'Heart Route' alternatives available if certain bridges were not secured, and the flanking VIII and XII Corps were on 'Spade Route' and 'Diamond Route' respectively.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Dave But weren't the Poles scheduled to be dropped just south of the bridge? How come it was ok for them?

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 - the assumption was that by the time the Poles were due to arrive on D+2 the area would be under the control of the 1st Parachute Brigade, so any remaining Flak guns would be dealt with, and the high tension lines crossing the zone from the Arnhem power station (now industrial units on Nieuwe Kade east of Baadhuisstraat) would be cut. In fact, the power station in 3rd Parachute Battalion's sector of the Brigade perimeter was the rendez-vous for the division's Royal Engineer squadrons and company after they had completed their primary tasks, so they would be in control of the station and cut the power to the lines. There were 6 light Flak guns at the point where the southern bridge viaduct meets the 'winter dijk' - the road on the dijk is called the Malburgse Bandijk. The drop zone was outside the loop of the modern N325 around the original 'Arnhem Zuid' built up area, but inside the loop of the Huissensedijk, which is also now built upon. In 1944 this area was still polder, criss-crossed by numerous drainage ditches with limited access for vehicles, ruling it out for large scale glider landings bringing in Jeeps and artillery for example. There were two heavy Flak positions on either side of this zone, the well-known one on the Meinerswijk that also fired on British units across thr river attempting to get to the bridge, and another at what is now the location of the Rijschool Arnhem Zuid on Kleefseplein. If you can find a copy online of the military map 06-NW-Arnhem, I found a good one you can view by searching 'Arnhem map 1944' and got the first hit on the right map on the Library of Congress - you can download it in JPEG (2616x1618 px) format to get a reasonable resolution copy. There should be others available if you have a search around the web, some in very high resolution (large file sizes!) The drop zone is the MALBURGSCHE POLDER area. The high tension line is marked by '-- o -- -- -- o --' across the zone, which would be a shocking experience for a glider or paratrooper to hit them! The Meinerswijk Flak Batterie (6 x 7.5cm heavy Flak, 3 x 2cm light Flak) was at grid ref 724772, and the Huissenstraat Batterie (6 x 7.5cm, 6 x 2cm) was at grid ref 748756. There were also 4* light Flak guns near Elden at 732751, where the De Koppel farm access road meets the main Nijmeegseweg from the bridge. (* light Flak platoons usually have 3 guns each, but there was one 2cm gun on the roof of each toll booth converted into a Flak tower at the north end of the Arnhem bridge (I believe one or both of the buildings were reinforced to create a bunker with a machine gun inside), so the 3rd gun in that platoon was probably attached to the platoon at the Elden position, hence 4 guns - just my speculation. The heavy Flak at Arnhem belonged to gemischte Flak-Abteilung 591 (v), ['gemischte' means mixed, with heavy and light batteries, but all heavy batteries have a platoon of light guns for their own local defence] providing the heavy batterien around the city at points north, east, south, and west. As best I can determine (Luftwaffe units very difficult to research because they destroyed their records at the end of the war) the deployment was: 1./gem.591 [RAD 4./216 - 6 x 7.5cm M.36(f) - Arnhem West - Meinerswijk] 2./gem.591 [RAD 6./214 - 6 x 7.5cm M.36(f) - Arnhem Nord - Mentenberg?] 3./gem.591 [RAD 11./212 - 6 x 7.5cm M.36(f) - Arnhem Ost - Velper Broek?] 4./gem.591 [RAD 1./208 - 6 x 7.5cm M.36(f) - Arnhem Sud - Stads Waarden?] 5./gem.591 [RAD 6./212 - 15 x 2cm - 12 guns at Oosterbeek spoorbrug] 6./gem.591 [RAD 6./212? - 15 x 2cm - 18 guns at Westervoort IJsselbruggen] The (f) indicates they are captured French guns, in this case Schneider 75mm M.36 guns, very similar in appearance and capability to the famous German 8.8cm. A large number were captured in 1940 and added to German inventories and manned by RAD (Reichs Arbeits Dienst - State Labour Service) crews to expand the Luftwaffe Flak manpower, but Abteilung staff were Luftwaffe. The light Flak at Arnhem bridge I believe is from another Abteilung, leichte Flak-Abteilung 845 (o), which was responsible for bridges and ferries on the Waal and Neder Rijn area. My data on them is: 1./le.845 (from le.Res.Flak-Bttr. 13./VI) [12 x 3.7cm] 2./le.845 (from le.Res.Flak-Bttr. 14./VI) [12 x 3.7cm] 3./le.845 (from le.Res.Flak-Bttr. 15./VI) [12 x 3.7cm] 4./le.845 (also known as RAD 4./281) [15 x 2cm - Arnhem Zuid (Rijnbrug)?] One of these batteries I think was probably located at Pannerden and another at Huissen, to guard the ferries, but it's not confirmed they belonged to this unit. There were at least 9 guns (three platoons) at each location on the British Intel 'Defence Overprint' maps I've seen. So this area was completely unsuitable for major airborne landings, except possibly a small coup de main glider attack using just six gliders carrying an Airlanding Company like the Pegasus Bridge operation (Operation 'Deadstick') in Normandy. Since the area was not under wide control beyond the bridge by 1st Parachute Brigade as planned, it was still unsuitable for the Poles and no question their drop zone had to be relocated away from the area to Driel. Considering all these problems, you can see how the zones around Wolfheze were seen as "ideal" landing zones for the division and easily defendable.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

ha! two slappies on the same account agreeing with each other - get help

damn and here i thought that was the fall of France that was the biggest allied defeat of ww2

Thank you Mr. Robot

A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was: *1)* Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or; *2)* Take the Schedlt. Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, a push to the north on his stretched broad front lines. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower.Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, and was actually a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack. Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. *Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany.* Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Sorry Johnny you're going to have to make up a whole bunch of wonderful new lies or people aren't going to want to go on reading. The failed marshmellow monty never showed certainly no field marshall like Model *"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co.From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219"...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."* *Air Marshall Aurthur Tedder, With Prejudice, p.586* Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination* which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. *Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder* : "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." *Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415* After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. *After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, *Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem*

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the British general who had to take command of two shambolic US armies in the German Bulge attack? 20 points for the correct answer.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

And Antwerp WAS open by the end of November.... yet the Americans went on to fail in Operation Queen and then were in retreat in the Ardennes. Antwerp being opened was never some magic wand that would have made everything perfect. In fact it changed the situation not a jot. As a matter of fact its not much of a difference in distance from Le Havre to Aachen than it was from Antwerp to where the Americans were wasting supplies and men in the Alsace and Vosges.

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 In the Bulge attack, British forces secured the US rear and also secured their supplies from Antwerp.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

John Cornell,err, I mean lyndon that wasn't the time line the tosser monty set. Who after the war admitted "a bad mistake on my part"

Defeat was due to 30 Corps being unable to reach Arnhem in time. The Germans were dealt a lucky hand. Montgomery:s achilles heel was the route 30 Corps had to take. Fashionable for the chattering classes to talk down the Allies regardless. Book sales etc Need to check the scoreboard. 1st Airborne held out far longer than asked against a larger force. As pyrrhic victory none the less.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Nothing to do with the route or the infamous "single road" - the script for the film A Bridge Too Far has a lot to answer for. The tanks arrived in Nijmegen in good time to get to Arnhem in the promised two days, only to find the Nijmegen bridges were still in German hands and heavily reinforced with SS-Panzer troops. The failure of the operation had nothing to do with XXX Corps at all. They were let down, along with 1st Airborne and Montgomery.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

XXX Corps did 100km in just 3 days. This was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. The route can't have been that bad. They actually did get 90% along it in pretty good time.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 - on the subject of KZread high strangness, I've only just received an email notification of your post here, actually made over "1 hour ago"!

