This lecture is truly exceptional. Many of the details that are usually not present in documentaries are mentioned here and described in significant detail. It would be nice to be able to view the slideshow but for those who already have knowledge on the subject it's not really necessary. The lecturer understands the key ideas of the great war at sea, and that what was going on, or the "historical trends," was much greater than a single war/conflict.

Jellicoe had absolutely nothing to gain by taking risks. He knew, as was said, that he was the only man who could lose the war in an afternoon. He held the field at the end and the blockade held. Beatty and his flag officer Seymour are another story. Thx.

Professor Maurer does an excellent job of presenting a clear view of pivotal events, amalgamated from several vectors; the economic, the political, the inevitable conflicting quests for personal glory, the arms race, the mass media lauding qualities of national prestige and destiny-sometimes with a little help from its friends. One does not need the slideshow to get his message, though it might've been nice at times. As an "armchair admiral" with considerable interest in the evolution of warship design (part of a keen desire to understand the causes of World War 2) I found the lecture very informative and interesting.

By far the best lecture of any I’ve seen on this channel. This guy does a helluva job

Fascinating view of Jutland before during and after in its historical context from across the pond.

@dianedilcher1162

2 жыл бұрын

Gfdjb.

A few things should be added to this presentation. The British armor piercing shells were defective, and exploded on contact. Von der Tann was famously hit and survived because of this fault. The German battle cruisers were also very well built, as two of them earned nicknames: 'Iron Dog' and 'the ship that will not die'. Beatty was an idiot, and his flag officer was incompetent. I would also agree with those who say that Lusitania was a legitimate war target. She was known to be carrying munitions illegally, and Churchill himself had hoped that the ship would be destroyed to force the U.S. into the war.

Most gripping recitation of the Battle of Jutland (my oldest son married a danish girl, moved from Fairfield Iowa to Aalborg 20 years ago) ive heard in my short life

Marvelous presentation, outstanding. Considering the eventual overwhelming percentage of persons over the months and years who will be given the opportunity to view this gem of a lecture-via the web; versus the sole live audience present the day it was given, I would’ve thought it prudent to have put a bit more effort into incorporating the slides with his lecture in this video, and perhaps if possible more than one single static video camera. Just a thought….

Excellent talk, would have been good to see the slides.

Superb lecture.

The Geddes Axe - the stroke that ended an Empire.

Fair winds and following seas for all involved on that tragic day. 😢

His translation of "Nimbus" is 100% correct. And I say this as a German. An analogue would be "halo". Not the game but the halo on angels etc. in old religious paintings.

Why did you not show the slide show?

@riff2072

4 жыл бұрын

We almost always miss the slideshow. It's been three years and we are stilling missing it.

@jonrolfson1686

4 жыл бұрын

These speakers and instructors go to great lengths to illustrate their presentations. It would be wll worth the trouble to show the complete presentation.

Whoa, the building of the HMS Dreadnaught did not dissuade the USN from building all big gun battleships. Indeed the design South Carolina class predates Dreadnaught, only Congress’ tight purse strings prevented the US Navy from having the “first” all big gun Battleship.

@will2brown50

2 жыл бұрын

Designs are irrelevant. If they didn't build them, it doesn't matter. The USSR had dozens of "planned" battleships in the second world war that never came to be. Using that as an indicator of strength or prowess is ludicrous. So many things have been designed, but until they are built and tested they are effectively worthless.

