What We Learned from TMI

What was learned from the nuclear power station at Three Mile Island accident and how that has changed operations, training and equipment. The advent of simulators. Discussion of how generation three reactors are different and do not need water to constantly cover the core and with out as many back up power sources.

Пікірлер: 125

  • @defiantshadow6859
    @defiantshadow68594 жыл бұрын

    These videos make me feel a lot less scared of any sort of nuclear disaster happening like Chernobyl again, thanks professor!

  • @linkin543210

    @linkin543210

    3 жыл бұрын

    Tell Fukushima that 🙄

  • @rapid13

    @rapid13

    3 жыл бұрын

    @@linkin543210 Fukushima worked properly for the most part. 9.0 earthquake and massive tsunami that just happened to occur during refueling of one of the reactors, and the biggest issue was with the spent fuel pool in a 40+ year old design. The reactors SCRAMd properly and the containment buildings did exactly what they were supposed to do: contained the core and radiation.

  • @markawbolton

    @markawbolton

    2 жыл бұрын

    @@linkin543210 Fukushima coverage by the Lügenpresse woke me up to what was really going on there. I did a bit of back ground checking and found how disgustingly untruthfull they were. 18 K Japaneese were killed and all the MSM could do was howl about how the Pacific coast of the USA was aglow with Chrenkov radiation. That was what Red Pilled me...

  • @johannhowitzer

    @johannhowitzer

    2 жыл бұрын

    The 18,000 people were killed by the tsunami itself sweeping over the coast and destroying homes. The reactor itself killed no one, even though it eventually melted down. None of the radioactive material from the core escaped containment. The only safety feature that failed was the generators disabled by the tsunami overcoming the seawall, which stopped the pumps, but the people on site responded correctly, and the hydrogen explosion in the top of the core buildings blew away the blast panels correctly, failing to damage the containment.

  • @becksvideoproductions

    @becksvideoproductions

    2 жыл бұрын

    @@johannhowitzer and that was a gen2 reactor. Gen3 is "walk away safe"

  • @paultidwell8799
    @paultidwell87994 ай бұрын

    Thank you, you're doing great work, the public fears nuclear to a hysterical extent and you're doing a higher calling of helping a paniced public understand and through understanding become less terrified.

  • @agoniaXdunya
    @agoniaXdunya3 жыл бұрын

    That simulation week is brilliant

  • @kiwidiesel
    @kiwidiesel2 жыл бұрын

    This Man has a gift. He can articulate any subject matter to a person in a way that has you so involved you absorb everything he delivers with ease.

  • @jimkemp3985
    @jimkemp3985 Жыл бұрын

    Thank you so much for this series. This is exactly why I wish I had gone to an engineering school rather than just majoring in Physics.

  • @fanjan7527
    @fanjan75274 жыл бұрын

    Prof Ruzic, thank you again.

  • @michaelwoodhams7866
    @michaelwoodhams78664 жыл бұрын

    3:20 proof positive diagnostic: failure to do this was also a major factor in the Turkish Airlines flight 981 crash, a DC10 which crashed in 1974 near Paris. The indication (a small vent door closing) that the cargo door was properly latched depended on 'the rod which closes the latches has moved far enough that the latches should be closed', however this rod was bent and went into its final position without closing the latches.

  • @puncheex2

    @puncheex2

    4 жыл бұрын

    Yes. In engineering, they are known as closed-loop indicators which indicate the state of the control, not the operator's intention (open-loop control)

  • @rdspam

    @rdspam

    9 ай бұрын

    As an engineer, I would never claim that any indicator can never be wrong. It’s better than a software-based switch, but not failure-proof.

  • @TakeDeadAim
    @TakeDeadAim4 жыл бұрын

    If people don't know...Jimmy Carter was a nuclear engineering officer in the US Navy so was very familiar with how things work in a reactor so although a lot of people were up in arms about the President going into TMI, he knew there was no real danger. I remember that whole fiasco very well... Also, in my world(flying) our modern simulators are so good that when transitioning to a new aircraft, the first time you fly the REAL iron...it will be a full tube. Gone are the days of doing crash and go's in the real thing to train. In commercial aviation it's all done in full motion sims.