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

@@davemac1197 Hi Dave. Im getting to the end of my tether with You Tube 😂

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 - you'renot the first. A friend of mine who taught IT in college gave up on KZread years ago! At least you can still complain about KZread comments in KZread comments, so I suppose that's one step above Ruzzia and Ch1n@!

A number of big mistakes were made. One was using one road that was elevated and easy to attack the ground forces (tanks). Germans got lucky and captured the plans so follow up drops and supplies were delivered straight into German arms.

A lot of them weren't mistakes (although there were plenty), but unavoidable circumstance!

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Every operation has mistakes and unavoidable circumstances, but not every operation fails. The failure in Market Garden was the failure to secure the Nijmegen highway bridge on the first afternoon, when it was guarded by an NCO and seventeen men. This failure was due to a command failure at the top of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the unit had a history of such problems on their first combat operation in Normandy. 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) refers.

@bigwoody4704

7 ай бұрын

Dave hack the only false assumption is you,the pathetic idea of having to fly over 300 miles one way was the 1st cock up.There were more flights,much longer flights,and a lot less day light than the D-Day landing 3 months earlier.Oh and the pathetic instigator of it all - Bernard got scarce as his debacle came apart immediately 3 miles from Joe's Bridge in Belgium Even the planners of Linnet/Comet stated that as soon as the flight formations hit the Dutch coast the Gerries stationed there would be radioing back to all the troops along highway 69 straight up to Arnhem - losing all tactical surprise - so you must be a Wehrmacht sympathizer to appreciate it

Monty didn’t plan Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery’s relations with the commander of Second TAF, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, were poor, and he was largely excluded from the planning process. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF. It was Brereton and Williams who: ▪ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ▪ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ▪ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ▪ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ▪ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE 1944-1945. Rick Atkinson: _“General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in Dragoon the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.”_ Beyond the initial broad outline, Monty didn’t plan the operation and nor did he have any jurisdiction over the air forces. He can consult and discuss but he cannot give them orders. Monty’s aides tried to persuade Brereton to double missions on the 17th but Brereton refused and as I just pointed out, Monty even went back on his idea for the 101st to be strung out over a long distance when a Taylor argued against it. Monty did not wish to step on the toes of the airborne commanders. He respected their views and he let them plan it. Also neither Montgomery nor Browning could dissuade the RAF from deciding to drop 1st Airborne so far way from the Arnhem bridge, which led to the vast majority of 1st Airborne not even reaching it. The orders of advice Marshall Hollinghurst could not be changed. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst are the ones who should be vilified, not Montgomery. It was their decisions that screwed the operation and prevented it from being a 100% success. Eisenhower: _“I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.”_

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

burns you've lied once - continuously then why did he admit it? Get a life

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Montgomery could have easily shifted the blame onto others such as Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst etc but he did not. Montgomery never blamed any other commander or any specific divisions etc. Only himself. In contrast to Brereton who blamed British 1st Airborne and XXX Corps. Brereton never admitted his own culpability.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Why don't you try your John Cornell account, sad but more believable than this sock account you slappies monty had access to ULTRA and ordered it forward anyway. How does is feel to not only lie about a pedo but support him EVERY DAY - repeatedly. How sad is your existence the chattering ebola chimp burns repeating every day demented drivel. *Monty even admitted it after the war a bad mistake on my part.* Do you tossers even work? Seemingly no as you sit here 24/7 badmouthing a country that foolishly came to your aid .Propped you up,fed and fueled your supposed efforts IKE and the GIs gave Monty/Brooke 4 full years to cross the English Channel.What was the problem?30 miles the GIs came 3500 miles and supplied your wavering war efforts AGAIN just like the last war. By the way. How do you British have Australia, Canada,SAfrica and India make up half your forces and say you did anything on your own. India was a protectorate I get that and so was South Africa, but neither are really British,. And Australians and Canadians have their own countries - they live in Australia and Canada I believe. You're Great Britain until attacked but then become the UK But yet you had help from the ENTIRE English speaking world and still claim you stood alone. Doesn't happen and you rubes just made it up. That is what you do, make up shit

I can respect a man that blames at least part of failure on yourself

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

He could have thrown Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst under the bus but he didn't. Brereton threw British 1st Airborne and XXX Corps under the bus.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 um no IKE gave Bernard one more shot at the big boy table and he didn't even show while his boys waited until 2:30 in the afternoon to move from the Belgian Border. And as you know Carrington stopped after crossing the bridge when he finally did arrive,and you call him "LORD" the other guy never shows and you call him "Field Marshall". One can learn so much from the Lyndon Library 🤣

1st Airborne took 8000 casualties, engineers managed to ferry out 2000 of the division out under cover of rain and darkness. The ground along the roads to the destination was wet and would snarl tanks in mud so leaving the road to advance more broadly was largely impossible. If the allies had bombed all the airfields in the area and all along the route on both sides, the 1st Airborne could have landed closer to Arnheim and the ambushes along the roads would have been fewer and less intense. Monty did not see his plan through to the end, and did not undertake his usual build up of logistics, Frost, the commander at Arnheim bridge blamed Browning for the failure of the operation.

The excuse of the British Airborne dropping into 2 German armoured divisions is so untrue. Both were under-strength, being re-equipped, with no tanks and seriously under-manned.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

They had a few tanks, but 1st Airborne Division took more anti-tank guns to Arnhem, 83 in total, including 16 of the heavy 17-pounder guns. In fact, Model had less than 100 operational tanks in his entire Heeresgruppe B in September, facing Montgomery's 21st Army Group with 2,400 to put things into context. SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 based at the Saksen-Weimar kazerne in northern Arnhem had 3 Mark V Panther tanks and two Flakpanzer IV 'Möbelwagen'. I have a Dutch historical article that tells a story about a Dutch resident in the corner house at the end of Callunastraat receiving a knock on the door on the Friday morning (15 September) asking for any spare milk. They were SS panzer crewmen who explained they had removed their tanks from the barracks and hidden them under trees on the Heijenoordseweg to avoid possible bombing. According to Christer Bergström's Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2 (2019, 2020), two of the Panthers were disabled in western Arnhem by B Company of 3rd Parachute Battalion on 19 September with a Gammon bomb and a PIAT. The third tank survived to participate in the siege of Oosterbeek. The two Möbelwagen are well-documented and photographed operating along the Dreijenseweg against 4th Parachute Brigade on 19 September. SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 had 16 Mark IV tanks concentrated in 5.Kompanie and 4 Stug IIIG assault guns concentrated in 7.Kompanie, both part of Kampfgruppe Reinhold (II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10) at the Klooster Kranenburg (monastery) near Vorden. The SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 headquarters was at the Huis 't Medler, a little further east of Vorden. Their I.Abteilung with a few Panthers were still training at Grafenwöhr in Germany and would not be fully operational and join the division until operation Nordwind in January 1945. My main source for this is Dieter Stenger's history of the 10.SS-Panzer-Division, Panzers Wast And West (2017), and James Sim's (of 2nd Parachute Battalion) book Arnhem Spearhead (1978) confirms that the Mark IV tanks were all held back for action at Nijmegen until the end of the siege at Arnhem bridge, because he saw them all lined up in Arnhem waiting to cross over when he surrendered at the bridge. According to 10.SS-Panzer-Division commander Heinz Harmel, the Mark IV tanks were too heavy for the Pannerden ferry, so they could not get them to Kampfgrupp Reinhold at Nijmegen until after the Arnhem bridge was cleared.

@GregWampler-xm8hv

4 ай бұрын

Eeeeyeah uh NO. Ask the British troops the following: * Drop on 2 partial SS armored divisions * Don't drop on 2 partial SS armored divisions

The Dutch told them that pre war exercises that tanks would be picked off esasly

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

But XXX Corps still did 100km in 3 days. This was the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

um no they only advanced 10 miles after Monty Garden until the port of Antwerp was opened on 28 November . Would you like Miles Dempsey and Freddie Deguingand's comment on that? If you quit posting I shall dig it out

@OTDMilitaryHistory

Жыл бұрын

Any corridor that thin with an entire corps moving down one road is prime tank ambush territory. The plan was ill-conceived from the beginning.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@OTDMilitaryHistory absolutely - Monty Garden

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

@@OTDMilitaryHistory It wasn't based on a single road. Horrocks XXX corps thrust was along that road, but VIII corps (Richard O'Connor) and XII corps (Neil Ritchie) attacked in the same direction along a different route.