From what I understand only the Battlecruiser of Beatty's squadron down at Rosyth institudet the sloppy ammuntion handling procedures they paid so dearly for at Jutland. The rest of the Grand Fleet up at Scapa did not. Paradoxically the ships of Beatty's squadron, from what I understand, instituted this horrendous practice of stacking the gun barbettes with ready round propellant charges, as a result of their experience at the battle of the Dogger bank in 1915, where the British were very impressed with the brisk initial rate of fire opened up by the opposing German battle cruisers, as a result of the German battle cruisers entering the battle with ready rounds stacked in their gun barbettes. In fact the Germans almost lost the battle cruiser SMS Seydlitz in same fashion as the British battle cruisers at Jutland, as a result of these sloppy ammunition handling procedures. But, besides flooding the affected barbettes, the Seydlitz was only saved from blowing up by 2 technical differences to their ammunition compared to the ammunition on the British battle cruisers. 1st, the main 1st propellant charges (Ladung 1) on the German battle cruisers were encased in brass cartridges (as a result of the German guns having slide rather than interrupted screw type breech blocks) rather than in canvas cylinders, as employed by the British (whose guns had interrupted breech blocks). Thus delaying the spread of fire from one stacked propellant charge to the other. And 2nd, the German propellant charges (Kaltes pulver) had a higher ignition temperature than the cordite employed by the British. Needlessly to say, the Germans made the opposite conclusion to the British after their defeat at Dogger bank, and tightened up their ammunition handling procedures. While the captains on the British battle cruisers of Beatty's squadron to their cost fatefully chose to disregard their own ammunition handling safety procedures after Dogger bank. How the captains on the battle cruisers of Beatty's squadron came to institute their fatally sloppy ammunition handling procedures after Dogger bank is somewhat unclear however, as so far no written orders to do so have been found in the Admiralty archives from what I know. Apparently one or more of the battle cruiser captains instituted this change in ammunition handling procedures on their own initiative, with the silent consent of their immediate superior adm. Beatty. Some of the captains may even have instituted this practice even before Dogger bank, though it took Jutland to expose it full on. As regard professor Maurer's mention of the British having a quality problem with their armor penetrating main gun shells, it may not necessarily have been a decisive factor if the British had managed to keep the German battleships locked in battle at Jutland. After all the Japanese beat the Russians at Tsushima with HE shells rather than armour piercing shells. As for Beatty becoming less aggressive after taking over from Jellicoe, it's one thing to criticize your top dog for being too passive. To be the top dog yourself is something totally different. And after what he experienced at Jutland, I don't blame him for becoming a bit less cocky and more carefull with his business. All in all, though the British lost the most ships at Jutland, I think they came away learning the most lessons. With the British fleet acting much more aggressively in WW-2 than in WW-1, night & day, as well as giving subordinate commanders more room for initiative. Personally I'm rather amazed the Germans didn't act more aggressively with their surface fleet during WW-1. The consequences of loosing a large portion of their High seas fleet wouldn't have been any worse to them, compared to how things actually ended, as a result of in the main restricting their operations to Skagerrak and the eastern part of the North sea for the rest of WW-1. IMO they had everything to win and little to lose with a high risk strategy, but the German admirals didn't dare to challenge the Kaiser's "my private plaything" attitude towards his beloved fleet strongly enough.

@1teamski

4 жыл бұрын

The loss of the Hood shows exactly why Battlecruisers, bad powder handling or not, were not good ship designs.

@mikepotter5718

Жыл бұрын

@@1teamski A lot of people seem to be saying that Hood was the first fast battleship.

@1teamski

Жыл бұрын

@@mikepotter5718 Well, it was a battlecruiser after all, being the longest warship in the world when it was built. But even with the armor upgrades it was never a true battleship.....

@brucenadeau2172

Жыл бұрын

@@1teamski battle cruiser was not eant to fight battleships you have understand the hood was out class by bismack gunnery technology the bismack had radar control guns they just finish several month of gunnery train hood had done any gunnery during the war the hood was lost when the bismack hit the forward magazine under b turret and the prince cruiser hit with punning fire in the after magazine at about the same time

@1teamski

Жыл бұрын

@@brucenadeau2172 Exactly my point. The Hood should never have been put in that position in the first place.

Why is Lavrenti Beria lecturing on Jutland? Kidding aside, brilliant lecture thx.

This is the first I've heard of Jellicoe even knowing about the ammunition handling issue in the battlecruisers. I don't believe that's actually true. And Beatty's famous remark is misquoted.

First class presentation. Informative and objective, and great to see the strategic context being mapped out.

Yeh, can't see the slides. Who signed of on production techniques!

Cannot see his presentation slides.

And German fleet withdraw, sounds like good victory...... Oh see you tomorrow morning, empty seas.

Great lecture. Would rather see the slides than the speaker.

Two reasons why Jutland wasn't a German victory, but a British one: - Yes, the British lost more ships and men. But they were ready to do battle the next day. The Germans were not. Their ships were still afloat, but that was the best that could be said about them. Most had suffered damage, some had suffered severe damage. Scheer could not have faced the British the next day. - The Germans fled the scene and left Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet in control of the North Sea. They had to. If they hadn't departed, they would have been annihilated. As it was, Scheer escaped by the skin of his teeth.