  • @bananabb
    @bananabb4 жыл бұрын

    I've found this channel and love it... been watching all his video's on disaster ... can he do a discussion on the team that in the 1980's made TIME magazine for creating fission in a bottle and how it was discredited? or covered up? To this day I cant imagine that team risking its credibility claiming they had invented it only to be discredited by the nuclear community later after being placed on the cover of TIME magazine ... which back then was a big deal... thanks!

  • @puncheex2

    @puncheex2

    4 жыл бұрын

    The problem there was the $ signs that kept dancing, not only in front of the scientists but the department and university officials and state agencies, along with all sorts of prospective sponsors and hangers-on. No doubt Nobel-level fame called, as well. The pressure got too high, and Fleischmann and Pons broke, and held a rather impromptu press release before they were really ready for it.

  • @jeffedlund5050
    @jeffedlund50504 жыл бұрын

    Can't stop watching..

  • @davidwilkie9551
    @davidwilkie95514 жыл бұрын

    Teaching and Learning by doing continues. Good to have figures on the odds.

  • @puncheex2
    @puncheex24 жыл бұрын

    The four shift operators at TMI were all ex-Navy nuclear operators. They were very well trained; the Navy would have it no other way. The problem was that they were not re-trained for the differences between naval nukes and the power plant they were hired to operate. Their focus was not on the water level in the reactor, for which they had no direct monitor/indicator anyway, but rather the level in the pressure exchange tank, which on a naval nuke is of utmost importance. That's why they turned off the ECCS - they were watching the water rising in the pressure vessel and didn't want to let it get full, thereby losing their backup against overpressures.

  • @Babyblasphemy

    @Babyblasphemy

    4 жыл бұрын

    Not to mention the fact that the entire pressurizer was not the highest point in the system, so indication of water in the pressurizer did not necessarily mean there was water in the core. They should've recognized that pressure and temperature were at saturation and thus a steam bubble was formed in the core, followed by pressurizing the plant and collapsing the steam void.

  • @JohnMaxGriffin

    @JohnMaxGriffin

    4 жыл бұрын

    I’ve heard this explanation from another lecturer on KZread... and frankly I don’t think we should go around stating it as a factual part of the TMI accident narrative. Nukes are just as capable of adapting their habits to new work environments as anyone else.

  • @puncheex2

    @puncheex2

    4 жыл бұрын

    @@JohnMaxGriffin Yes, I certainly agree, but it is a fact they were not retrained when they joined on with the power company. It's also known that B&W, who should have been doing such retaining, appreciated the differences between the two kinds of reactors. I'm not a blamer of the operators. What I wrote above was based on their testimony before the Kemeny Commission and is a part of the "narrative", like it or not. There is at least one former operator who was trapped in exactly the same situation in an incident 9 months before TMI who blames the commission for not wanting to state something systemic about B&W reactors, something that would have affected running reactors all over the world.

  • @thegardenofeatin5965

    @thegardenofeatin5965

    4 жыл бұрын

    Well trained on a different system == not trained. In aviation, we recognize this. "I've got 10,000 hours in the Boeing 737." "Cool story bro...but this is an Airbus A-300. A lot of the systems on this jet work very differently than you're used to, you do things the B737 way in the A-300, you're gonna die a fiery, slammy death. You need to go take the training on this airplane before you're allowed to fly it." You're allowed to have the type ratings for both, and many more besides, but you have to be trained specifically on the plane you're flying.

  • @andrewallen9993

    @andrewallen9993

    3 жыл бұрын

    In the Royal Navy nuclear submariners are allowed to drink alcohol when off duty, US submariners characters cannot be trusted around alcoholic beverages so are forbidden to do this.

  • @insanitysportal6692
    @insanitysportal66923 жыл бұрын

    Seems like the boards that show status need to say both: "Yeah, you flipped the switch" AND "Yeah, that thing that's supposed to be closed actually is closed"... just a thought...

  • @dave-in-nj9393
    @dave-in-nj93934 жыл бұрын

    something no one outside of the few are aware of. there was a device, an air-sampler in the vents that would measure the amount of particulate in the exhaust. it was not supplied and installed. on the day of the disaster we got a call to bring it NOW, if not, they would send a military escort to get it. after we explained it was never ordered, never fabricated and the factory was in calif. they sent troops to the factory and they were stationed there for the 2 weeks it took to fabricate. anyone watching at that time, might remember the placed samplers in circles around the plant at certain distances. the day the equipment was installed and turned on, the reports came out that lots less radiation was released as the vast majority fell out so rapidly that the sensors on the ground read high.