The main reason it failed was that the Allies after breaking out of Normandy were able to travel across France and reach the edges of Germany in a few weeks. Once the Germans reached their own country, they would be fighting for the own country and their families. The Germans would fight hard and contest every advance into Germany. The events of the Battle of Bulge and its aftermath showed that breaking Germany was going to be tough. I think the US and British generals thought they could end the war by Christmas. This belief created unrealistic expectations. This created conditions that meant the failure of Market Garden and the other attempts to break the German lines that fall. Something similar occurred in the Pacific Theater.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

In September though, particularly early September the Germans were comparatively weak. They were in a sorry state just after Normandy and Bagration. A stronger, better backed push may have succeeded. We must point fingers at Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst for the fatal decisions they made with the Market (air portion) of Market Garden, such as dispersed drops over a number of days and not flying closer to Arnhem.

@johnlucas8479

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 Explain 1) how Brereton, Williams could have delivered the Market Force earlier than they did and 2) where in the Arnhem Area could they landed 1st British Airborne that was closer to the bridge? If you cannot not answer those 2 questions than how can you point the finger at Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst and say their decision was fatal. Remember William was responsible for the air plans for Husky, D-Day, Dragoon as well as the cancelled operation Linnet 1 & 2. The last 3 each had 2 lifts schedule for D-Day. So, ask the question what causes Williams to decide only a single lift could be achieved on 17th. Can you provide an alternative plan? You can also point the finger to Dempsey for the failure of XII and VIII Corp to prevent the Germans attacking the highway. Then Montgomery received the final Market plan on the 15th, after studying the Market plan allow the operation to proceed, clearly, he didn't consider the Market fatally flawed.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@johnlucas8479 don't waste your breath, this guy has got into arguments with 2 actual soldiers - in his keyboard kommando style safe at home out of reach. Too bad the Monty and him weren't around to suffer for bernard's handiwork

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

John Lucas. Double missions were possible, if difficult. Most argued for them including Montgomery. The RAF even told Brereton it could fly double missions to Arnhem but Brereton rejected this and insisted that NO divisions have double missions flown on day one even though the RAF had that capability. A coup de main could have been made on the Arnhem bridge. Though not ideal, there was ground just south of the Arnhem bridge that paratroopers could have used although not gliders. Richard Gale of 6th Airborne insisted Urquhart went along too meekly with the RAF decisions and he said he would have done things differently regarding some drop zones. Grudgingly Urquhart himself said the same thing. The fatal flaws of Market Garden were ensured when Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst made the respective decisions to not fly double missions on day one or not fly closer to Arnhem. Brereton had to gall to absolve all responsibility from himself and instead pass the buck squarely onto British 1st Airborne and XXX Corps. He did this openly in a 1960s tv interview. XXX Corps did the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. 100km in 3 days. Not the fault of XXX Corps that all three Airborne Divisions failed in their primarily tasks.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

John Lucas, Ref: "Heeresgruppe B, Ic Nr. 1887/44 gKdos of October 1, 1944. Concerning: Report on experience gained during combat and destruction of British 1st Airborne Division." "..the main mistake made by the enemy was that the entire British 1st Airborne Division was not dropped simultaneously, but over a period of three days" This document is reproduced in full on pages 716 to 719 in Margry's Market Garden Then And Now two volume compendium. The decision to disperse drops over three days rests squarely with Brereton and Williams. Nobody else. Regarding VIII and XII Corps failing to prevent the Germans momentarily, and it was only momentarily, cutting off Hells Highway is irrelevant, because the operation had already failed by then. British 1st Airborne did not fail in Arnhem and the US 82nd did not fail in Nijmegen due to Hells Highway being cut. They failed for other reasons, notably the decisions made by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst.

On the battlefield the germans fought as well as could be expected with no air cover

PS- When I think of Monty, I think of a tight assed little man who can win only when he outnumbers his opponents by a large margain, and fusses about all the time. And after 2nd Alamein he could not or would not move fast to crush the little that remained of Panzer Armee Afrika who were desperately trying to flee and whose rear guards were paper thin. And he had an ego as large as the rings of Saturn. I know, I know, Patton was a prima donna as well.

@thevillaaston7811

Жыл бұрын

You met him when?

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Why do you think that? If Montgomery were alive in the modern era he would probably be diagnosed as having high-functioning Aspergers, which would make you an a-hole for being so intolerant. You need to do more research...

Never heard such a biased account of an Allied failure. It’s true a lot went wrong. Most commanders would happily accept a 90% success. You didn’t even mention the Polish contribution. And give no recognition of the German response. Both Patton and Bradley made mistakes in North West Europe. And Montgomery had to help out in the Battle of the Bulge. Then there was the small matter of the Rhine crossing during spring 1945. It was an Allied failure not exclusively a British one!

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

The Rhine crossing operation plunder was a complete success! So im a bit lost to what your talking about ??

@eddiegilbey3846

Жыл бұрын

The narrator stated “Montgomery was never allowed to lead another operation.” The crossing of the Rhine was as you say a success. My final sentence was about Market Garden. I was not suggesting the Rhine crossing was a failure .

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

@@eddiegilbey3846 .Market Garden was not Montgomery's operation! Brereton USAAF carried out Market Garden! Montgomery planned operation Comet but cancelled due to his intelligence finding panzer units in the area of operations! Eisenhower insisted that the operation go ahead and handed the operation to Brereton USAAF who with Williams and Browning planned and carried out Market Garden . Operation Plunder was in 1945 which involved 1.2 million men !

@bluemarshall6180

Жыл бұрын

A bridge too far.

@dmbeaster

Жыл бұрын

It should be clear that "90% successful" was an ass-covering lie by Montgomery. This was an Allied failure, but Montgomery merits top billing in the failure department. The thing was also hastily planned, and not well thought out. The paratroopers were too spread out, and the drop zones bad (they were good for insuring a highly successful drop, and they were highly successful, but too far from many objectives). Dropping in daylight insured good drops, but required multiple days of drops. There were not enough transport to get more than half there in one lift. Two drops in one day means one will be in the dark. Should in be the initial or second? An initial drop pre-dawn would almost certainly have been a failure based on prior experience. A second drop in the dark serves little purpose in comparison to a daylight drop the next morning. The whole thing hinged on essentially no meaningful resistance and capturing all bridges intact. Both assumptions were bad, and it took only modest resistance to wreck the plan. Bridges were easily hlown as there was essentially no coup de main as to any bridge.

You did a good job in presenting the facts.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

He didn't. His 'facts' are incorrect. He even got it wrong and claimed Eisenhower didn't trust Montgomery to command another operation again. Ardennes, Grenade, Blockbuster, Varsity etc proves otherwise. Eisenhower even asked Montgomery for help and to command AMERICAN armies in the Ardennes.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Lyndon you slappy what part of him admitting *a bad mistake on my part* didn't you understand - try one of the other alias accounts

Monty woos the wimmins.... In 1925, in his first known courtship of a woman, Montgomery, then in his late thirties, proposed to a 17-year-old girl, Betty Anderson. His approach included drawing diagrams in the sand of how he would deploy his tanks and infantry in a future war, a contingency which seemed very remote at that time. She respected his ambition and single-mindedness, but declined his proposal of marriage

Doesnt Matter whether or not Monty was in charge of Market Garden They had the Max of 17000 casualties Bradley and Hodges lost a max of 55000 at the Battle of Hurtgen Forrest Patton lost 55000 at the Lorraine Metz Campaign and it took 3 months So I would say you Americans need a wake up call and Vilify someone else . How about Eisenhower who had never been a field commander

@nickdanger3802

Жыл бұрын

Market Garden 17-27 September 1944 Battle of Hürtgen Forest 19 September - 16 December 1944 55,000 The figure includes losses from entire battle, 9 September to 17 February Lorraine campaign and Fortress Metz 1 September - 18 December 1944

@jacktattis

Жыл бұрын

@@nickdanger3802 Nick it Doe not matter one iota 55000 IS 55000 17000 is 17000 Your beloved USArmy was done like a dinner in one and the other spoiled Georgy Porgys Dash

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Tatters you are a troll that has gotten smacked around on other web pages. Everyone had their way with you like a cheap floozy near a Military base until you bailed deleting everything. Another one of John Burns/Gary Thomas creations perhaps amongst others have not sourced a damn thing but your backside

@nickdanger3802

Жыл бұрын

@@jacktattis 17,000 times 3 equals 51,000 casualties per month fuk wit.