@swunt10

4 жыл бұрын

1. both fleets had to go back to port for extensive repair, none of them where ready to do anything except claim victory for propaganda purposes 2. the british fleet disconnected from the german fleet, not the other way around, the fact that the german fleet then went home and the british changed their minds and tried to find the german fleet again before going home is hardly the germans fleet problem 3. naval battles are usually counted by number of ships sunk and not as overall war victories (it's a battle with limited objectives and not about winning the war in one day, throughout history it was always true that someone can win a battle but lose the war, you can't count every lost battle a win just because you won the war). 4. there are many other battles where the british claimed victory solely based on numbers of ships sunk and that has become accepted history, so why should this battle be different?

@wildewaffle9790

2 жыл бұрын

@@swunt10 well, from a strategic point of view, the British won simply because they were able to keep the Hoschseeflotte bound to port at Wilhelmshaven for essentially the rest of the war. As the American papers stated on the matter “the German fleet has assaulted his jailer, yet he remains in jail.”

@swunt10

2 жыл бұрын

@@wildewaffle9790 but the blockade has not much to do with this battle. the battle happened because the german fleet set out to destroy a proportion of the british fleet to reduce the british numerical advantage (the plan was to only engage a small part of the british fleet but then the entire fleet turned up). in the end this objective was reached to some degree. that germany lost the war or that the british blockaded germany is an interesting strategic fact but not that relevant for the battle. battles can be won without winning the war or changing the entire strategic landscape. there are countless of example of battles won but losing the war. it's just a nonsense argument to talk about a battle but then change the goal post to make it about winning the war or strategic objectives. a battle is limited to the battle space and to the time frame of the battle itself and not everything else between heaven and earth. btw quoting propaganda phrases like the jailer jab just proves my point.

@will2brown50

2 жыл бұрын

@@swunt10 Germany won the tactical battle, but lost the strategic goal. The goal of forcing the British into an unfavourable and decisive battle was not achieved. Anglo naval supremacy was maintained and the high seas fleet never attempted to hold pitched battle again. Strategically, the Germans did not achieve their objectives.

@davidwright7193

2 жыл бұрын

@@swunt10 1 immediately after Jutland Jellico has a greater advantage in dreadnaughts over the Germans than he did on the day. He has for instance 1 15 inch armed ship working up at Scapa flow and another coming out of a minor refit along with an Iron Duke and Dreadnaught in refit. 6 months later he has more dreadnoughts available than he did at Jutland where as Scheer has still to replace his losses and never really will. Scheer adds Bayern to the fleet Jellico gets 4 R class ships the 2 Renown’s and the courageous class battlecruisers. 2) This is just wrong. On both occasions that the main fleets come into contact it is Scheer who disengages. Jellico’s turn away at the end is to avoid the torpedoes Scheer is using to cover his retreat. 3) In battles both sides have objectives at Jutland Jellico needs to maintain the status quo anti and would like to improve his advantage over Scheer so ships can more easily be freed up for other tasks. Scheer is aiming to sink some RN ships for minimal loss so as to gain the possibility of a later decisive battle. Jellico achieves his principle aim and partially achieves his secondary aim. Scheer is in a worse position after the battle than before it. 4) again not really true. The only two I can think of are the 1st of June where the French fleet wanted to cover a convoy and the RN to increase its matieral advantage over the French and both achieve their goals and Ferol where Calder takes a couple of French ships but the French fleets unite and Calder has to fall back to Ushant rather than maintain his blockade. The 1st of June was a British victory from a British point of view. Calder on the other hand is roundly castigated at the time for allowing the French fleets to combine rather than destroying one in detail. Ferol is very much the case in point as it was seen both at the time and subsequently as a British loss despite Calder getting the better of the casualty count.

I guess a tactical victory for Germany but a strategic victory for Britain. Fisher's battlecruisers were just a bad design, with their paper-thin armour.

I wouldn’t be too impressed with Churchill’s record on the western front. He is given a regiment on a quite sector where no push is planned nor do they expect a German push. This is deliberate, even Haig doesn’t want this fool anywhere important. He was put into a sector where there was an informal “live and let live” agreement in place where both sides accept that they are acting as pickets and the only thing to be gained by shooting at each other is an early grave. Churchill responds by organising a series of utterly pointless raids that achieve nothing but increasing the casualties among the forces he is commanding. The artillery strike on his command bunker was the kind of action taken by the opposition against an idiot commander causing unnecessary casualties and was probably timed to maximise the chances of his being elsewhere. Churchill did request a division based on his “success” with his regiment but is told in no uncertain terms that he lacks the tactical and strategic nous to be a divisional commander (i.e. we wanted you to spend your time organising rugby not raids you twit). At which point Churchill slinks off back to London in a strop.

