Very nicely articulated! Thanks for this!

The most important question in regard to the idea of philosophy zombies is, why aren’t we philosophical zombies? It seems to me that we could just as easily be philosophical zombies but we’re not for some reason.

How can we be convinced by the zombie argument, if a zombie would have said the exact same thing ?

I don't understand how this rules out physicalism. The issue being that whatever "machinery" that drives the zombie would in fact be what I would denote as physical. The issue as to what that is is a separate matter. I find that consciousness is a product of our biology which seems to be demonstrated in a parade of different ways. Consider split brain patients, effects of drugs, and more all allowing an experience of a change of consciousness of various sorts. Granted, I am aware that narratives can be constructed which would suggest alternatives, but unless such narratives can be shown to be an aspect of reality, such are fictions (unsubstantiated).

Great lecture!

The flaw in this argument is that only if physicalism is false (or you believe it to be false) can you conceive of zombies. So you can't conclude that physicalism is false from the conceivability of zombies. The argument is circular.

@alpacamaster5992

2 жыл бұрын

No not in the slightest

@canwelook

Жыл бұрын

YES. The zombie argument comes across as a conclusion ina desperate and failed search for a supporting theory.

Philip Goff claims that it is conceivable that one can argue against physicalism if we take that the possibility of philosophical zombies contradicts physicalism. Any such argument will inevitably fail.

To say that X and Y are physically identical but one has consciousness and the other has not is the same as saying that two engines are physically identical but in one there is combustion and in the other not.

@argumentando6584

2 жыл бұрын

@@anonymouscoward2491 I think you missed my point. My point is that the Zombie Argument begs the question. By trying to support that consciousness is not a physical phenomenon, he rests on the assumption that consciousness is not a physical phenomenon. He does that by claiming that it's a metaphysical possibility that you and your zombie twin are physically identical in every aspect whereas one is conscious and the other is not. If consciousness is a neurobiological phenomenon (and I think there's a lot more reason to think it is, in fact), it's impossible for your zombie twin to be physically identical to you (even at the subatomic level) and still not have consciousness given that you have it. In the same way that, no matter the brand, the model, or any other property, if there are two engines identical in all physical aspects (to the level of the subatomic world) and in one the physical phenomenon of combustion happens, in the other it also happens.

@argumentando6584

2 жыл бұрын

@@anonymouscoward2491 Basically, you are wrong. It's really that simple. “1) A robot shaped like a human is not conscious 2)A human being is conscious 3) The robot therefore proves physicalism to be false”. No. Your argument begs the question pretty much as the zombie argument does. Premise (1) presupposes that . Also, the allegation that I “assume souls do not exist” is false. I’ve never said that souls do not exist. I didn’t say that physicalism is true, either. I just said that “If consciousness is a neurobiological phenomenon (…) it's impossible for your zombie twin to be physically identical to you and still not have consciousness (…)”. My point is that the Zombie Argument does not work, is not cogent, for it begs the question. I do think that . I also think that . But my point in my comments is not to “prove” that. I’m just focusing on the Zombie Argument. Now, you’re saying that . And you’re not giving any argument to support that claim.