@jacktattis

Жыл бұрын

@@nickdanger3802 I just told toy it did not go 3 months Snot gobbler

i love how you left out the fact that the 82nd airborne failed to capture nijmegen bridge on day one....... talk about a biased perspective !!! 😂

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

It's the 'conventional narrative' yet again. The video maker probably believes OBL is still hiding in a cave in Afghanistan! Very poor research.

@tankmaker9807

Жыл бұрын

Are you aware that the 101st did not go into Eindhoven until 0900 on D+1, the 18th?

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Richard the Loin - i love how monty's shit plan came apart immediately 9 tanks taken out in 3 miles stopping the column and your favorite POOF monty was no where around. Probably playing with you or the little swiss boy - can't make that shyt up. Going up one elevated lane for 70 miles with no room for manuever because of the marshes on both sides is the idea of an idiot who had no business leading a Boy Scout Assembly. So quite understanble why you like him - birds of a feather and all

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

tankmaker He's talking about the 82nd at Nijmegen, not the 101st at Eindhoven.

@tankmaker9807

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751My post was to make him aware that not all bridges were taken on the 17th. What is the purpose of your post?

On paper this was a very good plan. However all it took was one good German ambush to slow down xxx Corp and leave the airborne holding the bag til they couldn't hold on anymore.

It was a failure from Ike down to Monty to both British and American Corps commanders. Only group I don't blame are the Poles.

@davemac1197

11 ай бұрын

No American Corps commanders were involved in the operation. The fault was Colonel Lindquist's of the 508th PIR for failing to move on the undefended Nijmegen highway bridge on the first afternoon, and the responsibility for his divisional plan not being carried out rests with Gavin. Sources: Lost At Nijmegen, RG Poulussen (2011) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012) Montgomery had nothing to do with the planning of the operation as this was carried by Browing's British I Airborne Corps and Dempsey's British 2nd Army staffs for Operation Comet, and after Montgomery cancelled Comet and replaced it with a proposal for Market Garden by adding the two US Airborne Divsions, the air planning was handed over to Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army, who deleted the glider coup de main attacks on the Arnhem, Nijmegen and Grave bridges, and also deleted the double airlift on the first day, compromising the original airborne concept. The Poles were not without fault, but did not compromise the operation, arriving too late to affect the outcome, but helped facilitate the evacuation of the 1st Airborne Division from Oosterbeek.

stop blaming monty

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

I call it Montgomery Derangement Syndrome.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Some Americans have to. It deflects away from the failures of Hodges, Patton, Bradley and Eisenhower...... which were far worse.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

It's the truth it took 16 days for Rommel to kick Bernies ass into the sea and 4 yrs for the laggard to come back - after the GIs and Russians started pounding them. You revisionist rubes are a human version of the Hindenberg,gonna explode any moment. Go tell your tales to Poland and The Czechs who you cowards like lyndon abondoned to the Reich and the Russians. Your inferiority complex bleeds out in every post

@jacktattis

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 Most Americans I am sad to say. Lies told long enough and loud enough become the new truth All the US generals were looking to the future and wanted to be shown in the best light Many failures were overlooked by those Officers own publicity machines Case in Point during the war Eichelberger said that New Guinea was a wholly Australian Run affair Post war he changed his tune

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

are you off your meds or on the scotch? A. E. F. stood for American Expeditionary Forces or as the GIs and the rest of Europe said - After England Failed. Bernard had 4 full yrs to come across a crummy 30 mile channel. The GIs came 3500 miles to do it for him,pathetic I'm sure you'd agree

Too much had to go right for this to be successful. I don't blame anyone,plan was too ambitious and over reach. To you German fans great counter and blocking force.

@eddevin6250

Жыл бұрын

Not to mention rear guard actions on Germany part!

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

All the US para units had to do was get to the bridges ASAP. They were undefended. The 82nd could have walked on Nijmegen bridge whistling Dixie.

@eddevin6250

Жыл бұрын

@@johnburns4017 well what's a paratrooper. with out armor support and infantry? Nothing they may get the.bridge and die. According to what I read,the armour never got there.

@eddevin6250

Жыл бұрын

How long can paratrooper hold out without support, not long.

@johnburns4017

Жыл бұрын

@@eddevin6250 All the US para units had to do was get to the bridges ASAP. They were undefended. The 82nd could have walked on Nijmegen bridge whistling Dixie.

Great video...

The only good thing to come out of MG, was the losses were absorbed, and considering, it could have been a far worse debacle

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Well it also created a protective buffer zone in front of Antwerp, and the ground east of Nijmegen was where the British and Canadians advanced into Germany from. Taking that ground at a later date in say late October or November in worse weather and probably stronger German defenses would have taken longer, been more difficult and possibly with greater casualties. It was good going to advance 100km in just 3 days. That was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945.

@alexlanning712

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 buddy your posts are going in the bin, I'm over it, arent you?

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@alexlanning712 good decision, Lyndon's latrine has made and deleted numerous accounts to agree with himself. He has been busted answering to two different accounts. How sad really is that? look at the picture - he belongs right next to his hero Bernard in the channel

@alexlanning712

Жыл бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 Buddy "not surprised", I have known for some time, social media is a jungle!I used to belong on FB and found the same thing.I know I'm forthright, without being a troll or being obnoxious, but some of peoples' replies were less than welcoming and desirable, and maybe, i know, my therapist might consider me, "in need of help", but I've come accross many people, more mad, than me! Well, Woody, "stay safe" in this medium, and once again, Thanks for your help!

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@alexlanning712 thanx I tried being tactful and objective really i did but many (I.E. Lyndon/John Burns) probably the same troll will stop at nothing to get Monty off the hook. Most American posters don't mind pasting MacArthur because like Mony was a disingenuous,deceitful prick who likewise was an impediment to the allied war effort

One of the best German victories ever.😁

@Desperately-Coping-Incel-Sperg

Жыл бұрын

Hello friend

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

How is losing 100km of ground including major towns Eindhoven and Nijmegen and allowing 2nd British Army to get across the Waal one of the best Germany victories ever?

Never saw the accual numbers, but I believe over all in Europe more American soldiers died under Montieee than were killed by Rommel. Market garden, battle of the bulge, Antwerp, on-and-on..

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

Market Garden was not Montgomery's operation! Brereton USAAF! As for more American soldiers died under Montgomery's command ? Source ? Montgomery did have 2 American armies under his command at the Bulge and operation plunder! American losses at the Hurtgen forest 30000 , the Bulge 30000 and metz 50000! Market garden about 12000

@michaelkenny8540

Жыл бұрын

The good thing about beliefs is that they don't depend on evidence. Thus you are free to believe any lie/invention/fiction that tickles your fancy. I am amazed that anyone could make such an absurd claim.

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

@@michaelkenny8540 . ???

