@ 23:25 - This is an interesting reductio ad absurdum, but I think there's a good overarching rebuttal. Donald Hoffman bites the bullet with his basic argument that all such "evolved capacities" are, in fact, non-veridical. It's admittedly still a radical (even absurd!) view to most but I'm sold on it. What does still stick from Gideon's question is like a new, somewhat inverted incarnation of the Cartesian circle, where the "non-deceiving God" has been replaced by the inherently deceptive process of evolution: We can only know to mistrust our evolved capacities if we know that evolution is true, but we have only come to believe in evolution by said mistrusted capacities. I haven't read Hoffman's books but I haven't heard him make a response to this particular critique.

The key, altruism does not exist. Self-interest is behind all human behaviour beyond the initial instinctual base with which we are born.

Once I am born, therefore I am, period.

I enjoyed this discussion. The topic is interesting, the guest seems well informed, and Robert asks good questions and applies sound logic. My approach to ethics is to make a Pascalian wager: we can't know whether or not there are moral realities; if there are moral realities then we ought to act as if there are; if there are no moral realities then it doesn't matter how we act; if we act as if there are moral realities and there isn't, then at least we haven't done anything wrong; if we don't act as if there are moral realities then we risk failing to do what we ought to do. Therefore, relative to our ignorance regarding the existence of moral realities, we ought to act as if they do exist, in case they do. No risk of moral loss, only possibility of moral gain. However, I don't think we are justified in assuming morality rests on pleasure or the avoidance of suffering of sentient beings. It has been said that "it is better to be an unsatisfied Socrates than a satisfied pig." Seeking truth, speaking honestly, and acting honorably can sometimes lead to pain and suffering, and such acts might be worthwhile in themselves, not just because they help to avoid even greater pains. Just like we don't know if there are moral realities, we also don't know what the nature of morality is. What is the standard by which we ought to act? Relative to our ignorance about the nature of an absolute moral standard, we ought to adopt, as a supplemental moral standard, something that is most likely to be consistent with the absolute standard if it exists. I think that the supplemental standard is Truth: seeking truth, accepting truth, speaking truth, creating an environment conducive to such, and respecting others in their pursuit of such. (Granted, the avoidance of suffering can sometimes be helpful, but it ought to be considered a secondary goal or a means to the higher goal of truth.) The reason I think we should adopt truth as the supplemental moral standard is that it is most likely to be consistent with the absolute moral standard if it exists. In our pursuit of taking moral actions, regardless of what is the absolute moral standard, we will need to gather true information. For example, if part of acting morally is treating sentient beings with respect, then we need to gather true information about which beings are sentient. If part of acting morally includes feeding the poor, then we need to gather true information on how best to do that. No matter what actions are morally good, truth is a necessary tool for intentionally and efficiently taking those actions. Therefore, by pursuing truth we have the best odds of acting consistently with the absolute moral standard, for even if we knew what the absolute moral standard is, we would still spend much of our time pursuing truth. It may be objected that truth is useful not only in pursuing good but also in pursuing evil. To this I have to admit that morality must ultimately depend on good intentions or a good will. If one wants to build a house, one will need tools such as a hammer. Yes, the hammer might also be used to smash another house. But the point is that the hammer is a necessary tool for house building, whereas many things can be used to destroy a house. Likewise, truth is necessary for goodness, and although it can be used for evil, falsehood and deception can only be used for evil. I want to know the nature of morality. I want to do what is right. But despite my best efforts, my logic here might not be air tight. It wouldn't surprise me if Robert or his listeners could quickly point out the flaws in my reasoning. Please do.