  • @fixedguitar47
    @fixedguitar472 жыл бұрын

    We do know that a lot of nerds work in nuclear power. It’s safe to assume they use the simulation control room to reenact Star Trek scenes. It’s logical to assume so. I’m sure the Kobayashi Maru is a common theme.

  • @egvijayanand
    @egvijayanand7 ай бұрын

    Wasn't there a sensor to measure the temperature/pressure inside the core? As the water flow stopped entering the core and as a result the core heated up, the temperature would have definitely gone up, and if there had been a sensor to catch this rise in temperature, the workers at the power plant would have realized the water level inside the core is not up to the required level.

  • @PeterShipley1
    @PeterShipley13 жыл бұрын

    do the control rooms have physical detectors & controls beyond panels that require power?

  • @johnfarmer3506
    @johnfarmer35063 жыл бұрын

    I guess they where missing the hydro absorbers at Fukishima

  • @blipco5
    @blipco5 Жыл бұрын

    TMI taught us that profit is more important than people's health in the eyes of the power company. The End.

  • @blipco5
    @blipco5 Жыл бұрын

    What happens when the computer screen goes out?

  • @tarjei99
    @tarjei994 жыл бұрын

    The commercial reactors should have been molten salt reactors since they are inherently safer than PWR. And more versatile.

  • @riblets1968
    @riblets19684 жыл бұрын

    It would be really cool if the simulator and "real" control rooms were redundant and instantly interchangeable such that you can engineer a disaster unbeknownst to the employees beforehand.

  • @michaelkaliski7651
    @michaelkaliski76514 жыл бұрын

    The problem with passive safety systems is that in order for them to work, a reactor has to be run with a much lower power density than that which would give the greatest efficiency. A hotter reactor generates more steam and more power for a given volume and is therefore more efficient and cheaper to run. Economics remain the greatest threat to nuclear safety and in most other industries as well. Witness the current problems at Boeing.

  • @TonboIV

    @TonboIV

    4 жыл бұрын

    For a stationary power plant, the size and weight of the reactor aren't that important. The reactor just sits in the building, never moving, so heavy is fine. The reactor vessel is also much smaller than the electricity generating equipment, and the containment structure needs to be very large too, so the size of the reactor isn't that important. Cost is much more important than size or weight, and there's no reason why a passively safe design needs to be expensive (or even heavy, for that matter). Efficiency is mostly down to operating temperature, and most passively safe designs actually operate hotter than current designs. Besides, nuclear fuel is cheap and a reactor uses very little, so efficiency is less important than cost or safety.

  • @michaelkaliski7651

    @michaelkaliski7651

    4 жыл бұрын

    TonboIV If that were truly the case then there would be thousands of reactors around the planet based around sealed nuclear submarine reactor technology. Place a sealed module in a containment. Operate for x number of years. Return the unit to the manufacturer for refurbishment and refueling while installing a new module. As you rightly point out the electrical generating plant and sub systems are much larger than the actual reactor and generators can operate for a century of more without replacement.

  • @TonboIV

    @TonboIV

    4 жыл бұрын

    @@michaelkaliski7651 A naval nuclear reactor is like a child's toy next to a power station reactor. They're tiny. Shipping a 1000MW reactor back to the manufacturer for refueling is not practical, and a civilian power reactor needs to be refueled every few years because of their much higher power output than naval reactors which go for decades without refueling. Small, modular, sealed reactors are an area of current research for power generation, but the nuclear industry has been in a poor financial state for decades and manufacturers are in survival mode producing slight modifications on tried and tested designs, rather than innovating. Naval reactors are also designed for high performance and compact size which are irrelevant in a stationary power plant, and I would guess that they are quite expensive for their power output. It would be like using a Formula 1 engine for an electrical generator.

  • @michaelkaliski7651

    @michaelkaliski7651

    4 жыл бұрын

    TonboIV I was thinking more in terms of passive safety systems and the ability to restrict access to nuclear fuel material by supplying the active component in a sealed container. The sub reactors have to be inherently safe due to the conditions under which they are operated. The Russians have used decommissioned sub reactors to supply power in Arctic regions. Perhaps not particularly cost effective, but the system works. Then again, we are brought back to the question of economics. It always comes down to how we can extract the most energy for the least amount of money. So long as we have accountants trying to maximise the return on investment in nuclear plants, safety will not be the highest priority.