@michaelkenny8540

Жыл бұрын

@@garythomas3219 reply to post 1

@mathswithgarry7104

Жыл бұрын

Given hiow long the Yanks fought in North Africa, and how long they fought in Europe under Monty, this is an entirely useless comparison.

poor planning from the top the grunts on the ground were brave but generals were idiots

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

The top commanders mostly responsible for the fatal planning decisions were Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

The idea of Monty in charge of a operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable terror.And the Krauts with incredible Joy. Go visit his statue in Arnhem - oh wait there isn't one

I blame the Americans for not taking Nijmegan, they waited over 24 hours before even attempting to set off to the objective they'd been given. How does everyone seem to oversee this fatal mistake?

@davemac1197

11 ай бұрын

It was a command failure by the Colonel in command of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment assigned to take Nijmegen on D-Day of the operation. Gavin's divisional plan and instructions to Colonel Lindquist included sending a battalion straight to the bridge after seizing the intitial objectives on the Groesbeek ridge. Lindquist was not a good field commander and thought he had to wait for a divisional order before moving on the bridge. When Gavin found out from the 508th Liaison Officer, Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham, that he was waiting for the Drop Zone to be cleared (by D Company helping the S-4 to established the regimental supply dump at Voxhill farm), Gavin was as "mad" as Graham had ever seen him. They went by Jeep to the 508th CP and Gavin told Lindquist "I told you to move with speed." It seems that Gavin (perhaps honourably) did not want to throw a subordinate officer under the bus and decided to take responsibility for the failure himself (as Lindquist's supervisor) by conflating the relative priorities between bridge and ridge, with, it would seem, some support from Browning in their post-war correspondence. So that established the post-war narrative. In his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far (1974), Gavin only briefly mentions the political problems in the Division when he says that Ridgway (CO of the 82nd in Normandy) did not trust Lindquist and wouldn't promote him. He said, in fact, that Ridgway had a problem in that he couldn't promote any other Colonel in the Division over him because Lindquist had seniority in the grade. He doesn't go any further and none of this appears in Ryan's book, which appears to suggest the operation was a British failure. The Hollywood film version only emphasises that because the film was aimed at an American audience and financed by pre-selling distribution rights to United Artists based on the guaranteed box office of its many stars. It might explain why Gavin also failed to replace himself as Assistant Division Commander after Ridgway was promoted to command XVIII Airborne Corps, he may have had the same problem with regard to promoting Colonels in the Division. Instead, according to DIvision G03 Operations Officer Lt Col Jack Norton (in John C McManus, September Hope - The American Side to a Bridge Too Far, 2012), Gavin actually showed Lindquist on a map the exact route he wanted the 1st Battalion to tke to the Nijmegen bridge. Nordyke's source, Captain Chet Graham, who also sat in on the divisional briefing, said "Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." McManus goes into quite a lot of analysis on this question of priorities and quite clearly explains why Lindquist was expected to take the ridge and then send one battalion on to the bridge without delay. It appears that every officer present understood this rationale except Lindquist himself. The interesting thing in terms of 'what if', is that Lindquist did organise a pre-planned recon patrol based on Lt Lee Frigo's 1st Battalion S-2 (Intel) Section and a reinforced 3rd Platoon of C Company under Lt Bob Weaver, and although most of this patrol got separated from the S-2 point team and got lost in the back streets of Nijmegen, the three-man point team under PFC Joe Atkins reached the Highway bridge, took seven prisoners by surprise without firing a shot and waited at the southern end of the bridge for an hour for the others to show up before deciding to withdrw as it got dark. Only as they left they could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end, which we now know was SS-Hauptsturmführer Victor Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 arriving from Arnhem. This story originally came from Zig Boroughs' The 508th Connection (2013). This mistake was not overlooked, but more like covered up. The recent books published around 2012 is after the senior officers involved have all passed away, and the more junior officers witness to the events now felt free to speak out before they passed on.

@DaveSCameron

11 ай бұрын

@@davemac1197 Hallo there and I am most grateful for your extensive explanation of my initial point, indeed it was Major Gavin who dithered about his dz wasting critical hours placing his men around a perimeter in defence of a phantom rumour when it is evident that his immediate objective was that bridge. Best wishes 🙏 ☘️

@davemac1197

11 ай бұрын

@@DaveSCameron - thank you, but contrary to the post-war narrative established by Gavin in his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for his book, A Bridge Too Far (1974), in which Gavin only alluded to some political problems in the Division (in the interview but not included in the book) and created the impression that he "dithered" over his priorities, it is clear from the more recent sources that have spoken out since the primary suspects have passed away that Gavin was very clear on what he expected from Colonel Lindquist in the final divisional briefing. Gavin's plan was based on the available intelligence, which had not positively located the 10.SS-Panzer-Division in the eastern Netherlands. So Gavin was told there may be "a regiment of SS" in Nijmegen, and it was believed there was a tank depot in the Kleve area, so the Reichswald forest may be host to a number of tanks laagered there. It started the silly rumour the forest could be hiding 1,000 tanks, but Gavin had to plan for the Groesbeek ridge possibly being occupied by combat troops and an armoured counter-attack from his rear. We know his rationale for selecting the 504th for the Maas bridge mission at Grave, because it was his best regiment and the Grave bridge was on the division supply line. The next choices are more problematic - the 505th and 508th were both 'over establishment' using the new experimental organisation of 167+ men per Company, while the 504th had barely recovered their numbers after Anzio to the official 130 men per Company. But while the 505th were almost as experienced as the 504th, the 508th had the problematic commander who had not performed as well as his brave troopers in Normandy. It is somewhat baffling why Gavin chose the more experienced and aggressive 505th to face the Reichswald (and secure a second River Maas bridge target) in a more defensive role, than the 508th that had to secure a potentially occupied Groesbeek ridge line as well as send a battalion to grab one of the only two available bridges over the Waal in the city. Gavin didn't dither (until after the war), but Lindquist did, and Gavin covered for him.

@jerryg53125

11 ай бұрын

Gavin was NOT in charge.British General Boy Browning was running the operation.Gavin did what Browning told him to do.Take the Groesbeek Heights and wait for 30 Corp.

@davemac1197

11 ай бұрын

@jerryg53125 - sorry, but you're wrong. Cornelius Ryan was mislead or did not get the full story: September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012), Chapter 3: ‘Foreboding’ - As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.” General Browning’s order, of course, made perfect sense. It was of paramount importance to hold the high ground. Any commander worth his salt understood that. Even so, the purpose of Market Garden was to seize the bridges in order to speedily unleash a major armored thrust into northern Germany, toward Berlin. High ground notwithstanding, the only way for the Allies to accomplish this ambitious objective was to take the bridges, and these were, after all, perishable assets, because the Germans could destroy them (and might well be likely to do so the longer it took the Allies to take the bridges). By contrast, the Groesbeek ridge spur wasn’t going anywhere. If the 82nd had trouble holding it, and German artillery or counterattacks became a problem, the Allies could always employ air strikes and artillery of their own to parry such enemy harassment. Also, ground troops from Dempsey’s Second Army could join with the paratroopers to retake Groesbeek from the Germans. So, in other words, given the unpleasant choice between the bridges and the hills, the bridges had to come first. General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance. At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote. Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion." Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012), Chapter 9: 'Put Us Down In Hell' - Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." Nordyke op cit, Chapter 10: 'Use Trench Knives and Bayonets' - Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liasion officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "

I love the German army

Great you mentioned the Polish airborne.. 👍

Another video presenting the outdated conventional narrative presented in A Bridge Too Far... The delay at Son was effectively zero hours because the Bailey bridge was constructed entirely in the hours of darkness, when it was doctrine not to operate tanks. The myth that the tanks were "36 hours behind schedule" after Son was started by A Bridge Too Far and debunked by John Sliz's book Bridging The Club Route (2015) from his Market Garden Engineers series of booklets. The XXX Corps tanks reached Nijmegen still on schedule to get to Arnhem in the planned two days, but were stopped by the fact the Nijmegen bridges were still in German hands and had not been secured by the Airborne on the first day, when the bridges were lightly held in a city evacuated by the Germans. The story of this completely unforced error was exposed by Dutch researcher RG Poulussen's Lost At Nijmegen (2011) and 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR - Put Us Down In Hell (2012). The story of three Scout Troopers from the 1/508th S-2 (Intel) Section getting to the Nijmegen bridge on the first afternoon and taking six or seven guards prisoner, held the southern end of the bridge for an hour until it got dark, and then had to withdraw when nobody showed up to reinforce them, is told in Chapter 6 of Zig Borough's collection of letters and stories - The 508th Connection (2013). As they withdrew, they could hear "heavy equipment arriving at the other end of the bridge". The Germans were allowed to reinforce the Nijmegen bridges with SS-Panzer troops and the tanks of XXX Corps had to assist the 82nd Airborne in doing their job for them. This was where the 36-hour delay occurred - too late to save 1st Parachute Brigade at Arnhem bridge. A video produced just four days ago should have included published research from the last 10-12 years, instead of relying on the 'conventional narrative' (to borrow a phrase from Zero Dark Thirty) created by sources published over 45 years ago.

