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Dr. Craig is WRONG| Logical Problem of Evil is NOT Dead

I'm joined by Dr. Justin Mooney to discuss Dr. Craig's animated video linked below.
• Suffering and Evil: Th...
Link to Justin's extensive bibliography on the PoE: docs.google.com/document/d/1d...
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Пікірлер: 41

  • @MajestyofReason
    @MajestyofReason Жыл бұрын

    Excellent video! Incredibly clear and informative. One minor correction: at 10:06, source incompatibilism is different from what Justin characterizes. Whereas leeway incompatibilists require an indeterminist condition on moral responsibility [or freedom] only because causal determinism removes leeway among alternative possibilities (and, according to them, such leeway is required for moral responsibility), source incompatibilists require an indeterminist condition on moral responsibility only because causal determinism vitiates our status as the appropriate sources of our actions (and, according to them, such sourcehood is required for moral responsibility).Thus, for source incompatibilists, causal determinism (by their lights) removes our responsibility not because it removes our leeway among alternative possibilities but instead because it compromises (in relevant ways) the actual causal history of our actions. To see how this is different from what Justin articulates, notice that leeway incompatibilists can happily accept the view Justin specified -- leeway incompatibilists can hold that one can be free and responsible for doing X even though X was causally determined, since leeway incompatibilists can hold that such cases involve freedom and responsibility when (and only when) they're appropriately related to earlier actions of the agent for which the agent had leeway (where that leeway is crucial for explaining the agent's freedom and responsibility in acting). But, of course, leeway incompatibilists cannot accept source incompatibilism. This illustrates that Justin did not articulate source incompatibilism. (For more on characterizing source incompatibilism, I highly recommend checking out Pereboom and McKenna's intro to free will with Routledge!)

  • @navienslavement

    @navienslavement

    10 ай бұрын

    🤓😎 the duality of man

  • @joop6463

    @joop6463

    10 ай бұрын

    a comment of 4 months ago under a vid of 1 hour ago interesting

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    @@joop6463 I released this video to my patrons 4 months ago. Patrons get early access

  • @andrewmoon1917

    @andrewmoon1917

    10 ай бұрын

    Orrrrr.... Joe Shmid is SO fast at writing comments that they appear months earlier than the video itself. Take your pick.

  • @theautodidacticlayman

    @theautodidacticlayman

    10 ай бұрын

    @@andrewmoon1917Definitely or.

  • @andrewmoon1917
    @andrewmoon191710 ай бұрын

    Good interview! Here're some additional points (I vaguely remember reading Alexander Pruss say something like this on the internet somewhere). What is still widely accepted from Plantinga's "solution to the logical problem of evil" is not the details of Plantinga's specific FWD but the structure of Plantinga's reply. 1) on the defensive side, show how difficult it is to formulate an explicit or implicit contradiction from "God exists" and "evil exists", using only necessarily true propositions or really, really obvious propositions. 2) on the offensive side, to find some broadly logically possibly true proposition, which when conjoined with the proposition that God exists, entails that evil exists, would show that the three propositions are compossible. Plantinga showed us better how to think about logical problems (back when modal notions were finding their way back into phil. religion). That's a huge accomplishment. And I think it's widely accepted that both the defensive and offensive strategies can be done (although different philosophers might disagree about how to get there).

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    Sounds correct to me based on my conversation with Daniel Speak. Thanks for add this important clarification!

  • @modernmoralist
    @modernmoralist10 ай бұрын

    Fabulous work! You are one of the best figures bridging academic philosophy of religion or analytic theology and popular apologetics. You are also providing a service for the Christian community, as you are showing us how to focus on Christ rather than stopping at idolizing his defenders.

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    Thanks for the kind words and thanks for watching my videos!

  • @travispelletier3352
    @travispelletier335210 ай бұрын

    Video title: "Dr. Craig is WRONG! The logical Problem of evil is NOT dead" Expert in the video: "It's fair to say that there was a time in which [the statement that the logical problem of evil is dead] was widely accepted in the philosophical community . . . [and] today it's more complicated but it's still true that philosophers are no longer defending the claim that the mere existence of some suffering or other is incompatible with theism. I don't think anyone is making the case." So in reference to the argument discussed in the video (the standard logical argument), Craig is simply correct. But yes, we need to be aware of new arguments from evil as they come up. I thought the content here was great, but it would be better to have a less "clickbaity" title.