Nice presentation, only 2 additions here: A - one should point out, that physicalism and the possibility of the existence of the zombie beeing presented/defined here cancel each other out. So its EITHER the zombie-argument holds and physicalism is false OR its physicalism holds and the zombie argument doesnt. B - There is different ways to define the philosophical zombie and those differences make the point: B1: "A philosophical zombie is a regular human minus consciousness" B2: "A philosophical zombie is a regular human minus consciousness, that DESPITE of this lack is indistinguishable from any regular human" I think its an easy case to make clear, that only B1 is conceivable and one could even go so far, that B1-zombies exist in the form of alzheimer/dementic patients in their very last stadium. B2 on the other hand, is not conceivable as it is a contradiction in itself. Or in other words: The zombie argument formulated after B2 holds inherent the statement, that consciousness isnt good for anything/does not have any effect on human actions. This goes along with the picture beeing painted by some, that consciousness is a mere movie one watches his own life through. Even though consciousness gives a false impression of what it is and does (just mentioning, wont digress here on that point), the assumption, that it has a fair impact on the human behaviour is still sound even though it is a question of destinction between correlation and causation. There are quite good examples that indicate, that a consciousless person (zombie) would be incapable of or at least heavily limited in certain actions and thereby very much destinguishable from a conscious person. regular persons beeing in temporal states of reduced consciousness like sleep, dizziness, drug-influenced give such examples. Such a (half-)zombie may be just as good in sports, but I doubt very much, that it would make a good chess-player e.g.. And most certainly, it would neither become an author nor a philosoph. That is simple to assume by what we all may be most sure consciousness does: It reflects our own feelings and thoughts. Since language is the expression of thoughts and feelings, any writer whilst forming his text will constantly run through it within his conscious mind to perfect it (the text). Thus, a zombie lacking that level of reflection cannot become a good writer - one may even argue, that such a zombie couldnt learn how to speak - in any way, this zombie would be a contradiction to the "DESPITE" addition of B2.

I would like to meet a philosopher who really believes philosophical zombies exist, especially one who claims to be one. It would make for an interesting discussion.

It's a very unconvincing argument. There's a massive assumption that you can have brain state without the manifestation of the causal consequence of such brain state.

This lecturer is very talented and sets a good example. Concise, articulate and passionate. Thank you.

The Wittgensteinian Argument against Physicalism: Suppose we allow two robots. A programmer programs said robots to collect apples. One robot hits a tree and now is suddenly collecting blueberries instead of apples. What are you appealing to physically that explains the fact that the robot is doing something wrong, if not an intention? (That is to say, the intention of the programmer.) The robot is merely following certain programs, lines of code, etc. What it is doing can't be wrong, unless you say it is amiss by virtue of not being what the programmer intended. If one attempts to appeal to something physical to say the robot who's collecting apples is now doing something wrong; it doesn't seem like you're going to be able to appeal to anything. The fact that it bumped into the tree and began collecting blueberries can't be wrong, unless one said it was out of the accord with the programmers intentions. Therefore, if you commit action X, rule Y can be made out to accord with that action. Ergo, the physical facts under determine what rule you are following. Therefore, the sole thing we are left to appeal to is something like intentionality.

@bouncycastle955

3 жыл бұрын

So when the robot hits a tree, it's lines of codes were affected, or the physical processor was affected?

@widewailcorduroy7278

Жыл бұрын

Post-Malus Vaccinium ergo Propter-Vaccinium Malus

How did you determine zombies don't exist? Seems to be begging the question.

@Trancer006

4 жыл бұрын

I know very late comment, but i thought the same thing lol. We cant disprove the existence of them. For example what if sociopaths are very close to what we call philosophical zombies?

As I continue to watch this video I'm seeing more problems.

Not including the audience's questions and reactions is very painful but probably legally necessary...

1. While inconceivable objects are those which are logically impossible, you may have the appearance of conceivability for an object but it may also be impossible. So I disagree that if something is conceivable then it is possible. 2. I don't think philosophical zombies are possible. The human body needs nourishment, and without feelings like hunger and thirst, how would the body remember to eat? Without feelings I don't see a baby surviving for long. What am I missing?

@Trancer006

4 жыл бұрын

John Camacho I’d argue that 1. In the example of the girl who has never seen a color in her entire life how can she conceive colors? 2. What if in the future we have super complex AI that replicates human mind except for consciousness?