@johnlucas8479

Жыл бұрын

Have you readed McManus, John C.. September Hope. Because on starting on page 159 he gives the account of the 3 men and what happy to the rest of the patrol and why they unable to reach the bridge. "Weaver had also lost touch with his three-man point element, led by Private First Class Joe Atkins, and that was a shame, because after somehow getting separated from the platoon, they had found their way to the bridge. They captured seven Germans who were undoubtedly members of the eighteen-man defense force referred to in the Dutch resistance reports." "Once the lieutenant obtained a guide, he resumed the search for the bridge. Before they had even gone a block, they encountered two Germans and captured them. At the end of the next block, a German voice challenged them. One of Weaver’s machine gunners opened fire, killing him. No sooner had the echoes of the shooting died out than they heard a truck approaching. “The men lay flat on the sidewalk, unobserved, and fired with machine guns, BARs, bazooka, and grenades, stopping the truck and setting it afire,” an after-action report stated. Out of the darkness somewhere to the right, they began to take heavy machine gun fire. Bullets ricocheted off the pavement, wounding fifteen of the soldiers. The patrol’s greatest asset, surprise, was gone. They were compromised. They responded with enough fire to disengage and retreat. All of the wounded men were ambulatory. The guide led the patrol through several dark side streets, all the way to the traffic circle, known locally as Keizer Lodewijk Plein, that led to the bridge (nowadays the circle is known as Keizer Traianius Plein). With German strength in Nijmegen clearly building, and his patrol’s presence revealed to the enemy, Weaver decided that there was no sense in moving on the bridge itself. To do so would invite slaughter. His job was reconnaissance, not assault. He gathered up his men and started back to the battalion." I also notice that Phil Nordyke does not mention the 3 men reaching the bridge.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@johnlucas8479 - thanks very much for that, John. I haven't got that book, so I might have to have a look at it. Your first paragraph account I haven't heard from that point of view before, but an account of the events in the second paragraph regarding the rest of Weaver's patrol is in Nordyke. It seems to be slightly different there: Nordyke's first hand accounts are from Weaver's Deputy Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Arthur R. Stevens, their medic PFC Gordon Cullings, and Private Gene Metcalfe. The other officer with them was Lieutentant Lee Frigo, the Battalion S-2, and Weaver was given an SCR-300 (backpack) radio from Battalion HQ (each battalion has six for contact with the Companies and two are probably spares) with instructions to get to the bridge, and if it was undefended or lightly defended, they were instructed to secure it and call for reinforcements. According to Stevens, they kept off the streets by going through back yards but wound up lost, so they stopped at a house to ask for a guide to take them to the traffic circle near the bridge and a guide was called to the house. They had not gone a block when they took two Germans by surprise and taken them prisoner, and at the end of the block they were challenged by a sentry, who was killed by one of the patrol's automatic weapons. They then heard a vehicle approaching from behind them and when the truckload of Germans got to the middle of the patrol all hell broke loose. Metcalfe was hit in the firefight and left for dead while the rest of the patrol took off. (I have a detailed breakdown on Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9, and after Normandy it was rationalised into the 1st (armoured car), 3rd (light), 5th (heavy), and the 6th (service) Kompanie with 95 men in trucks acting as infantry) The commotion drew the attention of an MG down the street that started firing, pinning them down and 15 men in the patrol were hit by ricochets. They managed to disengage and the guide took them down side streets to the Keizer Lodewijkplein traffic circle near the bridge. While there, Weaver received a message on the SCR-300 that Companies A and B were moving to capture the bridge (this would be after Gavin's intervention at the 508th CP), and Weaver decided to withdraw and rejoin C Company (Weaver's was their 3rd Platoon), which was accomplished without further incident by the morning. You're right that Nordyke has no mention of the three Scouts that got to the bridge earlier and would have withdrawn by the time all this firing had started. The first I heard of Joe Atkins' story was in Christer Bergström's Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2 (2019, 2020), and investigated his source, which was Zig Boroughs' The 508th Connection (2013) of collected stories and letters from other 508th veterans (Zig was in the Demolition Platoon). Joe Atkins was one of his contributors. These obviously post-date Nordyke, so he probably wasn't aware of the story. I see McManus' book is also a 2012 publication, the same year as Nordyke's Put Us Down In Hell. Very interesting, thank you for the reference, John. I'm grateful to you.

@johnlucas8479

Жыл бұрын

@@davemac1197 That Ok Having read all four accounts each appear to cover only part of the story, for example with Christer Bergstrom account on page 228. “As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge. This was the vehicles of Viktor Graebner Recon Battalion arriving from the north. They arrive just as Aitkin and his men had left the site but were quickly summoned north again as there were reports that British Paratroopers had taken the northern road bridge abutment at Arnhem. Graebner only left two armoured personnel carriers behind in Nijmegen." While would Viktor Graebner head north if the bridge was undefended? Christer Bergstrom does not actually state who was guarding the bridge when Viktor Graebner arrived. Nijmegen Bridge story is like a jigsaw puzzle with pieces missing and the more you read the more confusing the picture.