@DanielCCaz

4 жыл бұрын

Oners82 this is an interesting objection. Thank you for offering it. It reminds me of a similar critique of Pascal’s original wager. The critique is that to believe in God just for the sake of the possibility of eternal life and infinite rewards in heaven is to believe for misguided and selfish reasons. Or worse yet, it is not to believe at all, but rather to pretend to believe for the sake of possible rewards without risk. Setting aside the issue of whether or not this critique of Pascal’s wager is valid, I don’t think the analogous objection that you offer here works against the moral wager that I’m proposing. Let me explain why. To begin, let me state more explicitly the important premises of my argument. Premise 1: we do not and can not know whether there is an absolute moral reality; that is, we can’t know whether or not moral realism is true or false. It might seem like some actions are more ethical than others, but just because something SEEMS to be the case doesn’t necessarily mean it actually is the case. Our moral intuitions might be explained away by cultural norms, as mere survival mechanisms, or a combination of the two, or other possibilities we haven’t considered. In some cultures abortion is considered murder. In other cultures infanticide is practiced without concern. Cultures vary in what sexual practices are considered unethical, in how animals should be treated, and whether slavery is acceptable. For just about every act we might condemn as obviously evil, there are others who might see those acts as perfectly normal. Most people tend to adopt the moral codes of their respective cultures and tend not to question them. These moral codes become ingrained and are usually accepted as obvious moral truths. You might argue that while there is a great variety of moral beliefs among different cultures some moral values are so fundamental that they are universally accepted, and these universal values prove moral realism. I’m not sure if there actually are such universally accepted moral values (maybe you could list some), but even if there were such universal moral values, that doesn’t prove moral realism. It doesn’t prove that anyone OUGHT TO hold these values; it merely shows that everyone does. If we assume for the sake of argument that there are some universally accepted moral values, that still doesn’t mean that moral realism is true. Rather, it is plausible that these universally accepted values are universally accepted merely because they promote survival, whether of the individual or the group. That is, perhaps we oppose betrayal, for example, not because it is contrary to some real and absolute ethical standard, but because loyalty is more beneficial to the survival of the individual and/or the group. Most of us want to survive. Most of us want our group to survive. This doesn’t mean we are acting in accordance with the Good. But if we can convince ourselves we are good it might be even more useful to our survival. Our moral intuitions and instincts (such as compassion, empathy, etc.) may be explained away by cultural influences and/or survival mechanisms. But I really don’t feel the burden to explain them away in the first place. There may be other explanations we haven’t thought of. The crucial point is that the fact we have these intuitions doesn’t logically entail that they correspond to reality. The truth of moral realism cannot be demonstrated logically, phenomenologically, or empirically. Logically, either moral realism is true or false. Epistemologically, either we know it is true, we know it is false, or we don’t know whether it is true or false. Again, the first premise of my argument is that we don’t know whether moral realism is true or false. If you believe we can know it to be true, then this is likely the source of our disagreement, and perhaps you would be willing to demonstrate the truth of moral realism for me. Premise 2: If moral realism is true, then we ought to act as if moral realism is true. This statement is fairly self-evident and analytical I think, but making it explicit may help show the logic of my argument as a whole. Premise 3: If moral realism is false, then there is no way we ought to act, and it doesn’t matter how we act or what we do, with regards to morality. If moral realism is false, no acts are morally superior or inferior to others. If moral realism is false, then all acts are morally equal, or rather, all acts are amoral. Again, this premise seems true by the definitions of the relevant terms. Premise 4: we have two options, either we act as if moral realism is true or we act as if moral realism is false. There is no other choice. In other words, lacking the knowledge about whether moral realism is true or false, WE MUST WAGER. If there is a third option here that I’ve overlooked, please inform me. Conclusion: lacking the knowledge about whether moral realism is true or false, we ought to act as if it is true. A. If we act as if moral realism is true, and it so happens that it actually is true, then we were morally right to act as if it were true. B. If we act as if moral realism is true, and it so happens that moral realism is false, we have not acted in an immoral way as all actions are amoral in that case. C. If we act as if moral realism is false, and it so happens that moral realism is actually true, then we’ve acted immorally because we haven’t pursued the actions prescribed by the moral reality. D. If we act as if moral realism is false, and it so happens that it actually is false, then we’ve acted amorally as all actions are amoral in that case. So the only choice in this dilemma that can be consistent with morality is to act as if moral realism is true (option A.). And the only choice in this dilemma that can be inconsistent with morality is to act as if moral realism is false (option C.). If it turns out moral realism actually is false, then it doesn’t matter how we choose (options B. and D.). The purpose of the moral wager is not to maximize personal benefit or minimize personal loss like some have accused of Pascal. Instead, as I have shown, we have no choice but to wager, and the purpose of the wager is to maximize the odds that we are doing what is morally right. The wager itself is motivated by the will to act in accordance with the absolute prescriptions of moral reality, if it so happens that moral realism is true. I hope this clarifies why I think we have no choice but to wager and why I think we ought to wager in favor of Goodness. You did not address the other part of my theory where I argue that we ought to act as if Truth is the standard of morality, so I won’t expand upon that here. Thanks for engaging and please don’t hesitate to raise more objections or elaborate on your original objections if you feel I have not adequately addressed them. Thanks again.