@will2brown50

2 жыл бұрын

Literally. He was one of the most militarily incompetent men who's only talent was oration. It pisses me off how much our country glorifies this figure.

Classic example of why audio-visuals can't "save" a speech. "You see," you see," "you see. . ." But NOBODY sees s--t! Better he just tells us without all the hemming and awkward pauses..

11 British ships against 5 Germans... But British were drunk or blind and headed elsewhere... Evan Thomas said: there is 6 against 5, Beatty is an asshole and thus we will not join his scraped cruisers with our modern super dreadnoughts... Beatty miscalculated German cruisers and thought that Derflinger was a fata morgana.... Beatty was so fair-player that he waited until also German ships come to range.... Beatty is just so nice guy: NO ADVANTAGE to our fleet... lets Germans come close and stock cordite everywhere to let them sink our mighty ships..

so lets clarify this.... In reality British ships were destroyed by different reasons such as "sloopy shell" and mainly because Derflinger was unengaged for some time.. not because of their poor armor and tons of cordite everywhere even on board as well as on toilets and on Beatty's office...

@Jpdt19

11 ай бұрын

You seem to have an agenda...

@vitmatyas2097

11 ай бұрын

@@Jpdt19 definitely 😁

Jutland was a British victory. Germany was in jail (blockade) and assaulted the jailer (British Grand Fleet) yet remained in jail. The Grand Fleet suffered more losses, casualties due to Naval personnel not following simple health and safety regulations. Germany's Navy was never able to challenge Britain's dominance of the seas and lost the war as a consequence.

@mangalores-x_x

7 жыл бұрын

In my view the simplistic version. What you describe is not the result of the battle but what you describe is the geostrategic disposition of forces at the start of the war. In my view it is kind of ridiculous to claim victory for any fleet or army when the supposedly strategic victor could have achieved the entirely same result if they hadn't left port and put their Grand fleet into jeopardy in the first place. What the British achieved was not fucking up so badly that they lost which was the only end result in which giving this battle would have changed the strategic landscape for either side. That German navy didn't challlenge the British is also false. What happened is that the German navy decided to change to the U-boat war as a far more direct means to threaten the British war economy than gambling on lucking out in an artillery duel between big ships. That's the actual battle where the British won their strategic victory. Icidently the battleships proved so prohibitively risky to actual give battle so the thing was left to cruisers, submarines and small ships to actual fight and win the war.

@WildBillCox13

6 жыл бұрын

I see your point, but if I may give my perspective on it: If we look at the war as one of economic attrition, the diversion of Allied effort toward keeping the High Seas Fleet "bottled up", as you so aptly put it, presented another facet of the larger struggle. The British fleet was by far the superior in numbers, in deep draught accessible harbors and dry docks, in sailors, in training, and, especially, in expense. By hindsight we can see that the German global operations and Germany's hopes of obtaining the strategic initiative were strangled at Jutland, but, in the moment, it was not nearly as clear or clean cut. The German naval potential kept the bulk of British naval forces concentrated around the maritime sally ports, and the incredible expense of it proved in the end part of the reason that Great Britain lost much of her national prestige during the interbellum period. It can be argued that a continental power needs no maritime presence as long as she can trade, buy, beg, borrow, or steal, the necessary resources from her neighbors and allies. Once the degree of technological sophistication is factored in, however, the resource needs increase in both quantity AND variety. Molybdenum. TungstenWulfram. Helium. Mountains of copper and aluminum/aluminium. Manganese. Steel (subsuming coal/lignite, limestone, iron ore, and more . . .). That's when a continental power begins to eye up the distant third world, wondering if the Accord of Nations will turn a blind eye to a little human rights abuse in the name of profit. And for those dreams you need a strong Navy to protect all those delicious rewards of heavy handed exploitation. Naturally that navy does not need flung into battle to be effective. The mere threat of it is usually enough to keep other nations at bay. Most of the war went on unnoticed in the absolute superiority of British/French access to world markets. However, the costs of maintaining that trade monopoly were formidable. www.roll-of-honour.com/RoyalNavy/WarshipsLostWW1.html Those ships aren't free and you can't just write them off. Collectively, they represented a king's ransom. Once you sink enough warships to make your enemy stay at home, or you sink enough of his merchant ships until the Insurance Companies (cough cough Loyd's of London) declare a moratorium on payments (which almost happened twice), or, in reaction, raise rates (making maritime trade hugely more expensive), you have destroyed his access to foreign goods. Without those goods, advanced technologies . . . telephones, radios, electric fans, rubber tires, medicine (quinine, morphine, curare, and more) . . . degrade into proud memories. We know now that Germany was destined to be strangled, that France was meant by fate to be bled white, that the Russian Romanovs were soon to be beaten, raped, and executed, but all that was still in the future when the battle near Jutland threw so many brave men into their final rest. Between the threat in being of the Grand Fleet, and the U-War on commerce and naval units, coupled with the utility of timely intelligence obtained by air ship, there was a very good chance (in the eyes of strategists) that the German ruse might succeed, right up to the end.