@johnlucas8479

Жыл бұрын

@@davemac1197 Thanks for that, good luck with the project

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

@@johnlucas8479 - I didn't have time last night to go into this, but culling what I have in my notes looks something like this for the troops in Nijmegen on the first day, before the SS troops arrived: - i) Ortskommandantur 869 (Nymwegen), a small local military headquarters under Hauptmann Hagemeister, located in the Dominicus Klooster on Dennenstraat in Neerbosch, fled at about 1730 hrs across the Waal towards Elst on 17 September. - ii) Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei (BdO), which was the Headquarters of the German Order Police in the Netherlands under Generalmajor der Polizei Hellmuth Mascus and equivalent to a division HQ, originally located in Den Haag until 1943 and relocated to Nijmegen when the Dutch coast became a potential invasion coast. When the airborne landings began they started to evacuate the headquarters and left the city by 1830 hrs, appareently leaving behind their Musikkorps-Zug (music band platoon) of 30-40 men to guard the bridges. They went north over the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges first to their training depot at Schalkhaar (Deventer) and then onto Zwolle in northern Netherlands. - iii) Rüstungsinspektion Niederlande (Armaments Inspectorate Netherlands) - arms inspectors under Speer’s ministry controlled by the SS with Abteilungen (departments) with Heer, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe officers and small staffs, possibly co-located with the BdO in Nijmegen. Very difficult to get information on this organisation, it was the method by which the Germans controlled private industries to harness their production for the war effort. At the time of Market Garden the Netherlands organisation seems to have been disbanded and may have been awaiting transport for evacuation to Germany. - iv) Reserve-Kriegslazarett (military hospital) Jonkerbos - contained wounded from training units all over the Netherlands. - v) SS-Kriegslazarett located at the St Jozefklooster on Kerkstraat - some 300 walking wounded were formed into a company and added to KG Hencke. This is probably 8.(Genesenden) Kompanie, SS-Pz-Gren.Ausb-und-Ers.Btl 4, based at Ede west of Arnhem and deployed on the Waal defence line, but their convalescent unit seems to have been located at Nijmegen. - vi) I have unconfirmed information that some elements of Grenadier-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Bataillon 365 were present - Nijmegen was their home base but the training battalion had been mobilised under the 'Valkyrie Plan' in the first week of September and sent to Aachen, but it makes sense that the 7.(Stamm) reception and 8.(Genesenden) convalescent companies might have remained and also deployed on the canal defence line. - vii) Flak units at Nijmegen included a heavy Flak-Abteilung at four positions around the city to the south, and light Flak batteries were positioned around the Waal bridges and more heavy positions around Lent on the north bank. These had all been targeted by the preliminary bombing in the morning of 17 September. - viii) Two units at the NEBO monastery between Nijmegen and Groesbeek, which was later occupied by the US 508th PIR HQ and then later 82nd Airborne Division HQ, was intially occupied by two German HQs which evacuated and spent the afternoon evading US paratroops in the woods until they could get into Nijmegen and organise a defence: - - a) Ausbildungs Stab, Fallschirmjäger Oberkommando Ausbildungsstelle, a training staff under Oberst Günther Hartung. He took command of Wehrmacht troops north of the Waal to Lent. He had 95 staff and just 14 school candidates on hand, and a militia unit sent from Wesel was used to reinforce the north bank. His Staff Major was Engelbert Melitz, who would command a mixed group of troops between the two bridges in Nijmegen as Kampfgruppe Melitz. - - b) Fallschirm-Lehr-Regiment 1 under Oberst Friedrich (Fritz) Hencke, a regimental headquarters staff without any troops. Hencke would be put in charge of all Wehrmacht units in Nijmegen south of the Waal as Kampfgruppe Hencke and in charge of defending the railway bridge. - ix) Feld-Luftmunitionslager 15/VI (Mook) - a Luftwaffe aerial munitions dump located in the woods between Groesbeek and the 't Zwaantje Inn (the Mooksebaan road running through the depot was sealed off from public use) and defended by around 200 troops. It was a machine-gun outpost from this unit that nearly killed Gavin on his way to his HQ rendezvous.

That's Paratrooper looked scared bad

Great video

@FactBytes

Жыл бұрын

Thank you

I don’t know what it is with Montgomery, I’ve read a couple of biographies, certainly Patton’s opinion, (who I respect), was very low of Montgomery. He impresses me of “more blow than show”, who had luck in North Africa, and rode this for rest of the war. I know the British public liked him, and those brave folks needed heroes after the Battle of Britain other than the RAF. As a Canadian I still rankle that we stayed under British command, Should have insisted our own structure, or joined the Americans, we are closer to them, being from the American continent after all. Today I could not imagine this structure given how closely U.S. and Canadian forces are with NORAD, same command structure, ranking system, reporting lines, not like other Commonwealth countries that follow British military traditions . Montgomery wasn’t even liked by most British commanders, Market Garden did take what was left of his prestige.

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2. Montgomery was actually liked by most under his command including American generals such as Gavin, Ridgway, Hasbrouck etc. Richard Winters, of Band of Brothers fame referred to Montgomery as "the real deal, an example to follow". If Canadians were under American command they would have been thrown away in the disasters in the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace or Ardennes. Montgomerys Scheldt campaign was the only allied campaign of autumn 1944 to achieve its objectives, and it was achieved with just 1/4 the casualties of Patton's Lorraine debacle. The Scheldt's casualties were 12,000 (all forces including British). In the Lorraine, Patton's US 3rd Army suffered nearly 55,000 casualties and still failed to achieve its objectives. The Americans turned to Montgomery again after Market Garden and asked him to command their US 1st Army in the Ardennes. Hodges had just fled his command HQ in panic and Bradley dithered and did nothing. Montgomery was sent for. Good thing he was. He sorted the mess in the Ardennes out immediately.

@nickdanger3802

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 "After the failure of the operation, Montgomery began to question the strategy developed by Eisenhower and as a result of comments made at a press conference he gave on 7th January, 1945, he was severely rebuked by Winston Churchill and General Alan Brooke, the head of the British Army. Although he came close to being sacked, Montgomery was allowed to remain in Europe and the end of the war was appointed Commander in Chief of the British Army of Occupation." Bernard Montgomery Jewish Virtual Library

@nickdanger3802

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 Battle of the Scheldt 2 October - 8 November 1944 Lorraine campaign 1 September - 18 December 1944 "Allied" victory

@nickdanger3802

Жыл бұрын

@@lyndoncmp5751 At 1.28.40 Ardennes, Command passed to Monty because Bradley's "communications shattered". General Omar Bradley and Operation Cobra - Normandy 1944 kzread.info/dash/bejne/qIucqpSOmc7Qoc4.html&lc=UgxhmPTWxdE-XOPQ4b94AaABAg

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

@@nickdanger3802 He was also appointed Deputy Commander of NATO.

So not only did Monty not take the Schelt but divised a plan too have others fail too. Brilliant! Should have left it too Paton and the Boys!! After this Monty was not allowed to lead another major operation and the Allies won the war.

I readed a lot about Market Garden . The conclusion ? It fail because " the brain" was Montgomery ,with his arogance. Nothing more .

@thevillaaston7811

Жыл бұрын

No.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

With the exception of McManus, who provides no rationale for claiming it was all Montgomery's fault, these recent books all point to the failure at Nijmegen as the compromise for the entire operation: - Lost At Nijmegen, RG Poulussen (2011) - Put Us Down In Hell -A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) - September Hope -The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) - The 508th Connection, chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge, Zig Boroughs (2013) - Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2, Christer Bergström (2019, 2020) I think McManus' argument is that the whole plan or idea was just too difficult for Americans. Britain had already been at war for five years in 1944 and knew how to deal with the Germans from long experience. Many units in the US Army had only a few months experience since landing in Normandy. The 508th PIR, which dropped the ball at Nijmegen and compromised the entire operation, was only on its second combat operation and had command problems in Normandy that were not fully resolved by then division Matthew Ridgway. Cornelius Ryan had got hints about all of this in his interview with James Gavin, but chose to ignore or simply missed the significance of the story and it didn't appear in A Bridge Too Far at all.

The western allied troops were no match to the disciplined and highly experienced German troops.

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

@MyCarmenus It took over a week for those experienced German troops to dislodge an elite Parachute battalion. And if you don't think Western Allied troops were a match tell that to the German troops at Omaha beach and Hill 112, who both got driven off.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

The SS at Arnhem didn't agree with you. As arrogant and elitist as they were, they made a point of showing their admiration for the British Airborne at Arnhem, much to the disgust of the Airborne themselves, who did not regard these Germans as supermen at all.

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

11 ай бұрын

@@davemac1197 I would also include the failed German counter attack by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps during Operation Epsom ( which was also the largest counter attack of Operation Overlord) the British repulsed it in one day on July 1st.

@davemac1197

11 ай бұрын

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- - I think I have a book on Epsom (one of the Pen & Sword series) somewhere. The II.SS-Panzerkorps had recently arrived from Ukraine and were to spearhead a counter-attack on Bayeaux to split the British and Canadian armies from the Americans and reach the coast, but it was called off because of Epsom and they were needed to assist 12.SS-Panzer-Division on the River Odon. Can't remember who it was, but one of the commanders in the Korps remarked that in Normandy they were too late and at Arnhem too few.

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

11 ай бұрын

@@davemac1197 Do you know how many German units were involved that launched the Epsom counter attack?

8:00 the German solder were just very good! No need to jump through hoops and loops. In spite of the fact that the German solder were fighting so many and is enigma code was broken by the enemy.

I would say the fall of France, the low countries, Norway, Poland , were all bigger defeats

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

Even in autumn 1944, the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine were bigger failures with far more casualties and objectives not met.