@DanielCCaz

4 жыл бұрын

Oners82 “Sorry I wrote you such a long letter; I didn’t have time to write a short one.” -Blaise Pascal 1. Thank you for offering another thoughtful and respectful reply. This is my first time having a discussion with a fellow Wright Show viewer, and you have not disappointed my expectation of a high caliber of intellect among members of this community. In reading your latest response I am pleased to see that we agree on the fundamental epistemic view that we can’t know whether moral realism is true or not. Gladly, I think I now have a better understanding of the nature of our disagreement. Please forgive me my lack of brevity, but the topic we are discussing is complex, and one could fill a library with the innumerable books and volumes dealing with moral philosophy. So I think a few paragraphs is relatively short for this topic, though perhaps it is lengthy compared to the average KZread comment. Let me assure you that I do not wish to artificially extend the length of my comments beyond what I think is sufficient for expressing my views. I simply do not want to sacrifice clarity for conciseness. 2. We are all here just poking around in the dark, trying to understand as best we can this mysterious conscious existence into which we have been thrown. If we are lucky maybe once in a while we can stumble upon a bit of truth. But let’s not pretend the truth is obvious or that finding it comes easy. It is difficult, and if recognizing the truth is difficult and rare, then successfully communicating it to another person is nothing short of miraculous. Each of us with our own idiolect, trying to translate, like trying to navigate without a map or decipher a code without the key. We must take a leap of faith and hope there is enough mutual intelligibility on which to build a new semantic structure and corresponding conceptual schema that we can share. 3. I begin the present response by pointing out the difficulty of communicating, especially in philosophy, because I think one of the sources of our disagreement is that, at times, we have misinterpreted one another’s meanings. That’s not to say our debate is wholly semantic, but rather, we have only just begun to understand each other’s respective positions, a task which must be done prior to determining the nature and degree of our substantive dispute. 4. Beyond the apparent miscommunication, I think we have a two genuine disagreements. First, I think we disagree about what kind of intentions or motivations are required for actions to be considered moral. Secondly, I don’t think we agree about what are the logical and ethical implications of moral realism being false. I reject the notion of “subjective morality” as untenable, and I believe hypothetical imperatives can not qualify as moral imperatives without an objective moral reality. Therefore, I will address these two points of dispute below, but first I will attempt once again to clarify my meaning when I say we ought to wager on the truth of moral realism. 5. Throughout both of your responses you have repeatedly suggested that acting based on the moral wager, as I present it, cannot itself be a moral action, but is rather an amoral act because, according to your interpretation, I am arguing it should be done not for the sake of the moral act itself but instead for the sake of personal gain. I contend that this is a gross misunderstanding of my stated position. Your first response wholly consisted of this very critique. You say, “To do the right thing based upon a wager rather than because it is the right thing to do is itself an amoral stance.” I find this statement interesting because, as I explained, I think it makes for a better objection to Pascal’s Wager than it does to the Moral Wager I have proposed. 6. In response to this objection, I sought to clarify the differences between the wager I am proposing and the one Pascal proposed to show that while Pascal might be accused of wagering for selfish motives and personal gain, the motivation of the moral wager, on the other hand, is to maximize the odds of acting consistently with morality. In fact, in my reply I explicitly say, “The purpose of the moral wager is not to maximize personal benefit or minimize moral loss.... Instead...the purpose of the wager is to maximize the odds that we are doing what is morally right. The wager itself is motivated by the will to act in accordance with the absolute prescriptions of moral reality...” 