Also check out my interview with JD Bauman where he argues that Christians SHOULD be effective altruists! kzread.info/dash/bejne/oqCp1qilprasqMo.htmlsi=H-YwM-vza0Kiy1Lg

I love Eric Sampson! Great thinker, great defender of moral realism. I discovered him when he debated Lance "i have no idea what moral realists are saying" Bush and was glad to see Sampson answering Bush's concerns or arguments in a charitable way. I do have a question for Eric Sampson primarily but, Jordan, feel free to respond as well. Do you think moral anti-realists that go for the "unintelligible" thesis route such as Lance Bush are doing so because they're guilty of "psychologism"? Which is the tendency to interpret events or arguments in subjective terms, or to exaggerate the relevance of psychological factors (Oxford definition). I ask this because Lance Bush is a psychologist (he got a PhD) and I noticed most, and perhaps all of his arguments stem from what people say or their psychological experiences/differences. It is almost like he is trying to answer the moral realism/anti-realism debate from a scientific background yet such matters can only be answered through philosophy and perhaps he either hasn't realized that or he has, which probably explains why he is a metaphysical quietist, since (if I remember correctly) he lashed out on the discipline of philosophy for being "dogmatic" and not caring about the empirical sciences in a Facebook post.

@DaKoopaKing

10 ай бұрын

Fwiw philosophy will only settle that question if metaethical moral intuition is a reliable belief forming mechanism, which requires empirical evidence to ascertain, unless your belief in moral realism can tolerate e.g. complete dissonance among all humans' metaethical intuitions, intuition itself not being an operationalizable psychological state that we can identify when people are in it, etc.

Hmm. Here's a couple of counterarguments. And I mean here no snark or disrespect, this is a genuine query on my part, I would be happy to be shown where my reasoning is flawed. May God grant me humility and openness to correction. Firstly, one response would be to state simply that we actually do not have any power or influence over Hell and who goes there. We did not create Hell, God did, and if God determines that an individual should go to Hell we cannot prevent that, and if God determines that an individual should not go to Hell, we cannot impose that outcome on God. It would thus be equivalent to an argument stating we need to strive with all our might to prevent WWII or to prevent the collision of the Andromeda Galaxy and the Milky Way. It is out of our control and so even if true is not a proper object of our altruistic efforts or calculations. Similarly, even if God and an eternal hell exists it is not actually in our control to alter. From there one response to say that God has endowed us with genuine influence or control on individuals' and their final destiny. Perhaps the good, in God's eyes, of genuine agency & causality on our part outweighed the evil of individuals' eternal perdition. (I think this is an intuitively absurd distortion of relative moral goods but let's run with it). Even if this were true however you still run up against God's foreknowledge and power in actualising this world. If we let a bad thing X occur we can conclude that since God actualised the world in which we allow this bad thing X to happen that there must be countervailing goods obtained through this decision which ultimately outweigh its inherent evil and make it the right outcome to occur. Applied in this case, can we not say that in as much as we "let" lots of people go to hell, that this would be merely a more indirect means of God himself "letting" many multitudes go to Hell; and since God himself has created the world with this outcome (multitudes in hell) then from a moral point of view it is not, in fact, a bad outcome. It may be a supremely, unimaginably horrific experience for any individual personally, obviously, but that would not thereby amount to a morally bad outcome imposing a duty on us to prevent. If it eventuates that an individual goes to Hell owing to a lack of initiative on our part then we must conclude God did right by letting us, in turn, let them go to Hell. It would not amount to any type of "religious catastrophe" that such people go to Hell, as it would be God's elected outcome. So if we grant that the christian God and an eternal Hell exists it would still not be true that we are morally bound to factor this into to our altruistic calculations since whether we act, or fail to act, the best outcome obtains. On the other hand though, if there is no God, then the world is not predetermined to the best moral outcomes, so our altruistic decisions truly do have an affect on whether and to what extent morally good outcomes become real in this world. There is a real cost-benefit calculation involved, in which the best outcome can indeed fail to obtain, so our decisions are important. Thus there is a fundamental difference between assessing outcomes with God in the picture and without that breaks downs the argument that Hell needs to be taken into account by effective altruists. The argument could only obtain if Hell existed independently of God's existence, or independently of God's knowledge or power to change.