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Lyndon your hero had FOUR FULL YEARS to cross a channel.Why wait for the the Big Boys to cross and ocean? Go tell it to Europe that you left to Hitler's hounds

Eisenhower " Hey Monty ! I found something useful to do ! SO YOU CAN FK IT UP !!

Why did it fail? Because Ike listened to Montgomery. That simple.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Montgomery's assessment of Eisenhower after their first meeting: "nice man, no soldier."

The failure was caused by a plan that depended on doing everything right and on time. Like any battle after the first shot things didn’t go according to plan and there was no room for a contingency Plan B. The plan did have merit and it was the only plan to end the war before Christmas. Why did it have merit because the British experience in WW1 which many of its generals and commanders had fought in, believed a broad front may have resulted in a long war. A direct and deep punch would be a better strategy. Such a strategy was proven successful in the last 100 days of WW1. Market Garden failed because of a number of continuing errors, such as ignoring intelligence and the geography with no allowance for a back up strategy. The egos of the generals was tested as they pointed the blame at each other. But I believe the problem was they thought the Germans would surrender when the Allies moved towards the German border, but they didn’t. The Allies had no strategy and one had to be thought up quickly hoping to finish the war before Christmas. The Americans can blame the British but what was their Plan?

@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85

7 ай бұрын

Intel wasn't ignored. Much of the planning was terrible, which made so many things go wrong, but nonetheless it still nearly succeeded. Which means the concept was sound. Also, there was plenty of contingency planning - such as the bridging equipment used to cross the Zon after the bridge couldn't be captured. XXX Corps were back on schedule by the time they reached Nijmegen.

It wasn't a total defeat. We held the the Arnhem Bridge for 8 days, asked to hold for two. 30 Corp being unable to reach there on schedule. Credit where it is due.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Arnhem bridge was held for 80 hours bjt XXX Corps could not advance beyond Nijmegen as the bridges there were still in German hands. A 36-hour delay was imposed by having to take them with combined infantry and tank attacks.

And where was Monty when this circus failed!?!? Nowhere to be found!!

@thevillaaston7811

Жыл бұрын

Montgomery was at Eindhoven. Eisenhower was in Normandy. Brereton was England. Any questions?

IMO they should have dropped closer to bridges and tried nightdrops and twice daily airdrops like they had previously done

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

Landing zones closer to the bridges and twice daily drops rejected by Williams (US IX Troop Carrier Command) and backed by Brereton (1st Allied Airborne Army).

Yes good video great topic

Oh you’re gonna get some pushback from the Brits on this one. In general terms I agree Market Garden was an error made largely by Montgomery but Eisenhower bears responsibility as well. The planning was uncharacteristically rushed for a Montgomery led operation and the political pressure on Eisenhower to maintain British/American unity added to a fatal underestimation of German capabilities that resulted in the failed operation. The Scheldt Estuary should have been cleared while it was lightly defended opening the port at Antwerp. Perhaps Patton’s advance need not have been curtailed putting more pressure on the Germans south of the Hurtgenwald (America’s big mistake).

@Delogros

Жыл бұрын

The reason it was rushed is because the plan was changed from a largely planned out British operation to include the 2 American Airborne divisions at US insistence, US divisions being slightly bigger then British Divisions put a massive unnecessary strain on the transport capabilities available a the time. The original plan might have been "operation Comet" I can't remember other then being sure it began with "C2

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

The reason you get pushback is because you present opinions based on false assumptions. Market Garden was based on combining the air plan for Operation Linnet II with the landing zones and ground operation for Comet, so you have to include the time taken to plan those into account as well. Market Garden failed because the 82nd Airborne's divisional plan for the 508th PIR's mission was not followed on the ground, and that was an internal command issue in the division that has its roots in Normandy and before that in the regiment's formation. The Scheldt estuary was occupied by the entire German 15.Armee, so it was absolutely not lightly held. Had Market Garden succeeded in reaching the Zuider Zee as intended, it would have cut off the 15.Armee and all German forces in occupied Netherlands west of the corridor, considerably easing the clearing of the Scheldt to open up Antwerp. Antwerp was needed to supply further Allied operations into Germany, so it was the correct decision to wait until after Market Garden to undertake that operation - the right time to strike for the Rhine was as soon as possible, while the Germans were still recovering from their defeat in Normandy. Even Eisenhower saw the sense in that, he was a logistics man after all. You also need to look at Bradley's split ratio in his 12th Army Group supplies between 1st and 3rd Armies. Patton was slowed down by Bradley, not by the priority of supplies promised (but not entirely given) to Montgomery. Bradley could just as easily have reversed that ratio to keep Patton's 3rd Army moving.

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

@Chiller11 Giving supplies to Patton just adds to the problem....distance. How far are his supply lines again? 300 miles back to Cherbourg. The Channel ports on the otherhand are closer to the 21st Army Group so it makes sense to go through the North. Patton should've moved up towards Koblenz to support 21st army instead of wasting time at Metz.

@Delogros

Жыл бұрын

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- How comes you changed your name Bullet tooth Tony?

@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-

Жыл бұрын

@@Delogros I haven't mate, thats my original youtube name, but for some reason my nick name (Bullet tooth tony) has dissappeared and gone back to the original one. Must be youtube updates, you know what they're like.

A classic intelligence failure, in the sense that senior Allied commanders ignored the latest intelligence on enemy dispositions on the ground. But one suspects that a deeper root cause was probably a combination of factors that include, though not exclusively: pride and ego driving (over)-ambition, sunk cost fallacy (e.g. too much invested in planning and preparations to call off Operation Market Garden at the last minute), halo effect (e.g. riding on past victories, laurels and glory), military doctrine of making the situation fit the plan and bureaucratic inflexibility in holding the ground, when ground forces were badly needed to drive hard forward to support the paratroopers in time. For a characteristically more cautious man compared to the Americans, such reckless risk was uncalled for. You can guess who in particular I'm referring to. If only Patton had his way...

@thevillaaston7811

Жыл бұрын

Not really...

@lychan2366

Жыл бұрын

@@thevillaaston7811 Then what is really to you?

@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85

Жыл бұрын

Monty proposed Operation Comet, then cancelled it due to intelligence showing stronger enemy presence in the area. It was expanded into Market Garden, by adding two entire Airborne divisions. IOW, Intel wasn't ignored. It was a good plan, poorly executed by the Airborne's leadership, who ignored the key to Airborne's success: surprise.

@davemac1197

Жыл бұрын

This repeats the conventional narrative of trying to find excuses for the failure of Market Garden, omitting the critical mistake either missed or ignored by Cornelius Ryan in his original research for A Bridge Too Far. The cat is now firmly out of the bag in the last 10-12 years with books pinpointing the one place the plan wasn't even followed due to a command failure in the 508th PIR at Nijmegen on the first day: - Lost At Nijmegen, RG Poulussen (2011) - Put Us Down In Hell -A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) - September Hope -The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) - The 508th Connection, chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge, Zig Boroughs (2013) - Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2, Christer Bergström (2019, 2020) These researchers are not even British, they are Dutch, American, American, American, and Swedish.

.Monty cu Monty screwed up.

If British 1st Airborne Division wait for the Third Army to attract the main German army to the south of the bridge ARNHEM, it may be successful to parachute at this time.

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

If it was left to the 3rd army they would still be stuck on a beach in Normandy

@lyndoncmp5751

Жыл бұрын

How long did it take 3rd Army to take Metz again?

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

Somebody had to take it, the britsh never did in 1815 and daisies like you and Bernard might have by the Germans laughing themselves defenseless. And how about that 30 mile channel,why did the Gis have to cross the ocean to do it?

@garythomas3219

Жыл бұрын

@@bigwoody4704 ask your government?

@bigwoody4704

Жыл бұрын

@@garythomas3219 what,why they had to bail out a 1st rate 2nd rate commander like Monty.Well IKE kept propping him up to give the Soviets a bold look. He really couldn't let on that bernard was a steaming pile that could be rolled at a moments notice.