7. Nevertheless, in your second response, you triple down on your characterization of the moral wager as amoral and self-interested. You say, “to refrain [from murdering, raping, or torturing someone] based upon potential self-interest garnered from a wager is not a moral position.” You go on to say, “It is not having to pick an option that I take issue with but rather the fact that you motivated your choice by self-interest rather than moral concerns.” And finally you quote my explicit denial that the moral wager is motivated by personal benefit, then you respond by saying, “Okay, but that is how you presented the argument in your OP.” 8. There are two reasons why the statements made by you in the last three quotes I’ve cited in bullet point 7 are unfair. First, all three of these quotes are from your latest response, that is, after I had already clarified and explicitly denied that the wager is motivated by personal benefit. Why do you continue to mischaracterize my position if in the third quote you are acknowledging my clarification. The only explanation I can think of for this discrepancy is that you read and replied to each paragraph before reading my response in its entirety. 9. The second reason why I think your statements in these quotes are unfair is that in the third quote where you acknowledge my clarification, you claim that, nevertheless, my argument as it was presented in the OP argues in favor of wagering for the sake of personal benefit. However, if you read through the OP, you will find that I don’t ever say that we ought to be motivated by self-interest or personal benefit. In fact, I think a thorough and careful reading of the OP reveals plenty of contextual indications that such selfish motivations are not what I’m advocating at all. In the second paragraph of the OP I say, “...if we don’t act as if there are moral realities then we risk failing to do what we ought to do.” Here, I’m not saying we are risking the loss of personal benefits. On the contrary, I’m showing that my motivation is to avoid being immoral, i.e., “failing to do what we ought to do.” In paragraph three I say, “Speaking truth, speaking honestly, and acting honorably can sometimes lead to pain and suffering, and such acts might be worthwhile in themselves, not just because they help to avoid even greater pains.” Again, this statement is another strong context clue that I’m not advocating some kind of selfish egoistic amoralism, but indeed, I’m advocating the very opposite. In the last paragraph I explicitly say, “I want to do what is right.” And you interpret all this as having self-interested motives? 10. There is one statement I made in the OP that, in isolation, might be prone to misinterpretation, but, in context, I think is fairly clear. That is when I say in the second paragraph, “No risk of moral loss, only possibility of moral gain.” Admittedly, the use of the words “loss” and “gain” can be misleading here. But I’m specifically talking about moral loss and moral gain. I’m not sure how these concepts can be interpreted as loss and gain of personal rewards, especially if you read them in the context of the paragraph that they are concluding and essentially summarizing. Here, risking “moral loss” is a shorter way of saying, “risk failing to do what we ought to do,” and “moral gain” means increasing the odds that we are acting as we ought to act; i.e., morally. 11. Obviously I don’t feel that you have given my statements a very generous interpretation, but again it is often quite difficult (if not impossible, re: Wittgenstein) to successfully communicate such abstract and esoteric philosophical ideas. As I’ve noted, in the end you do seem to acknowledge and accept my clarification, and it appears that we can say that we agree on the principle that in order for an act to qualify as moral it must be motivated by the desire to do what is right for its own sake, not for any potential reward or fear of punishment. Yet somehow we still seem to have a major disagreement in this area.