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    Well said Travis! I truly don’t want to have clickbait titles. I’m aiming for a title that makes you want to click while also delivering on what the title promises. The Epicurean version of the logical problem of evil is dead. That is the weakest version of this type of argument and it is the version the video starts with. I didn’t mean to imply in my title that that particular version of the logical problem of evil isn’t dead. But it does seem that someone who watches my video will walk away thinking that this type of argument (logical problem of evil more broadly) is still alive and needs to be dealt with, and Plantinga’s free will defense was not decisive in refuting all versions of a logical problem of evil. Conversely, someone that watches Craig’s animated video will walk away thinking that all forms of the logical problem of evil are dead. So I actually think my video gives the right impression of the current state of the literature on this topic, while Craig’s video does not, which is why I titled it the way I did.

  • @minor00

    @minor00

    10 ай бұрын

    Good discussion! If "clickbait" refers to a title that hooks you in to want to watch the video then I agree it is "clickbait". If "clickbait" is a title that deceptively hooks you in, as it doesn't show what it claims to show, then I think it is not "clickbait". Having said that though, the person clicking it probably assumes a definition of the logical problem of evil different than the one used by the title since the main point of the video is to reveal how that definition is too narrow. All-in-all I think that is not deceptive, but actually highlights the most essential thing I learned from the video. And personally, I'd only have issue with the deceptive definition of "clickbait".

  • @travispelletier3352

    @travispelletier3352

    10 ай бұрын

    ​@@TheAnalyticChristian It really depends on the intended audience. If you are presenting an academic paper in philosophy, then your readers will be thinking of a wide variety of nuanced arguments. If you are targeting a lay audience, the epicurean argument is by far the most likely one that they see, and it is also one that has had some academic defenders in the past. So it isn't a strawman, and it is what most folks think about when they hear of the problem of evil. So it makes sense to focus on that problem. "Someone that watches Craig’s animated video will walk away thinking that all forms of the logical problem of evil are dead." I don't think so. People walking away from the video will get the impression that anyone who argues that God could not possibly coexist with ANY evil is at odds with most contemporary philosophers. That's the argument the video emphasizes, and it makes sense to emphasize that one. And people who get this impression would have an accurate summary. The newer arguments are simply different arguments from the one Craig is referring to.

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    @@travispelletier3352 got it. Fair points. It would have been nice if Craig had said “though this logical problem of evil is dead, more work is being done by theists responding to different versions.” I’ll leave it there. Thanks for watching and commenting. It keeps me thinking! I appreciate it.

  • @travispelletier3352

    @travispelletier3352

    10 ай бұрын

    @@TheAnalyticChristian Thanks for engaging so graciously!

  • @minor00
    @minor0010 ай бұрын

    Where can we find more information on some of those "compatibilist free will defense" arguments mentioned around 14:47? Also, who are some of the leading philosophers in the discussion on the logical (and evidential) problems? Thanks!

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    Read this paper by Jason Turner titled, “Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense” published in Faith and Philosophy in 2013. www.u.arizona.edu/~jasonturner/storage/CompatFWDef-web.pdf

  • @minor00

    @minor00

    10 ай бұрын

    @@TheAnalyticChristian Thanks for taking time to respond! I'm always interesting in hearing some compatibilist theodicies since Plantinga and Craig's views tend to take the main stage in the popular level discourse.

  • @Alex_Pinkney
    @Alex_Pinkney10 ай бұрын

    Is J.L. Mackie’s PoE dead?

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    I think Mackie himself acknowledged that Plantinga’s response was successful against his argument. However, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Alexander Pruss, and Marilyn Adams have pointed out some problems in Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. But those same philosophers have their own ways of patching up the problems and other philosophers have responded to those criticisms (such as Daniel Speak). My impression is that no one is currently still defending Mackie’s argument, so it’s safe to say it is dead I think. But there are other versions of a logical problem of evil by Sterba ans Schellenberg for example. Theists have responded to those, but it’s not like there is some consensus that those responses decisively refute their arguments.