  • @TonboIV

    @TonboIV

    4 жыл бұрын

    @@michaelkaliski7651 A nuclear submarine reactor is not passively safe, and definitely can meltdown. They're operated safely by everyone involved being very well trained and careful. They also don't have to worry as much about decay heat because they're much smaller than a typical nuclear power reactor. Supplying a small sealed reactor that doesn't require skilled operators is definitely something people are interested in, but like any new idea, knowing how to do it and making a business of it are two different things. Economics are very important if we want nuclear power to replace fossil fuels. It's pointless if the power plants are too expensive to use, but many current and upcoming designs manage to be much safer than previous ones, and also economically viable.

  • @MultiPetercool
    @MultiPetercool3 жыл бұрын

    Modern control room looks like’s Scotty’s engineering deck in Star Trek!

  • @stevealexander7772

    @stevealexander7772

    6 ай бұрын

    It is impressive. However, I believe the example shown is a research reactor, not a commercial nuclear power plant.

  • @steelwarrior105
    @steelwarrior1054 жыл бұрын

    But most panels are still all analog with computer systems integrated into monitoring, the AP1000, ABWR/ESBWR, etc. Are pretty digital but still have small amounts of analog systems.

  • @RaderizDorret

    @RaderizDorret

    3 жыл бұрын

    That is an advantage, if done properly. Good luck remotely hacking an analog setup.

  • @RonJohn63
    @RonJohn6310 ай бұрын

    Speaking of tsunamis... why did the Fukashima plant "break"?

  • @hypercomms2001
    @hypercomms200111 ай бұрын

    Why did the plants at Fukushima not have hydrogen absorbers?

  • @mikedevo363
    @mikedevo3633 ай бұрын

    Today's technology is the best and greatest. Nothing could go wrong this time..... I'm sure that's what they said about TMI when it was made.

  • @jermainerace4156
    @jermainerace41562 жыл бұрын

    A 19c sight glass would have served them better than a light that tells you the position of the switch you just switched.

  • @eddy2561
    @eddy256111 ай бұрын

    As humans we make mistakes all the time so it's not if but when an accident occurs at a nuclear power station.

  • @stevealexander7772

    @stevealexander7772

    6 ай бұрын

    Not true at all. That is the entire reason Defense in Depth exists. Human Error will always occur. It happens in every system which contains humans. In a commercial nuclear plant, the consequence of those human errors are minimized by the defense in depth built into the design of the plant and the operating procedures. An "accident", as you mention, is the degree of consequence, not the error.

  • @420sakura1

    @420sakura1

    3 ай бұрын

    They are lots more plane crashes than nuclear accidents. Do you still take planes?

  • @ronaldtartaglia4459
    @ronaldtartaglia44592 жыл бұрын

    Where have you been are you still alive

  • @chasa4347
    @chasa43474 жыл бұрын

    I wonder how much "management interference" was implicated in Three Mile Island. I worked for a major oil company who had a bad spill, and part of the cause was determined to be management pushing for profits over safety. PG&E had similar issues with the San Bruno explosion, and recently Management at Boeing trying to roll out the 737 Max without implementing needed training and with insufficient backup instrumentation may have doomed that platform.

  • @andycunningham2280
    @andycunningham22803 жыл бұрын

    Oh really?

  • @andrewallen9993
    @andrewallen99933 жыл бұрын

    All new hires at the South African nuclear power stations are appointed due to affirmative action.

  • @pureblood1978x
    @pureblood1978x3 жыл бұрын

    I've got a fish in the oven if anyone's interested?

  • @testy462

    @testy462

    3 жыл бұрын

    Sounds delicious what's the seasoning.

  • @e.d.6832

    @e.d.6832

    3 жыл бұрын

    What's seasoning?

  • @copperhamster
    @copperhamster4 жыл бұрын

    One thing that bugged me about F-D was the hydrogen explosion damage. There was a hydrogen explosion in TMI, and while it wasn't a good thing, it didn't make things worse. F-D it blew the containment apart. The TMI and other reactor's containment buildings are supposed to take 'an airliner strike'(1) and not be breached. It seems like the Japanese plant was not nearly as robustly contained. Maybe I'm wrong. 1. It should be noted that the definition of 'an airliner strike' is based on an accidental strike. Most airliner's involved in accidents hit at less than 350 knots. Intentional ramming at full throttle (550+ knots) is much harder to defend against.