@DanielCCaz

4 жыл бұрын

12. While trying to figure out how my argument could have been so misinterpreted, I stumbled upon an important distinction that had never occurred to me before. That is, there are at least two ways to formulate the principle that we ought to act morally and do what is right for the sake of doing what is right. One way to formulate that principle is the way I have always understood it: that we ought to want to take actions that are morally right whatever those actions happen to be, regardless of what those actions happen to be. According to this formulation, the desire to do what is morally right is logically prior to and independent of any knowledge regarding which concrete specific actions actually are the morally right ones. It is a desire to do “what is morally right” for the sake of doing “what is morally right” in the abstract sense of that phrase. 13. The other formulation of the principle that we ought to do what is morally right for its own sake is: that we ought to want to do the specific actions that happen to be morally right. According to this formulation, the desire to do the concrete specific actions is logically prior to and independent of any knowledge that those specific actions happen to be the morally right ones. It is a desire to do the concrete specific actions for their own sake, not because they are morally right. In this case, it seems one’s desire merely happens by chance to correspond to what is morally right. I’m starting to think that this formulation is how you understand the principle. 14. So when I say that I want to do what is morally right for the sake of doing what is morally right, I’m using the first formulation as described in point 12. I’m saying I want to do what is right, whatever that happens to be. I’m not claiming to want to do any action in particular, for I’m not claiming to know which particular actions are the ones that are morally right, at least not at the outset. Maybe working hard to build wealth to help feed, clothe, and shelter the poor is the morally right action. Maybe living a life of poverty and solitary contemplation is the morally right action. I can’t say that I want to do one or the other until I’ve subsequently determined which is the morally right one. This is what I understand as wanting to do what is morally right for its own sake. 15. It appears to me that when you say you want to do what is morally right for its own sake you’re using the second formulation as described in point 13. You say, “I don’t refrain from raping because I fear that moral realism is true and that I would be morally compromised, but rather that I care about other people and would never impose that on a fellow human being.” And earlier in your response you say, “I wouldn’t refrain from these acts based upon the wager that maybe realism is true, I would refrain because I care about other people regardless of whether or not realism is true.” I think it’s fair to characterize these statements as exemplifying the second formulation of the principle as described above. 16. The distinction between the two formulations of the principle that we ought to do what is morally right for its own sake is quite subtle and not that easy to immediately grasp, so allow me to further illustrate with an analogy. Imagine two individuals going grocery shopping. One of the individuals (Jane) selects her food items based on how healthy they are. The other individual (John) selects his food items based on his cravings and how much he will enjoy consuming them. As it turns out, they both bought fresh fruit and vegetables, whole grains, and lean protein sources. Now Jane didn’t always eat healthy foods. She didn’t really know which foods were healthy. First, she made a conscious decision to eat healthier foods, then she did some research, and then, based on the available information of what seemed to be healthy, made her determination of what to buy and eat. John, on the other hand, was raised on these food items, so to him they are comfort foods that he often craves and reminds him of his wonderful mother. The question I pose is, who is eating healthy food for the sake of eating healthy food, Jane or John? It can be argued that they both are, just in two different ways. Jane can barely stomach her brown rice and steamed vegetables, but she chokes it down nonetheless, whereas John chows it down with great delight and couldn’t care less about if it is healthy or not. 17. If you’re following the above analogy, then you see that “eating healthy foods” corresponds to “acting morally,” and Jane represents the first formulation as described in point 12, whereas John represents the second formulation as described in point 13. I think it’s fair to say that Jane is the one who is trying to be healthy, although she doesn’t desire or enjoy the particular means to that end. John, however, is not trying to be healthy, but he does in fact enjoy healthy foods for their own sake. But isn’t John more likely to smoke cigarettes and drink too much alcohol?