  • @tjmusic8697
    @tjmusic86975 ай бұрын

    Unfortunately, regarding the free will defense in the video, Dr. Mooney's critique misses the point. The point of the free will defense is not to show that the version of free will is correct. Rather, it is to show that there is a possible world in which evil/suffering exists and God still possesses the omni-traits. It can be helpfully laid out like this: 1) If "God" and "the existence of evil/suffering" are logically incompatible, then there is no possible world in which suffering and God coexist. 2) But there is a possible world in which suffering and God coexist. 3) Therefore, "God" and "The existence of evil/suffering" are not logically incompatible. So it doesn't actually matter if the version of free will that was used is controversial. All that matters is that it's logically possible.

  • @faithbecauseofreason8381
    @faithbecauseofreason838110 ай бұрын

    Good stuff!

  • @thecloudtherapist
    @thecloudtherapist10 ай бұрын

    I'm not sure what Mooney is getting at here 20m35s, with the example. Surely that event (Mooney refusing the dental work) will not come to pass, so why should that count amongst the infinite other possibilities leading up to that event, such as changing his mind voluntarily or being persuaded to do so or anything else, like being run over by a bus before he gets to the dentist, etc. Isn't his decision to not to take up the dentist's advice also a consequential one, of his own (hypothetical) stupidity, regardless of motivation (fear, lack of education, distrust of dentists, etc)??

  • @magno1177

    @magno1177

    10 ай бұрын

    Mooney's example is just a thought experiment, but if you don't like it, think about the trolley problem or the fat man case. Mooney's point is that sometimes it is morally impermissible to allow certain evils even if they are connected to greater goods. If we agree with Mooney here (and we should), it means two things. First, the theist can no longer use the proposition “God allows evils for a greater good” to solve the problem of evil because even if it were true, it wouldn't have normative power to justify God's permission. On the other hand, the atheist can no longer argue that the existence of God is incompatible with gratuitous evil (where gratuitous evil is understood as evil that doesn't serve a greater good), because God would not be working within a framework of mere consequences but with these non-consequentialist constraints.

  • @thecloudtherapist

    @thecloudtherapist

    10 ай бұрын

    ​​@@magno1177I do not see the point of it because WLC could also say: Ah, but it's not gratuitous or it's not consequentialist because actually what you thought was evil for no reason may be the FIRST perspective (the first person to observe or be affected by the evil) but it then leads that person to go on and do something positive which is actually the real positive thing (the SECOND) that I wanted to happen. It makes Mooney's point not only moot but rather pointless. And you can carry on that scenario to infinity, until you DO reach something positive and God can say: well, that's what I meant to happen, that's why I allowed that original gratuitous evil to happen. And again, what makes Mooney think something is "morally impermissible" to God, since we're in no position to make that judgement, just like we're not able to judge a typical evil event happening?

  • @magno1177

    @magno1177

    10 ай бұрын

    The main concern that Mooney shares with us is about what it means for God to have morally sufficient reasons to allow the existence of evil. For instance, philosophers like Craig have established specific criteria to determine when it is morally justifiable to permit some evil. These criteria can be summarized as follows: (i) Allowing E (or an equally bad or worse evil) is necessary to bring about a greater good, or (ii) Allowing E is necessary to prevent an equally bad or worse evil. Mooney's primary focus in his argument is to challenge the validity of condition (i), arguing that there are certain types of evil that should not be permitted, even if they might lead to a greater good. In your response, I haven't found anything that challenges this argument. In essence, our discussion revolves around the conditions that must be met for God to permit certain instances of evil. While Craig and others believe that the key factor is the connection between these evils and greater goods, Mooney takes a different stance, arguing (correctly) that mere association with a greater good is not sufficient for God to be morally justified in permitting certain evils. It's worth noting that even if (i) is false, it doesn't imply that God lacks reasons for allowing the existence of the evils we observe. Mooney, in fact, believes that God does have reasons, but these reasons are grounded in matters of rights and obligations, rather than solely in the realm of consequences. @@thecloudtherapist