@couch_philosoph3325

3 жыл бұрын

i know this comment is rather old, but i might be able to help you. philosophical zombies are aware of their surroundings. they do feel hunger and thirst. however, there is no phenomenological experience associated with all those functions. they can also talk and report about their inner life. an important destinction needs to be made: there is psychological consciousness and phenomenological consciousness. psychologocial are all those functions like "an information y is processed in x part of the brain". phenomenological experience however is that what makes us ultimately human; its the experience we have while having those more explanable functions. every science (neurobiological, psychology, etc) has the same problem: they can analyze a certain brain function or process, but they cannot explain why these functions are accompanied by phenomenological experience. i personally do not like the zombie argument, but chalmers (the guy who invented it) shows in his work a lot of very thought through critic of physicalism.

what i dont quite understand is why chalmers and everyone else is so obsessed with this argument. in my opinion, chalmers gives tons of excellent points to question physicalism and takes modern scientific theories and shows what they are lacking in terms of consciousness with each one. however, the zombie argument to me is not the strong point of his work. because it only works if you believe that physicalism applied to consciousness is false. if you are sure that consciousness arises from physical traits, you do not hold p-zombies to be conceivable. to make the point more clear: it all comes down to the premises you apply. we all know a pepetuum mobile is impossible because of thermodynamics. yet if i didnt know that, a pepetuum mobile is perfectly conceivable. if you can already show why conceivability is a bad example of possibility when using something that is clearly 100% phycal and logically supervenient on physical traits, then surely you can show why the zombie argument is not on strong ground

@user232349

3 жыл бұрын

Even if you concede that zombies are conceivable and possible, this means that there's a possible zombie world where some particular zombie comes up with Chalmer's argument, possibly word for word. However, in that zombie world, the argument is clearly wrong. If there's a possibility of a world, identical to ours in every observable detail, where the zombie argument is wrong, then how do we know that we aren't already in that world ?

@c0ck7aiL

3 жыл бұрын

great job, excellent points by both of you.

@couch_philosoph3325

2 жыл бұрын

@@anonymouscoward2491 i don't think you really explained to me why i am wrong. And firstly, i am not a physicalist, let's get that out of the way. As i said, i think chalmers mentioned great points throughout his work to question physicalism, i just have a hard time with this one argument. In what way am i confusing conceivability with believing? Explain it to me please. When you look at Chalmers argument, it's not like with your example that he first conceives p zombies and then he shows proof (like with your child example). We do not have concrete evidence of whether consciousness does arise from the physical or not. So your " you are confusing believing with conceiving" doesn't seem to hold up. Also: you say conception just means we have no way of disproving what has been conceived. I am not arguing against that. I am arguing on the premise of chalmers argument, on the whether or not it is even conceivable in the first place depending on what premise you apply. So we only hold p zombies to be conceivable because we accept the premise "consciousness arises not from the physical". If we instead accepted the premise "consciousness arises from the physical" than we would not hold p zombies to be conceivable. Also you did not argue on my Perpetuum mobile argument. At the moment we are like the scientists that did not yet know whether that was possible or not. We are like that in regard to consciousness. We simply don't yet know (and may never know) whether it arises from the physical or not. As i said, i gladly would like to understand your point better. Maybe i didn't understand the argument correctly. So please elaborate :)

pZombies can't exist as described. Cog dictatorship zombies?

Why would an identity-theorist agree that philosophical zombies possible?

Not a very good argument. Seems circular.

So philosophical zombies are essentially a rebuttal for physicalism, hmm

Perhaps this is what everyone who merges with AI will become. Scary thought.

I wonder why you claim that no one thinks philosophical zombies exist. How do you know that they don’t exist? If philosophical zombies are possible, then there is no way of telling whether any person is a Zombie or not. The difference is by definition not verifiable in any way. Is it politeness that makes you say that “no one thinks they are real” don’t all physicalists think they are real?

We can conceive of zombies therefore zombies are somehow 'possible'??? AND because they are 'possible' we can draw real-life conclusions based on armchair ideation of zombies? Really? Are these the depths of ridiculousness that philosophy has now fallen to?

@philipgoff7897

Жыл бұрын

lol