@DanielCCaz

4 жыл бұрын

18. With the above illustration I hope the subtle distinction between the two formulations of the principle that we ought to do what is right for its own sake is now more intelligible. Perhaps the analogy was unnecessary, but I’ve included it anyway. Of the two formulations, there are reasons why I think the first formulation is ethically preferable. The first formulation is preferable because it is a categorical imperative that is universally applicable, whereas the second formulation is derived arbitrarily and works only in cases where one’s desires and values by chance correspond to what is truly moral. For example, both Jane and John eat healthy foods, but they have different motivating principles. But anyone who adopts Jane’s principle will eat healthy foods regardless of their cravings, whereas someone who adopts John’s principle (eat what you crave) will only eat healthy if on the off chance their cravings line up with what are healthy foods. Another way of looking at it is to consider the fact that John could adopt Jane’s principle and continue to eat healthy foods, whereas Jane could not adopt John’s principle without resorting to binge eating Oreos all day. So does John really have a good principle for healthy eating or is he just lucky to have healthy cravings? 19. Likewise, this line of reasoning can be adapted to the two formulations of the moral principle. Anyone who adopts the first formulation, the one that I endorse, will pursue moral actions, regardless of their intuitions and natural inclinations. Whereas, anyone who adopts the second formulation, the one you seem to endorse, will only pursue moral actions if their intuitions and natural inclinations by chance happen to line up with the absolute prescriptions of moral reality. 20. I think the fact that the first formulation is categorical and universally applicable, as has been shown, makes it far superior to the second formulation. And the fact that the second formulation only works for those who by pure chance have subjective values that happen to align with objective moral truths makes it wholly untenable. And I doubt you will attempt to defend your position by disputing the lack of universality and lack of moral objectivity of your position. Instead you have embraced these aspects of your position. You argue in favor of an ethical theory based purely on hypothetical imperatives applied to purely subjective values. In your latest response you say, “Even if moral realism is false, I would still subjectively think that it is immoral to murder or rape or torture, because I care about other people.” 21. You go on to argue against my claim that all acts would be amoral if moral realism is false. You say my mistake here is that I’ve “ignored hypothetical imperatives.” You continue by giving an example of how a hypothetical imperative can be applied to subjective values to somehow create objective moral truths. You say, “For example if we wish to live in a happy, flourishing, and cooperative society, then it is objectively true that we ought not go out raping, murdering, stealing, and torturing as these acts are detrimental to our goals.” Unfortunately, the logic of this argument as presented is unsound. From, P1 We wish to live in a happy, etc. society. and P2 Raping, etc. is detrimental to achieving a happy, etc. society. It does NOT follow that C Therefore, we ought not to go out raping, etc. In order to fix it and make it a sound argument we must give an additional premise. The new argument is now, P1 We wish to live in a happy, etc. society. P2 We ought to get what we wish. (This is the added premise.) P3 Raping, etc. is detrimental to achieving a happy, etc. society. C Therefore, we ought not to go out raping, etc. Your unstated assumption, not only here but throughout, seems to be that we ought to get what we wish, that we ought to achieve our goals, that our values justify themselves, that our moral intuitions are infallible. But some wishes ought not to be granted, some goals ought not to be achieved, some values are misappropriated, and some intuitions are misleading. 22. If moral realism is false, then there is no objective moral reality, and all actions are amoral. We can’t build a moral theory on hypothetical imperatives because they can only be grounded by subjective values. In the absence of moral reality, there is no way to measure one value against its opposite. You may value human life and act accordingly, but someone else might not. Without an absolute moral reality there is no way to argue that one is better than the other. It merely becomes your preference vs. theirs. 23. In sum, the moral wager I’ve proposed is not motivated by self-interest, but rather is motivated by maximizing the the odds of acting morally and minimizing the odds of acting immorally. If moral realism is true, then we ought to act morally for the sake of acting morally even if such actions go against our intuitions and natural inclinations. If moral realism is false, then there is no truly moral way to act; there are mere subjective values for which we have no measure of validity or merit. But we don’t know whether moral realism is true or false, so in order to maximize our chances of acting morally we ought to act as if moral realism is true. We ought to wager on the existence of the Absolute Good.