@deeremeyer1749

5 жыл бұрын

Yeah. Lets play a game of football and I'll play with players and you can field eleven and after I score twice the points with half the players you can claim "victory" when I take my team home after the game and don't waste my time playing a team with twice the players and half the "game" again. If the Germans were in "jail" blockaded in port who was keeping them there and how did THAT British "victory" pencil out?

@williamarthurfenton1496

5 жыл бұрын

Jutland was an operational victory for Germany; and a strategic victory for Britain. Germany could not win a sustained battle, and they knew it. Jelicho was mostly to blame anyway for insisting on those cardboard battlecruisers. Also complacency as is so often observed by powers dominant in a field for so long, or in the water as the case may be.

@alganhar1

4 жыл бұрын

@@deeremeyer1749 It played out in the fact the High Seas Fleet never sailed again until it was surrendered to the Allies at the end of the war and sailed to Scapa Flow in ignomy. Jutland was the last chance for the High Seas Fleet to wrest control of the Sea from the Royal Navy, and it failed to do so. The number of ships lost is meaningless, you bring that up simply as a way of salvaging pride. By not gaining control of the sea and never again leaving Port the High Seas Fleet basically conceeded defeat, and in doing so all but assured the eventual defeat of Germany. So yes, the High Seas fleet were effectively imprisoned, they *lost* the strategic battle, plain and simple. Believe it or not industrial attritional wars are not won at the Tactical, or even Operational level, but at the Strategic. So, that is pretty much how *that* pencilled out, a 'victory' is only such if it meets an operational or strategic goal, and the High Seas Fleet managed neither at Jutland, salve your pride with a 'Tactical' victory all you wish, but the fact of the matter is that the High Seas Fleet literally gave up on seeking command of the Sea, as a result it could not hope to meet the very reason it had for existing in the first place.....

It's amazing to make your life studying Jutland and not learn how to pronounce Indefatigable. I don't care how they say it in America; this was a British ship. And Beatty too, for that matter.

Good lecture but no slide show. Navy, you need to work on your professionalism.

Shame, shame shame! US Navy unable to place a decent cameraman or 2 cameras & aan editor... Unable to put together a production crew and it expects us to believe it will fight naval engagements, project sea power & ensure sea lanes??? LOL, ROLF... Comme on! Nonetheless kudos to Professor Maurer for such a brilliant expoxition of the case presented in all angles to be learned from this pivotal engagement in the history of naval combat. Strategic/Tactical

Nelson's Corpse became a hero..as he never knew if; only courage undaunted in life, by the Navy..Industry is directly correlated with military weapons technology it is called progress, giving people something to do with their time. To become powerful is then a sin against man and nature..Why not show the pictures like Fischer?

@tamlandipper29

5 жыл бұрын

So you're saying that a man who was feted by the crowned heads of Europe, received numerous awards like jewelled swords, and got promoted admiral and made a duke... He didn't know he was appreciated as a hero?

there was one clear thing seen. Great Britain had a lot of cordite... less of armor.. but as they say: speed is our armor.... speed is our armor... speed is armor.. Cordite is speed, rapid fire.. cordite is armor... Beatty is speed, Beatty is armor... Seamen must learn this every day... no matter we lost 3 cruiser but we set up biggest ambush in history... biggest ambush is more important than 3 cruisers, biggest ambush... cordite... Beatty... pride of British navy... rapid fire but no hits... speed is armor.. cordite is speed, cordite is armor.....

Looking at slides the audience on KZread can’t see on camera makes this video a total loss.