I’m getting some wringing from the audio here and it’s not my headphones. Maybe you can fix that? It’s only a mild inconvenience

@TheAnalyticChristian

10 ай бұрын

Sorry about that. I tried to remove the wringing during editing but couldn’t get rid of it entirely. My microphone for that interview wasn’t very good.

An arguments against this video’s main claim, assuming the truth of theism: a) If 1 person in hell for eternity is infinite disvalue, then the solution to this problem has to be perfect (a trillion souls times infinite suffering is mathematically equivalent to a single soul times infinite suffering). One such solution is the destruction of the world. No people, no souls in hell. If this seems extreme, one just needs to realize that for every individual, non-existence is preferable to a finite life followed by an infinity in hell. However, given that there are already souls in hell, it is too late, the world had to be destroyed a long time ago. No one, effective altruists included, should worry about a problem without a solution. b) If, on the other hand, you have an argument I haven’t thought of, why a trillion souls in hell is worse than one, you should still be in favor of destroying the world. If even 0.001% of future people are unrepentant sinners, and we imagine a future of inter-galactic human expansion, there will be many, many more souls added to hell. Is anyone certain enough about the severity of this problem, and truth of the metaphysical position it assumes, to take such drastic measures? c) If destroying the world, even with the best of intentions, is itself a hell worthy sin, then we are back to having no solution to this problem. d) If, in your moral theory, people in heaven offset those in hell, then all that matters is existential risk. As long as we ensure there are billions and billions of future people, we can let them worry about getting enough into heaven to offset those in hell. That’s consistent with the longtermist claim that we will let future people ensure they have lives that are on the whole worth living, we just want to ensure they have lives, and that the worst case scenarios are not locked in. e) If you believe a sinless future is possible due to supernatural intervention (like the second coming, the messiah, or judgment day), then, again, all we can do is make sure we get there, i.e. address existential risk.

Which God, what Hell, what specific measures can we take to alleviate it? If Hell is something a God made do we want to try to mitigate it in any way? How can you do probability analysis when infinities are involved? This whole thing seems interesting but ultimately not that helpful.

@esizzle2005

10 ай бұрын

The answer to all your questions is: apply standard expected utility reasoning, just as secular effective altruists recommend. (After all, I'm just applying secular effective altruist principles here. None of these are my own recommendations.) "Which God?" "What Hell?" Answer: The one you judge to be most probable, given your evidence. Or you can hedge, giving the most resources to the mitigation of the kind of hell you find most probable, giving a little less to the one you find second most probable, etc. (Effective altruists already deal with this problem. Which existential catastrophe should I give my money to mitigate? Answer: the most probable one. Or you can hedge, giving in proportion to probability. In any case, probabilities lead the way.) "What measures can we take to alleviate it?" Answer: Listen to the traditions that tell us infinite (dis)utility lies in our future. How do they say you can avoid infinite disutility (or gain infinite utility)? They say you need to have a religious conversion to their religion. So, you send missionaries to people and try to convert them--or whatever means are most effective at converting people. "What if we convert someone to the wrong religion?" Start with atheists. They have no religion and so, on most religious views, are in the most danger of experiencing religious catastrophe. For people who are already religious believers, you should try to convert them to the highest probability religion (since that's how to promote the highest expected utility, as secular effective altruists say we should). KEEP IN MIND THESE ARE NOT MY RECOMMENDATIONS. I'M SAYING THESE ARE THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT FOLLOW FROM SECULAR EFFECTIVE ALTRUIST PRINCIPLES. I'M SAYING THIS IS WHAT THEIR PRINCIPLES COMMIT THEM TO. "If Hell is something a God made do we want to try to mitigate it anyway?" Answer: Yes. Hell is super bad for the person who experiences it--no matter which conception of hell you have. "How can you do probability analysis when infinities are involved?" Answer: Infinities are involved in the utilities, not the probabilities. But, again, if you have two outcomes, each of which is infinitely good, but you can only go with one, you go with the higher probability option. And if you have to try to prevent one of two infinitely bad possible outcomes (but you can only choose one) you try to prevent the highest probability one. But you don't have to choose. You can give/mitigate in proportion to probability. Again, probabilities lead the way.