@DanielCCaz

4 жыл бұрын

@Oners82 hi. I'm just now considering your latest reply. Thanks so much for reading such a long youtube comment. I think I might have to admit I may have gone a little overboard with the length for this type of format. I will respond to your last objection very soon, but first I wanted to make sure that you saw that my last comment consisted of not only two but three parts, for a total of 23 points. It's not that I think you need to respond to the last six points of part three. I just wanted to make sure you've had a chance to read them before I move on to our your most recent critique. Thanks again for your patience and your thoughtful responses. Even if we don't end up coming to a full agreement on everything, I think this discussion has been worthwhile "for its own sake."

I like the concept of a cutting edge. On one side of the edge, you are within the truth environment; on the other side of the edge you are in in the conjectural environment. The belief in God, for example, in my opiniom, is purely conjectural. I think the categorization as instinctive or learned behaviour/belief can define this cutting edge. Only instinctual behaviour can be defined to be TRUE. On the other side of the edge, you are in the conjectural/personal belief choice side.

While you can't say that will-being is better than suffering ,is a moral truth. Is it not reasonable that we drive morals from the this subjective truth. If we agree that well being is our goal, we then have objective actions that lead to that goal. In this we can be right or wrong because in striving for that objective action we are subjective and can be wrong. The word objective only works in terms of things such as 2 + 2 equals 4.

For me, life has a universal meaning that follows from movement, which could also be seen as engagement. All life moves and there's a moral realism derived from this. In the case of kicking a dog, there's two parts here: If the dog is injured, this is morally wrong because the animal has it's movement interfered with, and if the person kicking the dog does so out of a set frame of mind, like anger, this reinforces that frame of mind and so their mental movement as it were is restricted. With money, hoarding by an individual restricts both society and that individual, whereas being relatively free with the money encourages engagement. Human happiness vs suffering has no meaning. Both allow engagement, and it could be argued that suffering allows more engagement. This only works on an individual level...on a societal level, the kind of suffering that comes from retributive justice reinforces the mindset of the members of that society, revenge in this case, and restorative justice encourages engagement. It gets really interesting when the right to ownership is examined in this way. The right to put up fences and exclude, to deny others whether human or otherwise the freedom of movement, this justifies hoarding. Stewardship is morally right in this case and ownership is wrong. Retributive justice and the right to ownership go hand in hand.

@margrietoregan828

4 жыл бұрын

Project Malus. Thank you, Malus, for giving us a truly different and well substantiated point of view.

It's not always wrong to kick dogs.

@dominiks5068

2 жыл бұрын

it's always pro tanto/prima facie wrong.

Morality is relative and arbitrary depending one’s needs and desires. In times of peace things (whats moral) are one way. In war torn areas during extreme violence things are another.

@hunterdutkiewicz2993

4 жыл бұрын

Kicking dogs for fun is wrong whether a country is peaceful or violent. To say morality is situational is not to say it's arbitrary.

@ibmor7674

4 жыл бұрын

Morality is a social agreement and it changes. Slavery was considered moral.

@ibmor7674

4 жыл бұрын

Hunter Dutkiewicz some believe harming roaches or spiders or even plants are morally wrong too. Where does that line of thought end? Who’s to say whose right?

@hunterdutkiewicz2993

4 жыл бұрын

@@ibmor7674 I think harming spiders and roaches IS wrong, but regardless, it isn't a matter of "who." According to utilitarianism, well being is the goal of morality, and I adhere to that. However, I don't think it's true just because I think it; I think it's objectively true independent of human perception.

@dashrirprock

4 жыл бұрын

@@ibmor7674 And the earth was considered flat.