  • @steveaustin4118
    @steveaustin411810 ай бұрын

    You can't have an all knowing God and free will, If god knows every thing I will do I have no choice, We are no better than NPC in a game of the Sims or automatons following our programming. This also removes hell as an all loving fair God would know that everything we did in life was what he wanted and we had no choice

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    Hey Steve. You are raising a great question about foreknowledge and free will. I’ve responded to this question in this 10 minute video. I lay out 6 possible solutions to the problem and the solution I think is best is the dependence view. Watch it and let me know what you think. kzread.info/dash/bejne/nnmqzrl8h5ibfrw.htmlsi=JwxK-qVDXym8kgKc

  • @thecloudtherapist

    @thecloudtherapist

    10 ай бұрын

    Read about Molinism and Middle Knowledge.

  • @PyotrPiper
    @PyotrPiper10 ай бұрын

    By "the logical problem of evil" Mooney seems to mean "any deductively valid argument that relies on a premise stating that evil of some kind exists, including particular evils, to infer the conclusion that God does not exist". Of course, arguments of this form are not dead. And they never will be. But that's not what Mackie (who coined the term) meant by it. And it's not what Plantinga meant by it when he discussed it in "God, Freedom, and Evil". And it's not what Craig means by it in the video that Mooney and Jordan consider here. So, I think the critique here is unfair to Craig. Mackie wanted to show (in his words) “that religious beliefs … are positively irrational, that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another”. The idea was this: Christians accept certain doctrines simply because they are Christians. And those doctrines are internally inconsistent: taken together, they imply a contradiction. The doctrines Mackie had in mind are: (I) evil (e.g., sin) exists; (II) God is all-good; (III) God is all-knowing; and (IV) God is all-powerful. This kind of argument - the kind that is meant to show that religious belief is internally inconsistent and therefore irrational - is what Mackie and Plantinga have in mind. Plantinga says, for example, that Mackie takes it that “theistic belief contains an inconsistency or contradiction”. And Craig, in this context, has the same thing in mind: his video covers what he calls the “internal logical problem of evil” in “Philosophical Foundations” (the book that Mooney holds up early in the video), and Craig explains the “internal” problem in the way that I just did. To see the difference, imagine I give you a deductive argument from evil that takes as a premise “the moon blew up”, or “there is a lot of racism in the world”, or “there are people who are capable of relating personally to God but who, through no fault of their own, fail to believe”, or so on. Those arguments, if they’re successful, show that God does not exist. But they don’t show that my religious beliefs were inconsistent in the first place; rather, you had to show me something new that wasn’t taught by religion to show me that God does not exist. So, those arguments don’t qualify as Logical Problems of Evil in the Mackie / Plantinga / ("internal") Craig sense.

  • @PyotrPiper

    @PyotrPiper

    10 ай бұрын

    Here’s why that’s important. The Logical Problem of Evil was seen by many as a serious threat - even a damning threat - to theistic belief for a very long time. Hume has a character say of it that "nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive." And Mackie thought that the Logical Problem of Evil was so strong that it made religious belief demonstrably "positively irrational"! For an argument to go from 'understood by many respectable philosophers as a literal demonstration of the irrationality of religious belief' to “no longer defended by scholars” (in Dr. Mooney’s words) is, to put it lightly, a really big deal. That's one of the biggest wins that any serious, controversial philosophical position can enjoy. (Because yes, eliminating a major L counts as a major W. 😊 ) And it's also one of the clearest, most dramatic examples of philosophical progress in the entire history of philosophy. So, referring to Mackie’s Logical Problem of Evil as “the oldest, original, and sort of simple and weakest version of [the logical argument from evil]” obscures the significance of the Logical Problem of Evil, as well as the significance of both the W for theism and the general philosophical progress in the area that occurred with, after, and because of Plantinga’s work on the problem. Plus, the Logical Problem of Evil had a certain kind of strength in its prime that contemporary deductive arguments from evil do not now have. Remember, the Logical Problem of Evil showed that theism was positively irrational! But contemporary deductive arguments from evil don’t have that kind of weight, even for philosophers who think that they’re pretty darn good arguments. As far as I can tell, it’s no longer a standard position - as it once was - that a little reflection on evil shows theistic belief to be “unreasonable” or “rationally unacceptable” (as Plantinga put it). So, it’s important to distinguish between deductive arguments from evil, on the one hand, and the Logical Problem of Evil on the other. And the Logical Problem of Evil really is dead, just as Craig says it is.