@otakurocklee

10 ай бұрын

@@esizzle2005 Yes, and anyone who believes in god will end up in hell and suffer for eternity. We should encourage people to disbelieve in god.

@otakurocklee

10 ай бұрын

@@esizzle2005 "Start with atheists. They have no religion and so, on most religious views, are in the most danger of experiencing religious catastrophe. For people who are already religious believers, you should try to convert them to the highest probability religion (since that's how to promote the highest expected utility, as secular effective altruists say we should)." Completely wrong. On my religious view atheists end up in eternal bliss and believers end up with eternal suffering. There are infinite arbitrary belief systems where believers end up in hell and disbelievers end up in heaven. How exactly are you calculating probabilities? There is absolutely no reason to believe atheists are more in danger of ending up in hell.

Imagine believing a God that creates a world with infinite disvalue in it 😅

@TheAnalyticChristian

10 ай бұрын

What probability do you assign to the possibility that a populated everlasting hell exists? Is the probability of a religious catastrophe on a par with the types of existential catastrophes effective altruists are concerned with? If so, Eric’s argument works.

"The probability that there is a hell is one in 10,000" Huh? On what basis are you making this calculation? "Lots of sharp people have thought about something etc..." No, this is ridiculous. There could be multiple reasons that otherwise smart people keep making the same mistakes. I'd say this is the case for theism. Lots of the "smartest" people advocated for slavery (Plato, Aristotle) and racial supremacy. Is that an argument that slavery and racial supremacy are good things? This is a silly way to think. You might as well say that the largest proportion of people are Christian, and therefore Christianity is probably true. It's ridiculous. And you're saying all those philosophers making the claim for theism are also making the claim for "hell" ? Arguments for "theism" are not arguments for the existence of "heaven" or "hell". This is disingenuous. The probability that there is a "hell" is infintesimal. It is not one out of a 1000 or one out of a million. It is infintesimal. It is one out of infinity. There is no comparison to the other examples you stated. Out of all the possible belief systems (which are infinite) Christianity is one. There's no reason to take it seriously. My religion specifically states that god believers will suffer for eternity, and disbelievers in god will live in bliss for eternity. It is just as probable as Christianity. So I see no effective altruistic argument for worrying about any specific belief system.

One person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens. The video's argument leads to the absurd conclusion that, on theism, it may be better to spend money burning candles to glorify God than to prevent suffering from malaria in Africa. Because the conclusion is absurd, one or more of the premises must be false. In other words, if theism entails that effective altrusism as conceived under humanist principles is bad, then theism is false.

@TheAnalyticChristian

10 ай бұрын

Eric’s argument is a constructive dilemma, not modus ponens or modus tollens. Eric’s argument goes like this. 1. Either longtermism is true or it is not the case that longtermism is true. (Longtermism is the view that positively influencing the long term future is the key moral priority of our time.) 2. If longtermism is true, then effective altruists should treat religious catastrophe on a par with existential catastrophe. (In this case treating them on a par would be devoting lots of resources to both) 3. If it is not the case that longtermism is true, then effective altruists should treat religious catastrophe on a par with existential catastrophe. (In this case treating them on a par would be devoting very little if any resources to both)h So, 4. Effective altruists should treat religious catastrophe on a par with existential catastrophe. Now that Eric’s actual argument is on the table, where do you think it goes wrong? Which premise? 1, 2, or 3?

@kensey007

10 ай бұрын

@@TheAnalyticChristian I reject two and three. It just isn't possible to mitigate religious catastrophe because we have no basis for knowing whether such catastrophe is real rather than imagined and, if real, how it could possibly be mitigated. Now, if an effective altrusist already accepted religion, then I agree with the argument for that altruist. This is why you see religious people spending money on mission trips rather than spending money on malaria nets.

@theautodidacticlayman

10 ай бұрын

@@kensey007What do you think a mission trip is? 😆 If it was a vacation, we’d just call it a vacation. But it’s called a mission because we go out there and do stuff for people, or send money to people who already are doing stuff for people. 😜

@kensey007

10 ай бұрын

@@theautodidacticlayman Sure. Mission trips often involve both humanitarian and religious ends. If you are certain in the religious afterlife, the only reason to bother with the humanitarian ends would be if it enhances religious ends which are infinitely more important. And, it seems that the reality often reflects an alignment of that value.