  • @Willaev

    @Willaev

    4 жыл бұрын

    He did a video on that. F-D's hydrogen explosions didn't blow the containment buildings apart, what people see as the "containment building blowing apart" were actually blow-away panels that were specifically there in case of a hydrogen explosion to leave the actual containment building intact.

  • @vegashdrider

    @vegashdrider

    4 жыл бұрын

    Willaev is correct, the top panels were designed to blow up

  • @skunkjobb

    @skunkjobb

    4 жыл бұрын

    @@Willaev Wrong! The buildings, the secondary containments at F-D did have blow out panels but they were not designed to handle such powerful explosions and did absolutely no good. Therefore the whole damn buildings were blown apart and that was not what they were intended to do. So when people see the containment buildings blowing apart, they are 100 % correct, it's not to be put in quotation marks.

  • @Willaev

    @Willaev

    4 жыл бұрын

    @@skunkjobb "They were not designed to handle such powerful explosions" No, they were specifically designed for that. False. "Therefore the whole damn buildings were blown apart" False. Watch his video on Fukushima and try again.

  • @TonboIV

    @TonboIV

    4 жыл бұрын

    @@skunkjobb They blew apart, but they were never containment buildings. The reactors were contained within thick concrete below those lightly built roofs. The containment buildings of the BWRs used at Fukushima aren't that great by modern standards, but they were not breached by the explosions. Those roofs did enclose the spent fuel pools, which were then exposed. Spent fuel pools normally aren't inside a containment structure. Many people would like to see that changed, but it isn't currently normal practice.

  • @aby0ni
    @aby0ni4 жыл бұрын

    Build them underground. Less seismic activity, more cover, more beautiful land above.

  • @OOZ662

    @OOZ662

    3 жыл бұрын

    Digging a hole the size of an island will add quite a bit of time to the loan term to pay off the power plant and start making profits.

  • @aby0ni

    @aby0ni

    3 жыл бұрын

    @@OOZ662 Definitely. But if you burry only the reactor facility you could even come out profitable.

  • @erik_dk842

    @erik_dk842

    Жыл бұрын

    @@aby0ni The Swiss built one in a cave, and the lack of acces to clean up the mess proved it to be a bad idea

  • @christopherbullock2644
    @christopherbullock26442 жыл бұрын

    Homer Simpson in every reactor. Doh!

  • @Wppk765
    @Wppk7654 жыл бұрын

    I want to thumb up the video, but right now it’s at 665

  • @coderider3022
    @coderider30222 жыл бұрын

    New Netflix series makes this look worse than the Prof. Makes out?

  • @quietyou9980
    @quietyou9980 Жыл бұрын

    Why the NetFlix documentary is bullsh*t 101.

  • @mikem4432
    @mikem44323 жыл бұрын

    Gas or Nuclear plants are nothing more than a 18 century steam engine.. hahaha.. crazy shit. Why not use the HYDROGEN gas produce in the nuclear plant as your end product hydrogen fuel cell??

  • @tjabramosr7885

    @tjabramosr7885

    Жыл бұрын

    Hindenburg disaster

  • @PlateletRichGel

    @PlateletRichGel

    Ай бұрын

    I'm submitting you for Nobel Prize dumbass

  • @mikem4432
    @mikem44323 жыл бұрын

    haha.. no mater how educated or trained, if they are an EMPLOYEE of the company building the Nuclear Plant.. they cannot have the power to call out bad or poor construction .. so without independent verification .. your building a potential chernobyl

  • @crimony3054
    @crimony30542 жыл бұрын

    He says Chernobyl can't happen here, but he's wearing a woman's blazer with the buttons on his left and the button holes on his right.

  • @northsimulation3386

    @northsimulation3386

    2 жыл бұрын

    The video is mirrored, and what exactly does his attire have to do with what he’s saying anyways?

  • @erik_dk842

    @erik_dk842

    Жыл бұрын

    @@northsimulation3386 DOH. I thought he was just a master at writing mirror imaged. My bad.

  • @tracemiller9628
    @tracemiller96282 жыл бұрын

    A real degree is one in physical sciences and engineering, all the other degrees are just ancillary degrees that should only be valid when they have completed their engineering base degree. Quit putting people without a real degree of engineering knowledge in charge. The ceo of general motors has bulloney degree. As do many technical corporations in america. do. That's why we hardly make anything really good any more , like phones, cars , buildings.