Morality is not instinctive, it is a learned self-preservation behaviour. A baby knows nothing about morality, but it does know that his stomach is empty and that he must cry to to get fed.

Of course morality is not only a real ‘thing’ but is eminently measurable/quantifiable/demonstrable :- Evolution is a process; all processes by their very nature are directional. ‘A process’ is a gradual/stepwise change of state brought about by the action of an agent on a subject. All processorial changes of state continue to occur while ever the agent of change operates on the subject OR the subject becomes fully changed and can change no more. [[By way of contrast ‘an event’ is a simple change of position - eg a rain event refers to rain drops in clouds positioned in the sky falling down to the ground below.]] “Evolution is is a process of adaptation and given enough time and raw materials will eventually result in a fully evolved, perfectly adapted life form, which particular fully evolved, perfectly adapted life form will be evidenced by the facts that it will be able to live - indeed thrive - anywhere at any time under any circumstances, or relocate or terra form to suit, doing so, moreover, without causing or inflicting any waste, loss or damage on either itself or anything else, animate and inanimate alike.” Given that we sapiens sapiens can live anywhere, at any time under any circumstances or relocate or terra form to suit we are of course this fully evolved, perfectly adapted life form. At least we would be if we weren’t currently also causing/inflicting fully omnicidal amounts of waste, loss and damage on both ourselves and everything we touch. The reason why the evolutionary process proceeds (inexorably) towards this ‘no waste, loss or damage’ direction is simply due to the fact that living in the absence of any waste, loss or damage is the evolutionarily fittest, most cost effective, manner in which to live. A life form which can utilise all resource aspects of its evolutionarily normal socio-ecological milieu without wasting, loosing or damaging any of these resources will have an evolutionary advantage over any life form that does. It is the evolutionary process itself which makes all waste, loss and damage wrong/bad/evil/IMMORAL ......unfit or significantly less optimally fit.... The process of adaptation (evolution) will always proceed toward the ‘no waste, loss or damage’ direction, and any sentient, cognitively self-consciously aware life form will know and understand this, and even more relevant to the subject matter of Robert’s podcast here, will have evolved a commensurate kind, number and degree of behavioural (moral) guides - instincts, sensibilities, reflexes and eventual conscious cognition of the perpetual and inexorable direction of its own evolutionary destiny, as well as the cognitive ability to recognise if and when it arrives. Interestingly - most tellingly - any life form’s position on this scala naturale can be quite easily and quite concretely/objectively ascertained. All that is required to measure it is to determine the kind and amount of ‘waste, loss and/or damage’ it causes/inflicts on either itself or its surrounds, animate and inanimate alike. Were we sapiens sapiens (!?) to return ourselves to our manifest destiny of being this Planet’s first fully evolved, perfectly adapted life form, among other strictures we would adopt a fruitarian diet as the fruiting bodies of fruiting plants are not alive so dining on fruit involves no ‘waste, loss or damage’ ......both veganism and vegetarianism involves whole plant murder .... We’d also have to recentralise our primary reproducers - our womyn folk - as with complete control over reproduction our mothers could relearn how to reproduce at exactly the carrying capacity of our evolutionarily normal socio-ecological milieu. That is to say, we’d have dismantle the patriarchy root and branch....... As Frederick Engels said in ‘The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State’ “The rise of patriarchy was the world historic defeat of woman”. Patriarchy is nothing less than one great big motherf**ck - and the term is used here quite advisedly. To reproduce above the carrying capacity of our evolutionarily normal socio-ecological milieu would be a dreadful waste as one way or another all excess would have to be culled and to reproduce below would be to leave that optimal milieu open to invasion. For any readers perspicacious enough to notice, even though it flies diametrically in the face of any present worldview, above is a truly accurate way of describing and understanding life here on Earth. I herein state and declare intellectual proprietary over the intellectual content of this comment.

Next time discuss unicorns, Bob.