This video is all about a presentation, yet we don't see it. So this is useless

Battlecruisers were the ultimate mistake in ship design. Beautiful but not powerful. Another thing, the US already had dreadnoughts on the blocks when the Dreadnought was launched. England simply put a rush on it to be the first. Revolutionary, but not unique. British error with subs is that the majority were forced to work with fleets rather than being used to patrol in enemy waters.

@alganhar1

6 жыл бұрын

Actually, no, the problem with Battlecruisers is not that they were terrible at the job for which they were designed, but that they were used to fulfil roles for which they had NOT been designed. Let me explain, the Battlecruisers were designed as Cruiser Killers, their task was to engage and destroy enemy Cruisers, NOT to engage the main enemy Battle Line of Battleships. When Battlecruisers were utilised in the Role for which they had been designed they did exceptionally well. With their larger guns they outranged any conventional cruiser and had a far greater weight of fire, but were fast enough to outrun anything that could destroy them. The German Panzerschiffes of WWII were designed with exactly the same premise in mind, to destroy Cruisers and Merchentmen, NOT to engage Battleships. To give an example of when Battlecruisers were utilised for the role they had been designed for I could point out the Battle of the Falklands in 1914. The battlecruisers HMS Invincible and HMS Inflexible were not only more heavily armed than the German Cruisers, but also *faster* being able to make 25.5 knots compared 22.5. The inevitable outcome being 4 of the 5 of the German Cruisers and 2 Auxilaries being sunk with very little damage to the Royal Navy. That is an example of how Battlecruisers were supposed to be used. The problem comes when you send Battlecruisers against Battleships, you are using the ships in a role for which they are not suited or designed. They were never designed to withstand fire from battleship calibre guns because they were not supposed to ENGAGE those Battleships. Didn't help that Beatty was a fucking moron either. As for the British error with subs, the British Subs did not exactly have a target rich environment when it came to hunting German Merchant Shipping during WWI, there was virtually none. Most of the German Merchant Marine either sat out the war in neutral ports or were captured or sunk pretty early on. By 1916 it effectively did not exist. Given that they had no viable targets what exactly were the subs supposed to do?

@1teamski

6 жыл бұрын

Ahh, I never said that BC's were bad for the role that they were designed for. The problem with their design is that the role for which they were designed to fill was so narrow, that their very existence was questionable. With the exception of the battle of the Falkland Islands, the odds of a BC engaging CL's or CA's in set piece battles was negligible. The fact that the Germans started building BC's in response, made the class obsolete. It was going to be more likely the case as it was in Jutland that BC's were going to be mixed in with BB's. The ultimate expression of the failure of BC's was of course the sinking of the HMS Hood.

@thomasgray4188

4 жыл бұрын

@@1teamski actually the splendid cats onwards were designed to fight their German counterparts and if you look at the number of shell hits their armour stood up pretty well in many aspects the true culprit is poor flash protection.

@1teamski

4 жыл бұрын

@@thomasgray4188 I you are 100% correct about the poor flash protection, but still, the British designed battlecruisers to outgun heavy cruisers. Once the Germans built their own, the class was pretty much doomed: Their application was so specific and if they ended up running into dreadnoughts (very likely as was the case), their usefulness went out the door. The Hood most likely had fine flash protection, but that didn't do squat in the slugging match with the Bismarck. She should have never been put in that position.

@swunt10

4 жыл бұрын

the dreadnought was not even revolutionary. it was more of the same only slighly better just as every new ship before. only british propaganda made the dreadnought out to be something revolutionary and people just love simple labels. yet when you try to find what's revolutionary you only find evolutionary improvements. improvements that where going on for about 100 years at a almost constant rate without any navy ever claiming that one of their newer ships was 'revolutionary' only british propaganda did that and they still do the same to this very day. every time they build a new mediocre ship they claim it's the best in the world and congratulate themselves for it.

It was an economic war, first and foremost, that had been going on for years. The German intention was to drive Great Britain off the continent, where they had forced trade on their terms for many years, despite Napoleon's brave attempts to halt the process. The problem was that it took two world wars and far too long, temporally speaking, but, in the end, Germany succeeded in his strategic purpose. With Brexit, therefore, Germany has, at last, won her war against the British Empire. Jutland was just a side show.

Repetitive - the speaker is masterful in reconstituting statements, in consecutive sentences, that have the same meaning. Dull. Analysis of the battle of Jutland itself is at a schoolboy level.

@gaptainmcflaps8456

2 жыл бұрын

Andrew Lambert's lecture on Jutland is the best by far.

Really? You can’t be bothered to include the media? Pathetic.