  • @urikamoment

    @urikamoment

    6 ай бұрын

    Any logical argument that includes some tenets of faith as premises, and successfully demonstrates an inconsistency, shows that it is irrational to hold these tenets of faith along with the other premises the argument uses (yes the word “successfully” is doing a lot of work here, but that’s for the sake of brevity in a video comment). You can argue that no such argument exists, or that none has been offered so far. You cannot argue for special status for whatever you labeled “The Logical Problem of Evil”. Any other successful logical argument will work just as well, even if you call it a “deductive argument”. By way of illustration, it might be the case that we can show that god’s omnipotence and omnibenevolence are compatible with some evil, but incompatible with animal suffering. If you could successfully demonstrate the latter, and produce the suffering animal, you have shown that in our world it is irrational to believe in such a god. In short, the stakes are still as high as they ever were, even if Plantinga successfully defended against some versions of the logical arguments from evil. Of course, that too is on shaky ground in academic circles today, as Moony mentions in this video.

  • @PyotrPiper

    @PyotrPiper

    5 ай бұрын

    That isn't right -- sort of. Mackie purported to show that a contradiction follows from premises held by the (religious, especially Christian) theist in virtue of her being a (religious, especially Christian) theist. So, I say "sort of" because if you think that (e.g.) Christian theists are committed to the idea that there is animal suffering, and if you think that this (along with other premises to which Christian theists are committed qua Christian theists) results in a contradiction -- then sure, you could have a version of the logical argument from evil. But this is different from saying "we can generate a deductive argument which includes as as premises 'bad thing X is the case' (where bad thing X is not taught by the Christian faith) and 'God exists' and then generates a contradiction from this premise. It's obvious (and barely merits noting) that arguments of this type will be with us to the end of days. Now, you might not think it's not very interesting that the logical argument from evil, as I described it, has been done away with. (Maybe because you think that other arguments -- arguments that take premises which, although not taught by the Christian faith, are sufficiently obvious -- do the same work as the logical argument from evil.) That's OK. But Mackie thought the logical argument from evil, as I described it, was of special interest. So does Plantinga. And so does Craig. Mooney is just talking past Craig's (and Plantinga's, and Mackie's) interests here.@@urikamoment

  • @geraldbritton8118
    @geraldbritton811810 ай бұрын

    provocative title. but unless you have wlc on to respond and clarify, not really useful.

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    I plan to invite Dr. Craig on to discuss the criticisms. I hope he accepts. He’s been on my channel 3 times before.

  • @andrewmoon1917

    @andrewmoon1917

    10 ай бұрын

    why would that make the video not really useful? you get a clear overview and explanation of recent work on the problem of evil from a specialist who works on the problem of evil.

  • @geraldbritton8118

    @geraldbritton8118

    10 ай бұрын

    @@andrewmoon1917 simply because having WLCs responses in real time would clear up confusion and misunderstanding (if any) both of which happen frequently in other fora with one-sided discussions.

  • @TheRealisticNihilist
    @TheRealisticNihilist10 ай бұрын

    I don't know why you'd insist that no one defends the Epicurean problem of evil.

  • @TheAnalyticChristian

    @TheAnalyticChristian

    10 ай бұрын

    “No one” is too broad. I’m sure there are people outside the field of philosophy who defends it. That was never doubted. I mean I hear my own students bring it up from time to time. Rather, people who say the logical problem of of evil is dead mean that no contemporary philosopher defends it. I can’t think of any contemporary philosopher that defends the epicurean problem of evil. Can you?